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Abstract 
Used by states to investigate patterns of past human rights abuses, truth commissions have 
garnered considerable consensus for their value in addressing past harms and repression. Many 
still tout the South African model as a success story of truth commissions. This dissertation 
provides answers to two questions. First, what role, if any, did earlier investigative institutions 
play in shaping South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)? The dissertation 
argues that the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, 
also known as the Goldstone Commission, played a central role in transforming information-
gathering measures in South Africa. Second, what were the contributing institutional 
developments of the Goldstone Commission, and how do we characterize these contributions? 
The dissertation argues that the Goldstone Commission’s founding conditions, its institutional 
design, and its impartial investigations, created the conditions for the process of gradual 
institutional change in the Goldstone Commission as a commission of inquiry. The 
Commission’s credibility helped to strengthen information gathering during the negotiating 
period in South Africa and facilitated further change in information-gathering capacities, 
including the incorporation of witness protection. The dissertation also traces gradual 
institutional change in the use of amnesty to situate its eventual implementation as an 
information-gathering mechanism by the TRC. The South African TRC benefited from the 
operation of the Goldstone Commission in terms of investigative credibility and institutional 
experience. This dissertation makes the case that to better understand truth commission design 
and operation it is necessary to take institutional histories into account. 
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Summary for a Lay Audience 
This dissertation offers an answer to the question: What role, if any, did earlier investigative 
institutions play in shaping South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)? I 
argue that the South African TRC was shaped, in part, by an investigative institution, the 
Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation (also known 
as the Goldstone Commission), that preceded it. I demonstrate the impact of the Goldstone 
Commission, examining its contributing institutional developments, and how we characterize 
these contributions. 
Three components of information gathering are studied in detail to explore how the 
Goldstone Commission helped to undo legacies of repression and, through its operation, laid 
a strong foundation for the operation of the TRC. These three institutions are the commission 
of inquiry, witness protection, and amnesty. Each of these institutions had a history of unjust 
use under the Apartheid regime.  
The dissertation argues that the Goldstone Commission’s founding conditions, its 
institutional design, and its impartial investigations, created the conditions for the process of 
gradual institutional change, in the Goldstone Commission as a commission of inquiry. The 
Commission’s credibility helped to strengthen information gathering during the negotiating 
period in South Africa and facilitated further change in information-gathering capacities, 
including the incorporation of witness protection. The dissertation also traces gradual 
institutional change in the use of amnesty to situate its eventual implementation as an 
information-gathering mechanism by the TRC. 
This dissertation makes the case that to understand truth commission design and operation, it 
is necessary to take institutional histories into account. Although truth commissions are 
established to address past harms and injustice, they may rely on institutions that were 
implicated in past abuse. Using the case of South Africa, this project offers insight into how 
existing institutions can be adjusted or re-tooled in order to serve ends of truth-seeking. This 
is significant not only for countries establishing truth commissions after periods of conflict 
and authoritarian repression but also for countries engaging with questions of justice and 
redress in established democracies.  
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
This project explores how truth-seeking is institutionalized in the aftermath of repression, 
conflict, and abuse. The institutionalization of truth-seeking is particularly relevant in 
circumstances in which governments purposefully keep information hidden from the public 
or fail to acknowledge injustice by keeping information in the shadows. Offering an 
engagement with, and contribution to, the discussion on information gathering during 
transitions, this dissertation interrogates the effects of state-led commissions of inquiry on 
later truth-seeking processes in South Africa. 
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established in 
1995. Implemented after the country’s first democratic election in 1994,  the TRC was 
devised as the vehicle through which South Africa and South Africans would address and 
redress the country’s violent past. Violence and repression were pervasive in Apartheid 
South Africa. In response to the regime’s oppression, institutionalized racism, and 
restrictive discriminatory policies, opposition groups engaged in resistance against the 
regime. Throughout the 1980s, the Apartheid regime conducted counter-revolutionary 
warfare against the African National Congress (ANC) and other groups acting in 
opposition to Apartheid. But by the 1990s the country was in a “stalemate” with the ANC 
recognizing it was unable to win its struggle against the state and the regime conceding it 
too costly to continue using force.1  
                                                
1 On the situation as a stalemate see Timothy D. Sisk, "The Violence-Negotiation Nexus: South Africa in 
Transition and the Politics of Uncertainty," Negotiation Journal 9, no. 1 (1993): 78-79.  See also, Steven 
Friedman, ed., The Long Journey: South Africa’s Quest for a Negotiated Settlement (Johannesburg: Raven 
Press, 1993), 10-13.  
 
 
2 
In February 1990, President F.W. de Klerk initiated a number of reforms in a 
landmark speech. This address formally laid the foundation for negotiations towards an 
inclusive democracy.2 Reforms outlined in this speech included provisions to release 
Nelson Mandela from prison, unbanning opposition groups including the ANC, and a 
promise to repeal Apartheid legislation.3 Constitutional negotiations would not begin for 
almost two years, when in December 1991, the Government and the ANC, among others, 
agreed to a negotiating process, known as the Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
(CODESA).4 This was just the beginning of a long process of negotiation, which 
culminated with the 1993 Multi-Party Negotiation Process. Through this process, the 
parties established an agreement to transitional administration and an Interim Constitution 
in 1993.5 The intervening years saw substantial numbers of fatalities from political 
violence. Between February 1990 and April 1994, approximately 15,000 people died as a 
result of political violence.6  
In late 1991, the negotiating parties in South Africa agreed to the establishment of 
a commission of inquiry to investigate ongoing violence as a component of the National 
                                                
2 Some negotiations had begun to some degree before the 1990 speech. For an overview on this history see 
Allister Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country (Sandton: Struik Book Distributors, 1994). 
3 "F.W. de Klerk’s Speech at the Opening of Parliament 2 February 1990," O’Malley Archives: The Heart 
of Hope, accessed April 13, 2020, 
https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02103/05lv02104/06lv02105.h
tm. 
4 Friedman, The Long Journey, 14-15.  
5 John Hatchard and Peter Slinn, "The Path Towards a New Order in South Africa," International Relations 
12, no. 4 (1995): 8-9. 
6 Adrian Guelke, "Interpretations of Political Violence During South Africa’s Transition," Politikon 27, no. 
2 (2000): 241. 
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Peace Accord.7 For three years, until the democratic election in 1994, the Commission of 
Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation conducted over forty 
investigations into ongoing violence and made recommendations on measures to avert 
future violence.8 This Commission, also known as the Goldstone Commission, played an 
important role in the transition.9 It uncovered information about the causes of violence and 
made recommendations to prevent ongoing violence.  
In 1995, in the year after the first democratic election, the Government of national 
unity in South Africa passed legislation for the now famous TRC.10 The South African 
TRC, established by the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, was 
mandated to investigation gross violations of human rights between 1960 and 1994.11 It 
was a comprehensive exercise in truth-seeking in order to establish a record about past 
violations, “conceived as part of the bridge-building process designed to help lead the 
nation away from a deeply divided past to a future founded on the recognition of human 
rights and democracy.”12 The South African TRC’s innovations in public hearings for 
                                                
7 "South Africa, National Peace Accord, 1991," here after National Peace Accord, 1991. A copy of the 
accord can be accessed at United Nations Peace Maker, last accessed February 3, 2020, 
https://peacemaker.un.org/southafrica-national-peace-accord91. See also, Timothy D. Sisk, "South Africa’s 
National Peace Accord," Peace & Change 19, no. 1 (January 1994): 50-70. 
8 Richard J. Goldstone, For Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Prosecutor (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 2000), 25-58. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume 
One, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (29 October 1998), Chapter 13, 508. 
9 The names of the Commission, “Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and 
Intimidation” and “Goldstone Commission” are used interchangeably in this analysis so that the 
significance of its establishment as a commission of inquiry and the role of the Commission’s leadership 
remain equally present for the reader. 
10 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Act 95-
34 (1995). 
11 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume One, Chapter 2, 25, 29. 
12 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume One, Chapter 4, 48. 
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testimony and its unique amnesty process captured attention at home and abroad. It helped 
bring to light information about the past regime’s deeds and formally acknowledged 
information that was already known. This dissertation interrogates the relationship between 
the Goldstone Commission and the TRC. 
1.1 Research Questions and Argument Overview  
This dissertation answers two questions. First, what role, if any, did earlier investigative 
institutions play in shaping South Africa’s TRC? The dissertation argues that the 
Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation played a 
central role in transforming truth-seeking measures in South Africa, particularly in relation 
to the investigative institutions that preceded it. The Goldstone Commission’s design and 
investigation credibility facilitated information gathering that distinguished it from earlier 
commissions of inquiry. In addition, this dissertation demonstrates that institutional 
elements that supported the Goldstone Commission’s information-gathering capabilities 
were later taken up by the TRC. 
The second question asks: what were the Goldstone Commission’s contributing 
institutional developments, and how do we characterize these contributions? I argue that 
the Goldstone Commission contributed to the institutionalization of truth-seeking by 
undertaking gradual institutional change, and in so doing, it laid a positive foundation for 
the TRC. Characterized as a site for the processes of institutional conversion, as outlined 
by Mahoney and Thelen, the institutional developments of the Goldstone Commission 
provide an example in which institutions that have been entrenched by a repressive regime 
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were adjusted to serve different aims, in this case truth-seeking.13 These specific modalities 
were chosen because they are directly related to the project of information gathering. They 
facilitate the uncovering of information through testimony and investigation. 
First, the Goldstone Commission addressed a credibility crisis within the institution 
of the commission of inquiry. As a product of the transition, the Goldstone Commission 
was more effectively designed than its predecessors, and both the Government and the 
leadership of the Commission capitalized on the potential to make changes to the 
commission’s process. The opening of the political transition saw the establishment of new 
rules by the regime soft-liners. The Goldstone Commission is an example of institutional 
redeployment under these conditions. Instilled in the language guiding the Commission 
was an element of consensus and a separate legitimation given its establishment as part of 
the 1991 National Peace Accord. Its implementation as part of the peace agreement and the 
political environment shaped the Commission’s potential to alter the status-quo. The 
Government granted many of the requests made by the Goldstone Commission with 
regards to adjustments in the structure of investigations, increased resources to conduct 
investigations, protection for witnesses, and the publication of the reports.14  
Second, the Goldstone Commission responded to institutional limitations and 
identified institutional measures that were valuable for information gathering and which 
were eventually used by the TRC. The Goldstone Commission developed witness 
                                                
13 James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," in Explaining 
Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, ed. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1-37. 
14 For example, on the immediate publication of reports see, Richard J. Goldstone, "Quality Control in 
International Fact-Finding Outside Criminal Justice for Core International Crimes," in Quality Control in 
Fact-Finding, ed. Morten Bergsmo (Florence: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2013), 42-43. See also, 
Goldstone, For Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Prosecutor, 28-30. 
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protection measures during its operation, recognizing the limitations in relying on the 
inadequate existing state witness protection measures. As is demonstrated in Chapters 7 
and 8, these changes were possible because of the design of the Commission itself. A 
process of conversion is evident in the commission of inquiry and its adaptation of witness 
protection. After it was deployed within the Goldstone Commission and its value 
demonstrated, the use of witness protection continued within the TRC. Although South 
Africa’s was the first truth commission to include witness protection measures, taking its 
antecedents into account contextualizes this development in South Africa’s institutional 
history. 
Third, the final component, the truth commission’s ability to grant amnesty, is 
widely cited as a successful innovation of the South African TRC, and has garnered 
significant attention. However, assessing the amnesty process in light of previous 
indemnity processes and through the negotiating period demonstrates the manner in which 
amnesty was differently justified and deployed during Apartheid, in the transitional period, 
and in efforts at redress. The Goldstone Commission’s consideration of amnesty-in-
exchange-for-information helped to illustrate the potential value in changing the 
justification of amnesty. The experience of the institution of amnesty during the tenure of 
the Goldstone Commission highlights the significance of the environment for changing 
institutional deployment. Critically, the deliberations about amnesty by the Goldstone 
Commission also suggested the necessity of further truth-seeking. 
Tracing earlier investigations in addition to the TRC facilitates an in-depth 
investigation into information-gathering practices. Information gathering and/or fact-
finding are considered key justifications for the implementation of a truth commission. It 
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is therefore important to clarify how the truth-seeking practices were institutionalized and 
adjusted over time. The dissertation is making the case that institutional histories may offer 
important insights into information-gathering processes in transition. The Goldstone 
Commission played an important role in the transitional period and taking into account this 
influence deepens an understanding about the development of truth-seeking and 
information-gathering practices in South Africa.   
Like Sitze, who argues that the TRC can only be understood by taking into account 
colonial applications of indemnity and the colonial use of the commission of inquiry,15 this 
dissertation takes as a starting point that the truth commission in South Africa ought to be 
examined in relation to institutional elements and frameworks that came before. Sitze 
positions these elements genealogically to reframe the TRC not as “novel”,16 but as 
“reiterating the forms of colonial sovereignty and governmentality whose excesses the 
TRC also exposed and criticized.”17 He persuasively unpacks the inherent tensions in using 
an apparatus that entrenched or maintained colonial powers through indemnity practices 
and commissions of inquiry.18 This is a valuable interpretation of the structure of the TRC. 
Sitze’s skepticism of the transitional justice project provokes questions about the 
underlying assumptions associated with truth commission processes as a potentially 
unquestioned postcolonial endeavour.19  
                                                
15 Adam Sitze, The Impossible Machine: A Genealogy of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (Ann Arbour: The University of Michigan Press, 2013), 3-11. I owe a great deal of gratitude to 
the person who recommended Sitze’s work upon hearing about my research.  
16 Ibid., 3. 
17 Ibid., 251. 
18 Ibid., 83, 84, 98-127, 188-214.  
19  Ibid., 255.  
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Whereas Sitze’s focus is on interrogating and then repudiating the perceived 
innovation of the TRC itself, this project shifts the focus to explaining potential change 
within the institutions, building on the recognition of the institutional continuity. Sitze’s 
observations about the truth commissions genealogy can be used to approach the analysis 
of the institutionalization of truth-seeking, stretching back beyond the “transition” 
demarcated by the 1994 election. Here, though the line of argumentation breaks with the 
critical genealogy thrust of Sitze’s work, it keeps in mind the historical linkages and 
similarities in the process. Rather, it takes as foundational that truth-seeking relies on some 
facilitating institutional framework, like an investigatory commission. Further, the 
mechanisms that are developed in this regard may be shaped, in terms of transitional forces 
and institutional characteristics, by their predecessors. Yet Sitze’s work pays little attention 
to the role of the Goldstone Commission. The dissertation assesses how the Commission 
of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation countered the trends  of 
state-mandated investigations prior to the democratic election in South Africa. It frames 
this difference as a process of gradual institutional change. 
It is helpful to look outside of the boundaries of the transitional justice field to delve 
into the questions under consideration here. While repressive policies and institutions 
posed a problem for the investigation of violence in South Africa’s transitional period, the 
eventual implementation of the TRC, and its institutional innovations, can be better 
understood by taking into account institutional changes during the transitional period. This 
recognition is not intended to suggest that the repressive policies of Apartheid were re-
applied in the transition. Nor does it intend to prove the contrary. Rather, incremental 
adjustments to the familiar institutional frameworks during the negotiating period, suggests 
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that the truth-seeking measures that were eventually applied in democratic South Africa 
are rooted in the somewhat unexpected transformation of a familiar institution. 
1.2 Theoretical Framework   
This project uses an institutional approach to investigate how truth-seeking was 
institutionalized in South Africa. The theoretical framework used for this project is 
historical institutionalism, and particularly, theories of institutional continuity and change. 
Path dependence is a valuable explanatory concept in this investigation because of the 
emphasis on the importance of history and sequence in later institutional development.20 
Exploring the strength of the TRC as a result of institutional precursors requires observers 
to lengthen the time frame of analysis. In addition, path dependence helps make sense of 
the government’s use of commissions of inquiry. This type of investigatory practice was 
well-institutionalized under the Apartheid regime.  However, the institutional persistence 
associated with path dependence does not explain why the Commission of Inquiry for the 
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation was implemented in a manner so markedly 
different from its predecessors.  
Where earlier investigations into violence did little to rectify injustice, and in some 
ways perpetuated it, the Goldstone Commission remediated issues related to investigation 
credibility. This had positive longer-term impacts on the TRC. The Goldstone 
Commission’s ability to facilitate these effects resulted from the circumstances of its 
implementation and operation, in particular the negotiating period that guided the country 
                                                
20 Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," American Political 
Science Review 94, no. 2 (2000): 251-267; Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social 
Analysis (Princeton and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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to democracy.  Both the context of its emergence, and its incorporation into a negotiated 
peace agreement lent the Goldstone Commission different credibility to other 
investigations into violence that preceded it.  
This dissertation uses Thelen, and Mahoney and Thelen’s theories of gradual 
institutional change to unpack the process over time. The Commission’s establishment, and 
the implementation of new institutional modalities, can be explained as processes of 
conversion, which is understood as the deployment of the same institutional structures 
towards different ends or goals.21 In this case, institutions used for maintaining a repressive 
regime were redeployed as information-gathering institutions.  
 The theories of gradual institutional change and path dependence also shed light on 
the return to the inquiry method with the establishment of the South African TRC. Not only 
did the TRC share certain institutional similarities with the Goldstone Commission, but the 
Goldstone Commission in some ways helped prepared the groundwork for its 
establishment. Thus, the persistence of this largely familiar institution was aided by the 
operations and gradual adjustments made by the Goldstone Commission operating 
beforehand. This dissertation argues that knowledge about the TRC can be better 
understood when articulated as a process of institutional continuity and change based on 
the operating experience of the Goldstone Commission, even though the Commission of 
Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation was not established as 
purposeful precursor to the TRC.  
                                                
21 Kathleen Thelen, "How Institutions Evolve: Insights From Comparative Historical Analysis," ed. James 
Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 208-240; James 
Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," in Explaining Institutional 
Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, ed. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 1-37; Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills 
in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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1.3 Concepts 
This project uses Mahoney and Thelen’s conceptualization of institutions as “relatively 
enduring features of political and social life (rules, norms, procedures) that structure 
behavior and that cannot be changed easily or instantaneously.”22 Institutions decrease 
uncertainties by creating and structuring expectations about process and behaviour.23 The 
information-gathering and truth-seeking institutions under consideration in this project are 
the commission of inquiry, witness protection, amnesty, and truth commission. As 
institutions, commissions of inquiry, witness protection, and truth commissions structure 
procedures for investigation and processes of information gathering. Each also has 
associated rules for participation. The institution of amnesty specifies how amnesty can be 
applied, who decides on its application, and the eligibility criteria for amnesty. The focus 
of this project is how these institutions, and their comprising rules and process, endured 
and changed during the time-period under consideration. 
For the purposes of this project, it is important to draw a distinction between truth-
telling and truth-seeking measures. Although the terms are sometimes used 
interchangeably, truth-telling places the emphasis more specifically on victims’ 
testimony.24 While such measures are an integral part of many truth-seeking endeavours, 
the term directs attention away from the other investigative capacities of these tools. In this 
dissertation, truth-seeking refers to the often symbolic formal polices and processes 
                                                
22 Mahoney and Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," 4, emphasis in original. 
23 Robert E. Goodin, "Institutions and Their Design," in The Theory of Institutional Design, ed. Robert E. 
Goodin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22. 
24 See, for example, Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern, "Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice 
from the Bottom Up," Journal of Law and Society 35, no. 2 (2008): 271. 
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through which states pursue and make available information about human rights violations 
and repression. Information gathering refers to formal institutions and processes through 
which states pursue and make available information about violence and human rights 
violations. Both truth-seeking and information gathering efforts commonly take the form 
of commissions of inquiry, special investigations, and truth commissions. This project uses 
Freeman’s definition of a truth commission, defining a truth commission as: 
an ad hoc, autonomous, and victim-centered commission of inquiry set up in and 
authorized by a state for the primary purposes of (1) investigating and reporting on 
the principal causes and consequences of broad and relatively recent patterns of 
severe violence or repression that occurred in the state during determinate periods 
of abusive rule or conflict, and (2) making recommendations for their redress and 
future prevention.25   
 
The distinction between these institutional mechanisms is taken up further in Chapter 3. 
The project focuses on domestic, state-mandated truth-seeking processes: 
commissions of inquiry and truth commissions. These are distinct from what Bickford 
identifies as “unofficial truth projects”, which are carried out by non-state actors.26 
Bickford argues that these projects may be in lieu of, in preparation for, or in addition to 
“official” truth seeking-investigations.27 Their value can be linked to the type of process 
that emerges. When these projects operate instead of truth commissions, they may be the 
only source of information gathering under repressive governing structures or the chaos of 
civil war. Acting as a preparatory tool for a truth commission, they can retain and maintain 
                                                
25 Mark Freeman, Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 18. 
26 Louis Bickford, “Unofficial Truth Projects,” Human Rights Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2007): 994-1035. See 
also: Padraig McAuliffe, "Surrogacy and Resistance: Evolving Patterns in Unofficial Truth Commissions 
and Truth Projects," in The Global Impact and Legacy of Truth Commissions, ed. Jeremy Sarkin 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 269-292. 
27 Louis Bickford, "Unofficial Truth Projects," Human Rights Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2007): 1004-1005.  
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evidence and records in line with a vision toward a future truth commission. A key feature 
in all of these ‘unofficial truth projects’ is that they do not rely on the support of the state. 
In fact, the behaviour of the state might compel non-governmental organizations to initiate 
and undertake these processes.28 
 Commissions of inquiry and other domestic investigations are also different from 
investigations convened or carried out by international actors that precede truth 
commissions, generally the United Nations.29 The United Nations-sponsored 
investigations, “international commissions of inquiry” or “international fact-finding 
missions,” are defined as: 
Temporary bodies of a non-judicial nature, established either by an 
intergovernmental body  or by the Secretary-General or the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, and tasked with investigating allegations of violations of international 
human rights, international humanitarian law or international criminal law and 
making recommendations for corrective action based on their factual and legal 
findings.30  
 
International commissions of inquiry share a name with domestic investigations but require 
little, if any, institutional support from the government of the state being investigated. A 
lack of support from governments does not preclude investigations from continuing but 
does raise challenges of access.31 Since these investigations do not use institutions of the 
                                                
28 Bickford, "Unofficial Truth Projects," 1004-1005; McAuliffe, "Surrogacy and Resistance: Evolving 
Patterns in Unofficial Truth Commissions and Truth Projects," 282-286. 
29 Eric G. Berman, "The International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda): Lessons and Observations From 
the Field," American Behavioural Scientist 45, no. 4 (2001): 623; Rob Grace, "From Design to 
Implementation: The Interpretation of Fact-finding Mandates," Journal of Conflict & Security Law 20, no. 
1 (2014): 27-60. 
30 Office of the High Commissioner United Nations Human Rights, Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-
Finding Missions on International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Guidance and Practice, United 
Nations (New York and Geneva, 2015), 7, 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/CoI_Guidance_and_Practice.pdf. 
31 Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Law: Guidance and Practice, 65-65. 
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state, the locus of path dependence and gradual institutional change are differently 
embodied, putting them beyond the scope of this project. 
1.4 Chapter Outline 
Chapter two outlines the methodology for this project. It explores the value of the case 
study and identifies the utility of process-tracing to explore the comparison of institutional 
modalities explored in the dissertation. The third chapter provides an overview of the 
literature on transitional justice and truth commissions. This chapter defines a truth 
commission, situating its use in the field of transitional justice. The literature review also 
uses scholarship on commissions of inquiry to draw a distinction between truth 
commissions and commissions of inquiry. The literature illustrates a conceptualization 
challenge with these investigative processes in their institutional similarities. The project 
uses this tension as a starting point to consider the significance of this institutional 
continuity.  
The fourth chapter offers an analytical framework to articulate the relationship 
between earlier institutional investigations and later truth commission processes. The focus 
is on the potential explanations offered from a framework rooted in historical 
institutionalism’s path dependence in the context of transitional justice and the process of 
institutional change. Chapter 4 chapter situates a main contribution and argument of the 
dissertation. It argues that the operation of earlier commissions, under certain conditions, 
can engender change in what are considered usually well-entrenched institutions. 
Contextualizing truth-seeking in this light enables an account of the development of truth-
seeking in South Africa that offers additional insight into the design and operation of the 
South African TRC. 
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The fifth chapter provides an overview of the case of South Africa. This chapter 
offers background on the Apartheid system, violence, and the transitional negotiating 
period. The dissertation focuses on violence investigation and, as such, the framing for the 
case description focuses on violence under Apartheid and efforts to manage violence, 
including the National Peace Accord and the subsequent constitutional negotiations. In this 
chapter, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation 
is introduced along with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. The 
parameters for articulating the strength of South Africa’s TRC are presented in terms of 
institutional design and efficacy.  
In the sixth and seventh chapters, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of 
Public Violence and Intimidation is analyzed in depth to identify innovations in the 
application and deployment of this particular commission of inquiry. The chapter argues 
that the ability of the commission to facilitate incremental change in the legacies of 
commissions of inquiry in South Africa stemmed from the innovations in the founding Act, 
and the consensus built into the commission based on its inclusion in the National Peace 
Accord. In addition, the Goldstone Commission’s cultivation of internal credibility 
demonstrated value in the inquiry. This chapter then articulates the significance of this 
earlier institution for the later operation of the TRC in terms of credibility and the 
recognition that further investigation was warranted.  
The eighth and ninth chapters use two institutional modalities that are associated with 
information gathering to explore the impacts of the Commission of Inquiry for the 
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation on gradual institutional change and thereby 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. These two chapters explore 
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witness protection within the Goldstone Commission and amnesty. The purpose of these 
chapters is not to assess the operation of the individual institutional modalities. Rather, the 
purpose is to trace institutional continuity and change in the path dependent components 
of truth-seeking in the South African case. 
The eighth chapter demonstrates, with regards to witness protection, that the 
operation of the Goldstone Commission illuminated a challenge presented by the 
expectation that people could and would participate in these investigative processes. Over 
the period of its operation, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence 
and Intimidation built up the structures needed so that the powers granted to it could be 
used to serve the purposes of uncovering information. The design of the truth commission 
reflects some of the gradual adjustments that resulted from familiarity and experience with 
earlier information-gathering processes. 
The ninth chapter tackles the complex issue of amnesty. This chapter argues that 
indemnity/amnesty underwent a process of conversion from its initial purpose at the outset 
of negotiations and eventually for information-gathering purposes at the TRC. Although 
the processes around indemnity and amnesty preceded and succeeded the Commission of 
Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, the potential value of 
information-in-exchange-for-amnesty was articulated by the Goldstone Commission. 
These changes had significant implications for gathering information; restricting access to 
information at the beginning and then facilitating access to information at the TRC. This 
chapter identifies a deep-seated tension in the earlier investigations and TRC with regards 
to the eventual justifications for information gathering and the available means to do so.  
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The final chapter presents a concluding analysis of the implications of this research. 
This chapter identifies the main contribution of this project: articulating an institutional 
approach to truth-seeking, and identifying how earlier institutions transformed restrictive 
legacies through processes of gradual institutional change. This approach helps to 
illuminate the roots of unique institutional elements in the design of the TRC. Furthermore, 
considering the TRC and associated truth-seeking not only as a mechanism of transitional 
justice that emerged after the transition but as a project rooted in institutional histories, one 
can trace the adjustment within earlier truth-seeking efforts and between the Goldstone 
Commission and the TRC. Exploring transitional justice in light of a process of gradual 
institutional change is an innovative way to explain the implementation and operational 
design of truth commissions. The chapter then positions the findings more broadly in the 
transitional justice literature and identifies potential future avenues for research.   
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Chapter 2  
2 Methodology 
 
This project is a case study, exploring an instance of truth-seeking institutionalization in a 
political transition. The case under investigation is South Africa between 1990 and 1995. 
George and Bennett define a case as “an instance of a class of events,” and a case study as 
“a well-defined aspect of a historical episode that the investigator selects for analysis, 
rather than the event itself.”1  
The value of a single case study is its ability to interrogate, in detail, an instance of 
interest.2 The nature of the outcome of interest in this project warrants an immersive study 
to understand, in a comprehensive manner, the processes, and institutional development 
that shaped the conditions and operation of the truth commission in South Africa. In some 
ways, this fits within Gerring’s definition of a “single-outcome study,” which he defines 
as “studies that investigate a bounded unit in an attempt to elucidate a single outcome 
occurring within that unit.”3 This distinction separates case studies, which try to identify 
patterns in other cases, from a focus on a single-case itself.4 However, Gerring’s analysis 
focuses on determining causal explanations in a single-outcome.5 This dissertation project 
does not intend to make a specific causal claim about why the relationship exists, but rather 
                                                
1 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2005), 17-18. 
2  John Gerring, "What is a Case Study and What is it Good For?," The American Political Science Review 
98, no. 2 (2004): 345.  
3 John Gerring, "Single-Outcome Studies: A Methodological Primer," International Sociology 21, no. 5 
(2006): 708. 
4 Ibid., 707.  
5 Ibid., 710. 
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advances a analytic, probabilistic account of the case under investigation.6 The case under 
consideration here can be categorized as a “heuristic” case study as per George and 
Bennett’s classification.7 
There are, of course, limitations to the case study approach. Perhaps the most 
significant of these is an inability to generalize to a broader population.8 In addition, small-
n research and case studies run the risk of selection bias.9 The elements under consideration 
in this project are specific to the South African case. This is not to suggest that the 
relationship could not be similarly analyzed in other cases, but that the study presented here 
is a valuable starting point to prod how the process unfolded in this case. In future research, 
engaging in a cross-case comparison of the influence of earlier investigations will help to 
identify conducive or constraining conditions across cases. An understanding of the 
processes and institutions under investigation in this prominent case is a valuable exercise 
to identify under-considered components of truth-seeking because the focus is often on 
truth commissions themselves, rather than the influence of earlier truth-seeking policies.  
The decision to focus on the South African case for this study is warranted because 
of its centrality in the field of transitional justice. The South African case has been selected 
because it holds a position of notoriety in the transitional justice literature. It has been well-
studied, on multiple dimensions, given the popular attention it has received. In the field of 
                                                
6 Gerring distinguishes between descriptive and causal inference, see Gerring, "What is a Case Study and 
What is it Good For?," 347.  
7 See George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 75. According to 
George and Bennett, “Heuristic case studies inductively identify new variables, hypotheses, causal 
mechanisms, and causal paths.”  
8  George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 22.  
9 Barbara Geddes, "How the Cases you Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in 
Comparative Politics," Political Analysis 2 (1990). 
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transitional justice, much of the research conducted on truth commissions uses the South 
African model as an example or reference point. Similarly, in practice, the influence of the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has been widely noted.10 It 
stands out given its impact on the field and, in many ways, is considered a “model” in the 
universe of truth commissions.11  However, much of the theorizing of the South African 
case has been directed at the operation of the commission, the purpose of the commission, 
and an assessment of its influence on reconciliation.12 Less attention has been paid to the 
connection of the truth commission to past institutional developments in South Africa, and 
to their potential significance. An investigation into the roots of these elements will deepen 
the field’s understanding of this well-studied case. 
An exploration of the pre-transitional roots of transitional justice features offers 
further insight into the structure of the South African TRC. It enables an investigation into 
the component pieces of the truth commission project in South Africa, rather than taking 
for granted the ‘whole’ of the institution of the TRC. Given the propensity to model truth 
commissions after successful efforts, the past institutional influence matters for 
understanding the TRC’s operation.  
South Africa is also an interesting case for this investigation because an important 
component of information gathering emerged prior to the actual creation and 
                                                
10 For example, on Liberia see Priscilla Hayner, Negotiating Peace in Liberia: Preserving the Possibility 
for Justice, The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and The International Centre for Transitional Justice 
(2009), 17-18.  On the Kenyan case, see Ronald C. Slye, The Kenyan TJRC: An Outsider’s View from the 
Inside (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 50-51, 64-67. 
11 Robert I. Rotberg, "Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation," in Truth 
V. Justice, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 6.  
12  James L. Gibson, "The Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 
3 (2006): 409-432; Adam Sitze, The Impossible Machine: A Genealogy of South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (Ann Arbour: The University of Michigan Press, 2013), 2. 
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implementation of the truth commission. The de Klerk government envisaged and 
appointed an investigative institution with the capacity to carry out truth-seeking 
endeavours. This leads to a query about the process of institutionalizing truth-seeking prior 
to the transition and about how this process continued throughout and after the transition 
itself. An assessment of the information-gathering institutions during the transition can 
help to trace the lineage of truth-seeking institutionalization in this context.  
 
2.1 Methodological Approach 
 
The within-case analysis is conducted using process tracing. Process tracing enables both 
confirmatory analysis on necessary and sufficient conditions, and can advance causal 
explanations.13 However, the purpose of employing this tool in this project is a third option 
identified by Beach and Pedersen—outcome explanation.14 The purpose in this variant of 
process-tracing is, “not the theory-centric one of building or testing a generalizable 
theorized mechanism; instead the aim is to craft a sufficient explanation of the outcome.”15 
The purpose of this analysis is to identify under-considered influencing factors in the 
design of the TRC, and explain how the Goldstone Commission contributed to the 
institutionalization of truth seeking. 
With this approach, and with the parameters of the transitional justice universe of 
                                                
13 Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Process Tracing: from philosophical roots to best practice," in 
Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool, ed. Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 4. See also: James Mahoney, "The Logic of Process 
Tracing Tests in the Social Science," Sociological Methods & Research 41, no. 4 (2012): 57. 
14 Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013), 11-12, 18. 
15 Ibid., 11. 
 
 
22 
cases, generalizability is not the most valuable way to engage with the case. Comparisons 
with other cases can be offered, as they are in this study, where valuable linkages can be 
drawn. However, countries do not follow the same paths in transitions to democracy, from 
conflict, or in addressing other institutional injustice. They also do not face the same 
political conditions and constraints. There are sufficient similarities over time in 
transitions, that middle-range theory is a more fruitful intention in such analysis, 
recognizing, of course, the limitations in generalization and comprehensiveness therein.16 
This study contributes to a foundation for further study of these phenomena across cases 
by scholars of transitional justice.  
I used primary and secondary documentary evidence to trace the institutional 
developments. I relied heavily on primary sources collected from multiple archival sites 
during field work undertaken in South Africa over five months in 2016 and 2017. I 
analyzed approximately 2,000 pages of archival material from collections housed at Wits 
Historical Papers, the South African History Archive, the National Archives of South 
Africa, the Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory,17 Special Collections at the University of 
Cape Town Libraries, and the Parliamentary Library for the Government of South Africa.  
I began the archival process at Historical Papers at the Willian Cullen Library at 
Wits University looking for information to contextualize violence and the Goldstone 
Commission in South Africa. I started with collections like the Independent Board of 
                                                
16 Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Mechanisms, process, and international institutions," in Process Tracing: From 
Metaphor to Analytic Tool, ed. Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), 91-93; George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 8. 
17 “I acknowledge that the research assistance provided by the staff of the Nelson Mandela Centre of 
Memory does not constitute an endorsement of my work, or any views contained therein, and should not be 
construed as such. Any conclusions I have reached are my own and do not necessarily reflect the opinions 
or viewpoints of the Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory.” 
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Inquiry, press clippings from the South African Institute of Race Relations Collections, 
and the legislation in South African Government records. From here, I expanded the 
parameters to better understand the patterns in the Goldstone Commission’s operations and 
the TRC. I consulted a wide range of collections that contained information relating to, but 
not limited to: the peace process, the Multi-Party Negotiation Process, commissions of 
inquiry, the Goldstone Commission, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and 
parliamentary records related to the Goldstone Commission. Personal collections of people 
engaged in these processes, such as those of Alex Boraine at the University of Cape Town’s 
Special Collections, also contained important material about the period under investigation. 
The collections of non-governmental organizations and local organizing committees 
contained information that provided chronological accounts of the negotiations and 
transitions through publications, news clippings, and internal organizational 
documentation. I also consulted official reports from the Commission of Inquiry regarding 
the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, other commission reports, and the 
Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. 
 There are important considerations when using archival material as evidence. It is 
important to recognize that archives are created and managed by different members of 
society. As Verne Harris argues, “in any circumstances, in any country, the documentary 
record provides just a sliver of a window into the event.”18 Power and influence play an 
important role in the capacity to archive material and the perceived importance of 
information that ‘belongs’ in the archives and how archives are used. Returning to Harris 
                                                
18 Verne Harris, "The Archival Sliver: Power, Memory, and Archives in South Africa," Archival Science 
no. 2 (2002): 64. 
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again, 
if archival records reflect reality, they do so complicitly, and in a deeply fractured 
and shifting way. They do not act by themselves. They act through many conduits 
– the people who created them, the functionaries who managed them, the archivists 
who selected them for preservation and make them available for use, and the 
researchers who them in constructing accounts of the past. Far from enjoying an 
exteriority in relation to the record, all these conduits participate in the complex 
processes through the record feeds into social memory.19 
 
In South Africa, powerful forces have influenced the state material that has been available 
to be archived.20 While the TRC report has been publicized as historical record, other 
information and its access is managed tightly.21 Thus, the availability of information 
pertaining to government decisions, actions, and processes with regards to the Apartheid 
state and transition is still sometimes limited. Contemporary discussions continue to debate 
the necessity of “opening” the Apartheid archives and struggles of individuals and 
organizations to gain access to information.22 ​ Acknowledging these constraints 
necessitates recognizing the silent voices, of both perpetrators and victims, that inform and 
comprise the information available in the archives.  
As Harris points out above, the researcher also plays a role in how documents are 
used. I tried to look widely in the archival collections and to consult a cross-range of 
collections. Attempts have been made to acknowledge these absences by consulting a range 
of collections at different archival centres. I made every effort to note the order of 
                                                
19 Ibid., 65. 
20 On the destruction of records, see: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume 
One, 201-236. Verne Harris, "“They should have destroyed more”: The Destruction of Public Records by 
the South African State in the Final Years of Apartheid, 1990-1994," in Archives and Justice: A South 
African Perspective (Chicago: The Society of American Archivists, 2007). 
21 See discussions on the South African History Archive website: "The South African History Archive," 
accessed February 3, 2020, http://www.saha.org.za/index.htm. 
22 Author observation of conference proceedings, “Archives and Democracy: A colloquium of civil 
society,” The University of Witwatersrand, 24 August 2017. 
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documents in files and collections and to connect chronological points from materials 
across collections. Practical constraints prevented access to all archives across the country, 
and the ability to comb through all available collections. I recognize these limitations and 
attempted to supplement available documentary material with secondary sources and 
interview material.  
I conducted interviews in 2016 and 2017 as the project was taking shape. However, 
the project developed theoretically in a different direction, in part because of challenges to 
access information about the initial question under investigation. As such, given the 
changed focus of the project and the evolution in research design, I did not use the interview 
data to draw conclusions. While the interviews provided valuable background and 
contextual information there was not a sufficient number or breadth to empirically assess. 
Not all participants contacted to conduct an interview were willing to participate. The then-
current political environment in South Africa and the natural progression of life also 
impacted the availability of representative participants. I have relied most heavily on 
archival sources of information and public documents to draw conclusions such that other 
researchers can assess and review. However, two of the interviews conducted with the 
Chairperson of the Goldstone Commission inform some illustrations in Chapter 7.   
 I conducted nine interviews with actors involved in, or with knowledge of, the 
negotiations, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and 
Intimidation, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. I identified interviewees 
based on their expertise on the South African transition and the specific elements under 
consideration. I conducted interviews in person in Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria, and 
Ottawa. Each interview lasted between one and two hours. Participants were asked 
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questions from a framework designed beforehand. Given that the questions were open-
ended, follow up questions based on information presented in the interview were often 
based on the participant’s role and area of expertise. In order to conduct interviews, The 
University of Western Ontario Non-Medical Research Ethics Board provided approval for 
this project.23 The terms of the ethics approval were, in some ways, restrictive. For 
example, I was not permitted to use snowball sampling nor was I allowed to ask questions 
by email. This is understandable as it pertains to protecting participants. However, it did 
limit the recruitment of potential interviewees. Despite the challenges, the interviews 
provided context for the information under exploration here. I am grateful for the time 
people gave to speak with me. These conversations were a privilege. 
                                                
23 The University of Western Ontario, Non-Medical Research Ethics Board, Ethics file number #108564.   
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Chapter 3   
3 Literature Review 
 
This dissertation project focuses on one type of mechanism of transitional justice, the truth 
commission, to explore institutional continuity and change in transitional settings. This 
chapter uses literatures of transitional justice and comparative politics as the foundation for 
the discussion of institutional continuity and change in truth commissions. The next chapter 
incorporates the literature on institutionalism to position the project’s contribution to the 
literature. This chapter begins with a brief overview of the field of transitional justice 
before defining and assessing the truth commission specifically. It outlines a number of 
justifications for truth commissions and identifies, in the literature, several factors that 
influence the design of truth commission processes. Then, the next section explores the 
relationship between truth commissions and commissions of inquiry. It sets up the 
argument that truth commissions are a variant of a type of commission of inquiry, outlining 
the importance of the institutional lineage. The final section situates specifically the 
literature on the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Given its notoriety, 
it has had an important impact on the study of truth commissions themselves. 
 
3.1 Transitional Justice 
 
Transitional justice can be understood as “a set of moral, legal, and political dilemmas 
involving how best to respond to mass atrocities and other profound injustice in the wake 
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of periods of conflict and repression.”1 For many, the field is conceptualized based on the 
tools or mechanisms that have come to be associated with their use.2 These tools include: 
Trials, truth commissions, and lustration policies; victim-oriented restorative 
justice mechanisms, including reparations construction of monuments, and public 
memory projects; and mechanisms of security and peace, including amnesties and 
pardons, constitutional amendments, and institutional reform.3 
 
The field has evolved from a largely legalistic approach to justice during or after transitions 
to democracy to addressing broader components of justice for societies emerging from 
conflict and abuse.4 The field of transitional justice has developed around a shared belief 
that formally addressing past abuse creates a stronger foundation to rebuild societies and 
systems.5  
 As theorized initially, transitional justice offered the potential for countries to 
attempt “extraordinary” measures of justice; Teitel posited that justice mechanisms could 
be established that might otherwise not be possible during more stable periods.6 So the 
                                                
1 Dustin N. Sharp, Rethinking Transitional Justice for the Twenty-First Century: Beyond the End of History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 1. 
2 M. Brinton Lykes and Hugo van der Merwe, "Exploring/Expanding the Reach of Transitional Justice," 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 11 (2017): 372. Sharp, Rethinking Transitional Justice for the 
Twenty-First Century: Beyond the End of History. See also: Secretary General United Nations, The Rule of 
Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies (2004), S/2004/616, (2004), 4. 
3 Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter, Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing 
Processes, Weighing Efficacy (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), 1.  
4 Paige Arthur, "How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional 
Justice," Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009): 359; Zinaida Miller, "Effects of Invisibility: In Search 
of the ‘Economic’ in Transitional Justice," The International Journal of Transitional Justice 2 (2008); Ruti 
G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
5 Arthur, "How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice," 321-
367; Louis Bickford, “Unofficial Truth Projects,” Human Rights Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2007): 936; Pablo De 
Greiff, "Theorizing Transitional Justice," Nomos 51 (2012): 31-77; Colleen Murphy, The Conceptual 
Foundations of Transitional Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Diane F. Orentlicher, 
"‘Settling Accounts’ Revisited: Reconciling Global Norms with Local Agency," The International Journal 
of Transitional Justice 1 (2007): 10-22; Teitel, Transitional Justice. 
6 Teitel, Transitional Justice, 11-26. 
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“transitional” moment, or the “transitional” period, could facilitate a reconstruction of 
sorts. Countries in transition could demonstrate a commitment to human rights, and 
through transitional justice practices they could address and acknowledge the injustices of 
the previous regime.7  
 Once cemented, the focus of the field of transitional justice has been on what types 
of justice should be pursued in different transitional situations, and the focus has turned to 
assessing, and/or advocating for, the range of the application of transitional justice. Early 
debates framed questions of applicability in terms of what was possible, set alongside was 
determined to be morally correct.8 As the field has become more entrenched, articulations 
of the early framings have been questioned. The focus on retribution has been critiqued, 
and the field has, in many ways responded with a broader spectrum of default options.9 
Critics have voiced and attempted to rectify a ‘top-down’ approach of transitional justice, 
arguing for more focus on the victims and, perhaps more specifically, the local context of 
                                                
7 Jose Zalaquett, "Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New 
Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations," Hastings Law Journal 43 (1992): 1425-1438. 
8 See for example: Pablo De Greiff, "Trial and Punishment: Pardon and Oblivion," Philosophy & Social 
Criticism 22, no. 3 (1996): 93-111; Luc Huyse, "Justice after Transition: On the Choices Successor Elites 
Make in Dealing with the Past," Law & Social Inquiry 20, no. 1 (1995): 51-78; Martha Minow, Between 
Vengeance and Forgiveness: facing history after genocide and mass violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1998); Elin Skaar, "Truth commissions, trials - or nothing? Policy options in democratic transitions," Third 
World Quarterly 20, no. 6 (1999): 1109-1128; Paul van Zyl, "Dilemmas of Transitional Justice: The Case 
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Press, 1995). 
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of Law and Society 34, no. 4 (2007): 411-440; Jennifer J. Llewellyn and Robert Howse, "Institutions for 
Restorative Justice: The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission," The University of Toronto 
Law Journal 49, no. 3 (1999): 355-388.  
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transitional justice processes.10 Transitional justice mechanisms are frequently, almost 
automatically, assumed to be appropriate across situations of human rights violations. 
Despite the entrenchment of the idea of transitional justice internationally, the field is still 
divided on the effectiveness of transitional processes.11  
 Evaluations of transitional justice processes often take the form of case studies or 
small-n comparative analysis in order to account for the specific forces at play in particular 
settings. Many studies have focused on the operation of particular mechanisms through the 
study of single cases and comparative studies.12 Others explore whether the theorized goals 
of transitional justice, like reconciliation and recognition, are achieved through certain 
transitional justice processes.13 Large-n research exploring the utility or effectiveness of 
                                                
10 Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern, "Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the Bottom 
Up," Journal of Law and Society 35, no. 2 (2008): 265-292. 
11 Erin Daly, "Truth Skepticism: An Inquiry into The Value of Truth in Times of Transition," The 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 2 (2008): 23-41; David Mendeloff, "Truth-Seeking, Truth-
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(2004): 355-380; Olsen, Payne, and Reiter, Transitional Justice in Balance; Oskar N.T. Thoms, James Ron, 
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Journal of Transitional Justice 4, no. 20 (2010): 329-354. 
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177-199; Franklin Oduro, "Reconciling a Divided Nation through a Non-Retributive Justice Approach: 
Ghana’s National Reconciliation Initiative," The International Journal of Human Rights 9, no. 3 
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transitional justice mechanisms has focused most frequently on outputs or goals of 
transitional justice: measures of democracy and human rights,14 or deterrence.15  
 The traction that the idea of transitional justice has gained has seen transitional 
justice mechanisms implemented across a variety of cases and under different operating 
conditions. State-led transitional justice processes implemented within a country rely on 
the institutions in place to carry out their work. Even if new institutions are established, 
like truth commissions, their operation depends on other facets of governance. The extent 
of this reliance is informed by their mandate. For instance, if a truth commission is 
established with subpoena powers, other judicial institutions may be necessary to enforce 
those powers.16 Sharp points out that the historical roots of the field of transitional justice, 
heavily influenced by legal practitioners, have resulted in: 
an emphasis on a constrained yet institutionally and professionally demanding 
understanding of justice that some have argued is not consistent with the quality 
and capacity of state institutions in many postconflict countries, to say nothing of 
cultural congruence.17    
 
Sharp’s recognition of the institutional weight required to facilitate transitional justice 
raises important questions about the institutions themselves. Often, the institutional and 
governance characteristics for legitimate transitional justice institutions to operate are not 
                                                
reconciliation and the ethics of amnesty," South African Journal on Human Rights 17, no. 4 (2001): 531-
562. 
14 Olsen, Payne, and Reiter, Transitional Justice in Balance. See also, Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth 
Commissions and Transitional Societies: The Impact on Human Rights and Democracy (New York: 
Routledge, 2010). 
15 Hunjoon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink, "Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for 
Transitional Countries," International Studies Quarterly  (2010): 939-963. 
16 With regards to the South African TRC, for example, when a subpoenaed witness failed to appear, 
criminal sanctions could be brought, as was the case with former President P.W. Botha. See Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume One, Chapter 7, 197.  
17 Sharp, Rethinking Transitional Justice for the Twenty-First Century: Beyond the End of History, 12. 
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found in the places where transitional justice is most heavily advocated.18 For example, 
institutions, like the rule of law, are necessary to implement prosecutorial transitional 
justice processes, but are also expected or anticipated ‘ends’ of transitional justice.19 
Continuing in this vein, legitimate prosecutions for human rights violations depend on the 
capacity of a judicial system to do so. This illustrates somewhat of a disconnect in the 
transitional justice mechanisms advocated by the international community and that have 
been the focus of the field of transitional justice.  
One debate about how to respond to human rights violations is referred to as the 
truth versus justice debate that characterized the field of transitional justice in 1990s and 
2000s.20 The crux of the debate pertained to the type of justice to be prioritized: that 
achieved through prosecution or that achieved through investigation and truth. The field’s 
resolution of the truth versus justice debate gelled around the idea that truth commissions 
could serve as a middle ground, offering a different, but equally valuable, or 
complementary type of justice.21 Sometimes truth commissions are advocated when trials 
are not possible, and increasingly they are valued for their own contribution to justice. 
Rather than engaging in the debate about the trade-offs or complementarity in types of 
                                                
18 The institutional characteristics will be addressed further below. See Angela D. Nichols, Impact, 
Legitimacy, and Limitations of Truth Commissions (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); Jeremy Sarkin, 
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21 See for example, Alex Boraine, "Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way," in Truth V. 
Justice, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 143; 
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justice, it is important to underscore that insufficient attention has been to paid to the fact 
that a truth commission is a mechanism that requires a similarly demanding institutional 
framework to prosecutorial legal responses. While truth commissions may be politically 
possible when prosecutions are not possible, the institutional demands of truth 
commissions are still extensive. 
3.2 Defining a Truth Commission 
Definitions of truth commissions do two things. First, definitions delineate truth 
commissions from other types of investigatory bodies, whether that is commissions of 
inquiry, “unofficial truth projects”, or international investigations.22 Second, definitions 
specify the features of truth commissions that refine the universe of cases. This includes, 
for example, elements such as independence, duration, location, and focus.23 The 
importance of agreement on the definition is recognized, particularly as the number of truth 
commissions increases alongside assessments of their effectiveness.24 
 Hayner’s definition of a truth commission has anchored the debate on the definition 
in the field of transitional justice. Hayner offers the following definition: 
A truth commission (1) is focused on past, rather than ongoing, events; (2) 
investigates a pattern of events that took place over a period of time; (3) engages 
directly and broadly with the affected population, gathering information on their 
                                                
22 On unofficial truth projects see: Bickford, "Unofficial Truth Projects." See also: Padraig McAuliffe, 
"Surrogacy and Resistance: Evolving Patterns in Unofficial Truth Commissions and Truth Projects," in The 
Global Impact and Legacy of Truth Commissions, ed. Jeremy Sarkin (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2019), 269-292. 
23 Sarkin, "Redesigning the Definition a Truth Commission," 355-359.  
24 Eric Brahm, "What is a Truth Commission and Why Does it Matter?," Peace & Conflict Review 3, no. 2 
(2009): 1-14; Geoff Dancy, Hunjoon Kim, and Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, "The Turn to Truth: Trends in 
Truth Commission Experimentation," Journal of Human Rights 9, no. 1 (2010): 47; Sarkin, "Redesigning 
the Definition a Truth Commission," 351. 
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experiences; (4) is a temporary body, with the aim of concluding with a final report; 
and (5) is officially authorized or empowered by the state under review.25 
 
Criticisms of this definition highlight the conflation of procedural characteristics and the 
outcomes of truth commission process. For example, Hayner’s definition is critiqued 
because it does not specify independence.26 Others criticize the necessity of completing a 
report.27  
In other definitions, Wiebelhaus-Brahm argues that there is an over-prescription of 
certain goals, like democratic consolidation, and certain features, like public hearings 
which are not necessarily constitutive elements of truth commissions.28 A narrower 
definition is offered by Freeman:  
A truth commission is an ad hoc, autonomous, and victim-centered commission of 
inquiry set up in and authorized by a state for the primary purposes of (1) 
investigating and reporting on the principal causes and consequences of broad and 
relatively recent patterns of severe violence or repression that occurred in the state 
during determinate periods of abusive rule or conflict, and (2) making 
recommendations for their redress and future prevention.29  
 
Freeman’s definition recognizes the evolution of the idea of a truth commission from a 
commission of inquiry. It also focuses on the ‘victim-centered’ nature of a truth 
commission. The potential for a truth commission to be able to address victims’ needs rests 
                                                
25 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions 
(New York: Routledge, 2002), 11-12. 
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Experimentation," 48. 
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on moral theorizing about restoring equality and dignity.30 Each of these values seeks to 
create a space where the marginalized narratives are given voice.  
Sarkin argues that part of the challenge in the definitional debate is the recognition 
that definitions struggle to capture the characteristics of truth commissions of the past, for 
comparative analytical purposes, and the normative features of truth commissions that may 
guide their establishment in the future. He offers a distinction between these two 
dimensions, outlining a “backward-looking” and “forward-looking definition” of a truth 
commission. The “backward-looking” definition provided by Sarkin is:   
(1) a temporary investigative institution that (2) focuses on understanding past 
violence and human rights abuse and its causes, which can focus also on on-going 
events if necessary; (3) usually investigates patterns of violence that took place over 
a (usually relatively recent) period of time and the reasons for why they occurred; 
(4) ordinarily issues a final report with recommendations; (5) is officially 
authorized, empowered, or sanctioned by the State, but may be established by an 
intergovernmental organisation or United Nations where the state is unwilling or 
unable to do so.31 
 
The purpose of the backward-looking definition, according to Sarkin, is that “if a [truth 
commission] is too narrowly defined, it can exclude some institutions that should be 
classified as [truth commissions].”32 Sarkin’s backward-looking definition is sufficiently 
broad to capture most past variants. The caveats or exceptions provided in this definition 
help to unify the cases of the past that have garnered consensus as being a truth commission 
before the term came into widespread use.  
                                                
30 Kader Asmal, Louise Asmal, and Ronald Suresh Roberts, Reconciliation Through Truth (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1997); De Greiff, "Theorizing Transitional Justice," 31-77; André du Toit, "The Moral 
Foundations of the South African TRC: Truth as Acknowledgement and Justice as Recognition," in Truth 
V. Justice, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 122-
140; Murphy, The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice. 
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32 Ibid., 354.  
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Presenting these three definitions illustrates that although there is a general 
consensus on the idea of the truth commission, specific elements are still debated. Each 
definition resembles the practice of a commission of inquiry applied to human rights 
violations. Elements like gathering information and intending to create a report are usually 
also expected of commissions of inquiry. Freeman’s definition specifies the truth 
commission as a type of commission of inquiry explicitly. Freeman’s definition of a truth 
commission is used in this project because of this embeddedness, which enables an 
interrogation of the relationship between the concepts of commission of inquiry and truth 
commission. 
3.3 Why are Truth Commissions Used?  
Generally, truth commissions are supposed to uncover information about past injustices, 
or, as Rotberg puts it, “to uncover the past in order to answer questions that remain 
unanswered.”33 A broad range of intentions, goals, and expectations have been associated 
with truth commission processes. Justifications for using truth commissions during 
transitions from authoritarianism, conflict, or mass human rights violations can be 
separated into three thematic categories. First, they may be deployed as  “fact-finding” 
tools to uncover and acknowledge information about violence. Second, they are justified 
as a means to achieve justice through acknowledgement and restorative practices. A third 
explanation for their adoption centres on their being the result of political bargaining. These 
categories are not mutually exclusive; indeed, most truth commissions are envisioned as 
means to achieve justice and access information. However, it is helpful to separate out 
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some of the reasons why states may opt to implement truth commissions to more clearly 
map the perceived benefits.  
3.3.1 Information Gathering  
Truth commissions are designed to uncover and collect information about repression, 
abuse, and conflict that is either not public, or not publicly acknowledged.34 Of truth 
commissions, Crocker suggests that “their chief virtue is discerning overall patterns, 
institutional context, and, to a lesser extent, the general causes and consequences of 
atrocities.”35 Truth commissions gained recognition as effective tools to identify the nature 
of crimes and whereabouts of victims in countries that relied on purposefully secretive 
repression tactics. Teitel describes transitions in Latin America, for example, as “decades 
of military dictatorship and brutal repression, involving widespread abductions, detention, 
torture and disappearances, all carried out in the name of ‘national security’ and in absolute 
secrecy.”36 According to Teitel:  
The repression in 1970s Latin America revealed a singularly coercive state power—
to make the body disappear, making citizens vanish, rendering them desaparecidos. 
During Argentina’s military rule, more than 10,000 persons were abducted, 
detained, and tortured, vanishing without a trace. Like the secrecy of the abduction 
and detention, the victim’s ultimate disappearance is endemic to the ‘impunity 
crime.’ Every step of the military’s process—kidnapping, detention, and torture, 
culminating in murder—is denied by the disappearances.37  
 
The secretive nature of state repression propped up these types of regimes. Similarly, in the 
South African context, the ‘hidden’ mechanisms of state repression oftentimes meant that 
                                                
34 On truth and acknowledgement see du Toit, "The Moral Foundations of the South African TRC," 132-
135. 
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Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 101. 
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the perpetration of crimes and the location of victims left those close to the murdered or 
disappeared without answers. Thus, the potential ability for the new regime and the public 
to gain information about repression and violence carried out under the previous regime is 
identified as one of the benefits of choosing a truth commission in South Africa. For 
example, the South African TRC report states:  
We know now what happened to Steve Biko, to the Pebco Three, to the Cradock 
Four. We now know who ordered the Church Street bomb attack and who was 
responsible for the St James’ Church massacre. We have been able to exhume the 
remains of about fifty activists who were abducted, killed and buried secretly.38 
 
In the aftermath of such violence, truth commissions offered a useful approach for 
uncovering information. As Popkin and Roht-Arriaza outline, “while most people had at 
least some inkling that human rights violations were occurring, the nature of the violations 
themselves—especially of disappearances and killings by anonymous ‘death squads’—
entailed secrecy and deniability.”39 The goal of truth commissions convoked in these 
environments was to “compile and present a historical record of the scope, means, and 
victims of the prior human rights violations.”40 In these contexts, truth commissions offered 
an effective means to access information about atrocities while being able to maintain 
relative political stability, a theme that is considered further below. 
Truth commissions are used to gather information about the abuses specified within 
a truth commission’s mandate. Exactly how this is achieved differs across cases. Much 
                                                
38 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume One, 7. 
39 Margaret Popkin and Naomi Roht-Arriaza, "Truth as Justice: Investigatory Commissions in Latin 
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attention is focused on public hearings on truth commission processes.41 However, 
information and facts are collected and collated through other means. Information can be 
gathered through statement takers who record testimonies from individuals.42 Statement 
takers may travel to different affected communities to record testimonies.43 In addition, 
many truth commissions use investigation teams to corroborate information. These can 
function in addition to statement takers to ensure the record reflects the ‘facts’ as accurately 
as possible. In South Africa, for example, the TRC used investigation units to corroborate 
statements provided in applications for amnesty, among other investigations.44 State 
records may be available to the new regime, and these may contain information about past 
policies and tactics that have not previously been made public. However, in some cases 
like South Africa, important state records have been destroyed by the outgoing regime 
before a truth commission is ever convoked.45 Truth commissions also use existing 
                                                
41 For a  table identifying which truth commissions had public  hearings see Mark Freeman, Truth 
Commissions and Procedural Fairness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 318-325. See also, 
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research or research conducted by the commission from to contribute to the development 
of reports.46  
When operating at their best, truth commissions are valuable information gathering 
and disseminating institutions. Compiling and releasing findings from proceedings enables 
the period under investigation to be contextualized within a narrative that can work to 
locate the voices and experiences of the oppressed and dislodge a discourse of oppression. 
What is significant in these normative representations is the importance placed on the 
collection and compilation of testimonies in the outputs of truth commission processes. 
Within these collections emerge debates on the validity and malleability of the framing 
exercised by truth commissions. 
The value of information in times of transition is linked to several overarching ideas 
including justice and acknowledgement. Foundationally, though, the idea of truth itself can 
be difficult to conceptualize based on the intersection of perspectives, power, beliefs, and 
meaning. Contestation of the idea of truth is pervasive. In their consideration on the 
relationship between truth and reconciliation, Daly and Sarkin identify that truth is neither 
“objective” nor “neutral,” making it difficult to communicate and difficult to communicate 
accurately.47  
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Important questions have been raised regarding whether the truth ascertained by 
truth commissions can be truly representative of the facts. Chapman and Ball suggest that, 
“in many ways, truth commissions ‘shape’ or socially construct rather than ‘find’ the 
truth.”48 They base this reasoning on the necessary decisions truth commissions have to 
make to present the information collected through the truth commission process. Often, in 
transitional justice literature, the conceptual challenge of truth is demonstrated through the 
South African TRC’s decisions and discussions of the type of “truth” found in its report: 
truth that is “factual or forensic,” “personal or narrative,” “social or ‘dialogue’,” and 
“healing and restorative.”49 With these distinctions, the commission sought to overcome 
the challenges of contestation that are inherent in transitional processes by acknowledging 
the value of each.  
It is not necessary here to delve further into the constructivist nature of “truth”. The 
project takes as a starting point that the truth is malleable, and that many shapes can be 
made from the information investigated and uncovered. Parsing between variants of truth, 
as the South African TRC did, is helpful in mitigating the critiques about the value of the 
process itself based on the type of information presented by investigations. In this way, 
distinctions could be made between information about particular facets of investigations 
compared to information that emerged from individual testimony based on a person’s lived 
experience without subordinating one to the other. It is necessary at the outset to 
acknowledge the complexity of truth and truth commissions because similar charges can 
be made with regard to other investigative processes. The investigative institutions that 
                                                
48 Chapman and Ball, "Truth of Truth Commissions," 8. 
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precede truth commissions, like the one under consideration in this project, do not face the 
same symbolic demands made of truth commissions. Yet, the constructed critiques of the 
nature of truth are important for this project because of the way emergent facts or hidden 
facts influence governing and transition. 
The field of transitional justice has focused centrally on the idea of truth as a means 
of justice. One foundational text, Kritz’s Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies 
Reckon with Former Regimes, includes a section on “Documenting the Former Regime: 
Commissions of Inquiry” in its analysis of the considerations and prospects for the 
addressing the past.50 In these early discussions, Popkin and Roht-Arriaza, recognized four 
goals of such truth or investigatory commissions that help to situate their theorized value. 
In their evaluation, the authors identified the following goals:  
Creating an authoritative record of what happened; providing a platform for the 
victims to tell their stories and obtain some form of redress; recommending 
legislative, structural, or other changes to avoid repetition of past abuses, and 
establishing who was responsible and providing a measure of accountability for the 
perpetrators.51  
 
The use of truth commissions has increased steadily from the 1980s onwards, in pursuit of 
these goals.  
 
3.3.2 Justice and Acknowledgement  
As the use of truth commissions has increased, more attention has been paid to the 
relationship between truth and justice. Truth commissions can operate as embodiments of 
justice demonstrated through lenses of acknowledgement and restorative justice. A crucial 
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distinction is made between knowledge and acknowledgement that sets up the utility of 
truth commissions in various contexts. With reference to South Africa, du Toit outlines that 
“even under the prior regime the truth of ongoing political atrocities or human rights 
violations such as torture are in a sense already known… Officially, though, the occurrence 
of these violations is often denied categorically.”52 Truth commissions offer a means 
through which societies can acknowledge the past and access narratives of conflict 
experience. Acknowledgment and narrative play an important role in understanding 
“justice as recognition.”53  
The theorized value of truth on its own, and truth-as-justice frame information 
about past abuses as valuable to individuals and the transition. A ‘right to truth’ has been 
cemented at the international level. In December 2013, the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/68/165 Right to Truth. The resolution “Recognizes 
the importance of respecting and ensuring the right to truth so as to contribute to ending 
impunity and to promote and protect human rights.”54 The truth commission is explicitly 
recognized as a tool through which this can be achieved.55 One fundamental rationale in 
the development of the ‘right to truth’ is the recognition that the people victimized by past 
repression, and the people left behind without information about what happened to loved 
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ones should, at the very least, be given some information about their fates.56 The 
justifications go beyond this information focused endeavour.  
In transitional situations, the idea of truth is bounded in concepts of change, 
acknowledgement and non-repetition. The characterization of truth as acknowledgment 
stems from the reasoning that the repressive and abusive policies and actions may have 
been known, but denied.57 Boraine states that in the South African case, “the search for 
truth and the recording of that truth exorcised the fantasy of denial that makes 
transformation impossible.”58 As Hayner identifies, “for some victims and survivors, 
therefore, a truth commission does not so much tell them new truth as formally recognize 
and acknowledge the what has before been denied.”59 Furthermore, acknowledging by 
investigating and publicizing information may help to circumvent future denial or 
politicization of the past.60 In addition, in countries where violence and secrecy structured 
regimes, that maintained control using repressive tactics, making public information about 
these practices demonstrates a transparency shift—a move away from the old methods of 
control.61  
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Minow suggests that the “narrative project” of a truth commission enables a more 
comprehensive account of a regime’s history.62 The critical element, as du Toit suggests, is 
not simply being able to tell one’s story, but that it can enable the exercise  of “justice as 
recognition” that acknowledges equality “as equal sources of truth and bearers of rights.”63 
du Toit also acknowledges the importance of “narrative truth” in truth commission 
processes.64 According to du Toit, “what is at stake when victims are enabled to ‘tell their 
own stories’ is not just the specific factual statements, but the right of framing them from 
their own perspectives and being recognized as legitimate sources of truth with claims to 
rights and justice.”65 The acknowledgement potential from truth commissions enables the 
possibility of justice often sought in transitional justice processes. Proponents of truth 
commissions also advocate their use for their ability to generate elements of restorative 
justice. 
The focus on the restorative aspects of truth commissions is rooted in earlier debates 
in the field which assessed the justice element of truth-seeking and truth commissions. In 
attempts to explain the utility of truth commissions, alongside or in lieu of prosecutions, 
scholars appraised the intrinsic value of truth commissions, pointing to their potential as 
arbiters of restorative justice. Often presented as a counter to hegemonic representations of 
justice as retributive, restorative justice shifts the focus. Llewellyn defines restorative 
justice as:  
Fundamentally concerned with restoring relationships harmed by wrongdoing to 
ones in which all parties enjoy and accord one another equal dignity, respect, and 
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concern. Restorative justice understands wrongdoing in terms of the resulting 
harms; restoring relationships requires addressing the harm(s) experienced by all 
the parties involved in the wrongdoing.66  
 
Llewellyn argues that restorative justice aims to restore relationships, viewing harm caused 
by crime as a harm to relationships.67 A shift in truth commission applicability is evident 
especially since the South African TRC, which has been evaluated as a mechanism of 
restorative justice.68 Rather than focusing on the effects of not having prosecutions, using 
a restorative justice approach focused attention on the value of using a truth commission. 
The TRC offered a better option for reconciliation and societal mending in transitions.69  
 
3.3.3  Compromise and political constraints 
An element of negotiation undergirds a number of transitions that end up using truth 
commissions as a tool to address past wrongs.70 Early studies pointed to the structural 
constraints on selecting certain mechanisms over others. For example, societies may have 
opted to implement truth commissions because of the potential spoiler effects of power 
holders who have the ability to derail transitions should they have to face prosecution. 
Orentlicher outlines this puzzle faced by many Latin American countries undergoing 
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transitions to democracy. Despite the transfer of power to democratically elected 
governments, “armed forces continued to occupy an autonomous realm of power with the 
potential for imperiling their countries’ fragile transition if the new government breached 
their citadel of impunity.”71 With criminal prosecution perceived as the necessary response 
to repression, some analysts perceived truth commissions as a manageable possibility when 
trials were difficult or detrimental to pursue.72  
In this conceptualization, truth commissions are viewed as a political compromise 
achieved at the expense of criminal prosecution.73 Political constraints or destabilizing 
forces may necessitate the development of processes of acknowledgement that do not 
threaten the peace or stability that may have been achieved in transition.74 Identifying the 
pattern of truth commission selection as an output of structural conditions does not detract 
from the utility of these institutions. As articulated above, theorizing restorative 
possibilities and acknowledgement as processes of justice can persuasively alter the 
perception of a trade-off.75  
Despite the ability to justify truth commissions as useful tools in their own right, 
there remains a semblance of their selection-as-compromise in some cases. Anecdotal 
accounts of negotiation processes are useful sources of evidence here. Villa-Vicencio 
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suggests that in South Africa, “to have insisted on prosecution would have been to 
perpetuate war.”76 In Liberia, Hayner identifies that while amnesty was not formally 
written into the peace agreement, it was generally accepted among those involved in the 
negotiations that ‘a witch hunt’ associated with the idea of criminal prosecution was not 
going to happen. A truth commission was a useful compromise. She identifies that “the 
trade-off between a tribunal and a TRC seems to have been explicit in everyone’s minds. 
‘We chose a TRC because we didn’t want a war crimes tribunal. A tribunal would be seen 
as witch-hunting’, was a typical comment.”77 In Sierra Leone, a blanket amnesty was 
offered to all combatants and the peace agreement included provisions for the creation of 
a truth commission.78 
 The structural constraints that favour the adoption of truth commissions also likely 
influence the operation of the commission. The normative dimensions of truth 
commissions can come into tension with the development of the truth commission in 
practice. There often seems to be an element of altruism placed onto descriptions or 
discussions of truth commission processes. In practice, while their use is advocated heavily, 
a verdict on their utility and influence in achieving their intended outcomes has not clearly 
emerged. 
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3.4 Truth Commission Efficacy  
 
There is little consensus about how truth commissions should be evaluated in the 
transitional justice literature.79 Evaluation has proven challenging given that truth 
commissions are negotiating different environments. Some evaluate truth commissions 
based on their outputs, or influences on measures like human rights, democratization, and 
reconciliation.80 Or, shifting to the procedures of a truth commission, Wiebelhaus-Brahm 
suggests that elements like the number of victims heard or hearings conducted are valuable 
indicators of truth commission success.81 The flexible metrics for evaluating truth 
commission processes temper the assessments of their impact. Without being able to 
specify benefits and shortcomings across cases, it is difficult to evaluate conditions and 
factors that lead to success across cases.  
Two factors that appear to have garnered agreement for their impact on truth 
commission operation are political will and resources. Political will has been identified as 
a key informing factor of truth commission operation. Brahm argues that the temporary 
nature of truth commissions means that they “rely on moral suasion, pressure from civil 
society and the international community, and the political will of politicians to see most of 
their impact realized.”82 In some instances, a dearth of political will is suggested to be a 
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crucial factor in explaining the failure of certain truth commissions.83 With regards to the 
Kenyan truth commission, Lanegran argues that “technical issues such as selection 
processes are not [as] important as a broader challenge quite well known to observers of 
truth commissions: political will to support an active truth seeking project.”84 Despite the 
frequent recognition that political will impacts truth commission processes, as will be 
discussed below, insufficient has been paid to how information-gathering institutions work 
within these constraints and how political will can be cultivated. 
 The operation of truth commissions is also impacted by resources allocated to the 
actual carrying out of the work of the truth commission. Financial contributions and 
constraints are identified by many truth commission observers and scholars as significant. 
While on the surface this is to be expected, there are still pressures to convoke these 
institutions and funding often comes from a variety of domestic and international sources. 
Truth commissions are expensive, but as Chapman and Ball identify, there can be a range 
of operating costs. Over the tenure of its operation, the South Africa TRC received 
approximately $33 million, in comparison to Haiti’s commission which had to operate on 
just over $1 million.85 Despite this, Hayner identifies that observers critiqued the South 
African TRC for being “insufficiently resourced.”86 Similar claims are made about the 
Haitian truth commission and others.87 Brahm suggests that funding likely affects the 
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impact of truth commissions. He suggests that “well-funded truth commissions seem likely 
to be better able to hire more staff and, consequently, to investigate a greater number of 
cases and do so more thoroughly. As a result, the truth reflected will likely be more 
comprehensive.”88 This is significant because it increases truth-seeking capabilities. In 
terms of human resources, Hayner suggests that: 
Perhaps more than any other single factor, the person or persons selected to manage 
a truth commission will determine its ultimate success of failure. Several 
commissions have run into serious problems due to weak management, leading to 
staff divisions, misdirected or slow-to-start investigations, and limited support.89  
 
The design of commissions has to incorporate decisions that outline such dimensions as 
who should serve,  the number of commissioners, their location, their role and focus, and 
expected time commitment.90 Like financial challenges, the selection of commissioners has 
been implicated in the underperformance of truth commissions.91 
 Undoubtedly, these two categories, political will and resources, are related. A lack 
of political will may be demonstrated or entrenched by not providing adequate financial or 
human resources to carry out the component activities of a truth commission. Similarly, 
governments may appoint personnel to the commission who may be more sympathetic to 
their cause. There are, though, also resource considerations that may emerge less from a 
concerted effort to undermine the process, than from the reality of operating in a political 
environment of competing needs in times of transition.92  
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 Although these factors have been identified as difference makers, their absence is 
easier to determine than their presence. Identifying a lack of political will is important to 
beginning to understand what explains success in truth commission operations, but as 
Brinkerhoff suggests, “political will exhibits a latent quality; it is not visible separate from 
some sort of action. Measuring it can only be done indirectly.”93 With regards to transitional 
justice and truth commissions, less attention has been paid to how to cultivate political 
will.94 This is problematic because advocates of transitional justice are succeeding in 
entrenching practices of transitional justice across the world. While the intention is morally 
justified, the push to implement truth commission processes does not adequately account 
for leadership or environments that lack the capacity or will to undertake these processes 
with intentions of justice or reconciliation. Despite the recognition of potential problems 
with ill-conceived or weakly supported truth commissions, their general framework is 
fairly standardized. 
 Scholars are turning to the institutional components of truth commissions. Nichols 
points to components of legitimacy—authority, a break with the past, and transparency—
as key factors that affect truth commission operation and impact.95 Characteristics that are 
linked to institutional efficacy are valuable indicators of success because they do not 
depend on certain design features. Framing success in terms of the institutional legitimacy 
helps navigate the problem that truth commissions are established in different contexts and 
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thus have different institutional starting points. Similarly, Sarkin’s efforts to better define 
truth commissions offers a helpful metric for evaluation, shifting the focus from outcomes 
to institutional dimensions.96 Sarkin argues that it is the institutional dimensions of truth 
commission design that set up truth commissions for success:  
The best chance of success is one that is independent, publically supported and 
accessible to everyone, especially usually marginalised and excluded groups. A 
[truth commission] needs to be created after research and dialogue with all actors. 
It needs to be well structured and individually tailored to deal with the issues of the 
country in question.97  
 
This definition of success, or the most likely features to achieve success, accounts for the 
diversity of situations in which truth commissions are established but relies on expectations 
about well-functioning institutions. This helps to account for the recognition that there are 
significant differences in truth commission design and operation across cases.98 These 
metrics are revisited in Chapter 5 to substantiate the success of the South African TRC. 
 It is necessary to acknowledge a critical tension with truth commission operations. 
The recognition that transitional justice processes need to be adjusted for individual 
contexts is ubiquitous in the field. Yet, despite these claims, there is a core group of 
transitional justice mechanisms that are advocated for, and implemented, in varied 
contexts.99 Procedural elements of truth commissions can be altered to accommodate 
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different local needs or wants. For example, the design of truth commissions can be tailored 
to particular contexts with choices involving whether testimonies will be given in public 
or private; whether perpetrators will be named in reports, and in the selection of 
commissioners.100 However, the variation in structure of these processes, designed to 
achieve particular goals pertaining to justice, truth, and reconciliation are what have made 
them desirable in transitional situations in the first place.  
 The above analysis points to truth commissions as transitional projects. Despite the 
recognition that conditions shape some particular designs of truth commissions in practice, 
the transitional justice literature often presents truth commissions as a product of the 
decision to pursue transitional justice. Distinguishing the ‘menu’ or toolbox of transitional 
justice and analyzing or assessing these institutions as components of transitional justice 
often results in their presentation as appearing or emerging as a unique response to 
transitions; as neatly contained instruments.  
Beattie’s account of what he terms the German Bundestag commission, two 
commissions of inquiry created by the German government in 1992 and 1995, offers an 
important analysis of the influence of historical evolution on the process of truth-
seeking.101 These commissions, the Commission of Inquiry for the Assessment of History 
and Consequences of the SED Dictatorship in Germany (1992-1994) and the Commission 
of Inquiry on Overcoming the Consequences of the SED Dictatorship in the Process of 
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German Unity (1995-1998), were established by the German Parliament.102 These 
commissions were established by the German government to provide a thorough 
investigation into the Communist regime and opposition to it and relied heavily on 
research.103 The membership of both Commissions were parliamentarians with 
representation reflective of parliamentary composition, and external experts.104 
Beattie explains the unique elements of the Bundestag commission based on the 
contextual elements that informed its establishment. For example, he suggests that the lack 
of victim testimony ought not detract from its value as a truth commission, but should he 
acknowledged that in light of the existing records of the regime, the commission operated 
on the basis of a “more discursive, analytical, evaluative and symbolic understanding.”105 
Beattie argues that the commission’s adjustments in light of tensions regarding how to 
achieve its mandate help to explain the development of the process itself.106 This account 
of the Bundestag commission is important because it identifies a different explanatory 
pathway to explain the design of a truth-seeking process.  
Beattie contends that accounting for the Bundestag Commission’s emergence “over 
time is crucial, for such bodies are not static, inert institutions but rather events and 
processes whose evolution is not automatic.”107 This is significant because it acknowledges 
how earlier influences shaped the design of truth commissions. Specifically, this 
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demonstrates how institutions can be repositioned to respond to emergent needs. This is 
important because it demonstrates an element of agency and institutional agency in the 
process of truth-seeking. Truth commissions may have some standard features, by 
definition, but how they are designed or undertake their work retains an element of 
flexibility.   
To be sure, scholars do not ignore the context or structural dynamics at play, but 
insufficient is paid to the role of how histories and earlier institutional arrangements matter 
for truth commissions. Many analyses recognize the influence of judicial and security 
institutions affecting the operation of truth commission processes and in this way embed 
truth commissions within specific contextual dynamics. But, frequently the analysis begins 
without reference to how information or truth-seeking may have been carried out prior to 
political transition. The mechanics and optics of these processes may not be conducive to 
legitimate truth-seeking practices, but taking them into account can help to illustrate in 
what ways history matters. 
 
3.5 Institutional foundations 
This section explores what it is that sets truth commissions apart from other domestic 
inquiries into violence but why these elements may help us understand later truth 
commission operation. It argues that the shared features like investigations, the collection 
of testimonies, reports of findings and, often, policy recommendations make establishing 
a marked distinction between these categories of investigation difficult. This section 
outlines that the difference between truth commissions and other investigative processes is 
the symbolic rhetoric of justice associated with their use. Given that the value imposed on 
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the truth commission has entrenched their use to redress past injustice, their institutional 
lineage is more compelling in understanding the operational effects.    
3.5.1  Commissions of inquiry  
In non-transitional political spaces, commissions of inquiry are used by governments to 
address critical or concerning events/incidents in an official, non-judicial capacity. 
Commissions of inquiry are a means to uncover information and identify shortcomings in 
existing government or societal practice. A commission of inquiry falls under the umbrella 
of public inquiries, which may take different forms under different government systems, 
but that share similar features.108 Salter defines a public inquiry as “any body that is 
formally mandated by a government, either on an ad hoc basis or with reference to a 
specific problem, to conduct a process of fact-finding and to arrive at a body of 
recommendations.”109 With regard to information gathering specifically, Stanton suggests 
that commissions of inquiry “investigate an issue by gathering a broad spectrum of 
information in order to see the larger context that gave rise to the problem.” 110 These 
conceptualizations highlight the investigative purposes of inquiries that resemble truth 
commissions. 
Manson and Mullan suggest that defining a commission of inquiry is usefully done 
by focusing on the mandate an investigation receives.  This includes: 
all forms of inquiry directed to inquire into, and report on, the circumstances and 
causes of an event or series of events, or an issue of public importance… the 
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common feature is whether the vehicle is intended to be an element in the 
development of public policy by uncovering facts and generating 
recommendations.111  
 
In Canada, New Zealand, and Britain, commissions of inquiry are often categorized into 
two broad types: those that investigate conduct and those that inform policy.112 However, 
as Salter suggests, “at stake in almost all inquiries is public confidence in institutions with 
a public purpose, and thus is a matter fraught with political consequences. In short, almost 
all inquiries are policy inquiries, at least in some respects.”113 By setting up inquiries of 
this sort, governments have a venue through which to identify shortcomings and rectify 
policy and institutions. Inwood and Johns characterize commissions of inquiry as “extra-
governmental institutions” that are “established specifically to address issues beyond the 
existing branches of government and are invoked when the regular machinery of 
government or policy process is broken or fails.”114 While dissatisfaction or an emergent 
issue may inform the implementation of a commission, the existence of these factors does 
not always result in the initiation of an investigation.115  
 Significant attention has been paid to how commissions affect changes in policy in 
democratic states. Inwood and Johns investigate how the institutional design of 
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commissions of inquiry in Canada influences policy changes.116 Rather than identifying 
specific combinations of factors that lead to policy change, the authors identify different 
factors that structure commissions of inquiries—ideas, institutions, actors, and relations— 
to map the impact on policy change, differentiating between “transformative and direct,” 
“transformative but diffuse,” and “marginal and limited” policy changes.117  
In a study on pension commissions, Marier similarly explores the policy changes 
that resulted from investigations. Marier differentiates those with strong policy outputs that 
are accepted by the government or, “policy engineers,” from those whose outputs are not 
the policy accepted by the government for the issue under investigation, or, “alarm 
raisers.”118 A further distinction is made among those with minimal short-term policy 
impact but with longer term influential ideas, or “idea shakers”, and those that do not result 
in change, or “a source of the status quo.”119 Marier identifies specific variables that are 
related to a commission’s influence: a commission’s membership, terms of reference, 
independence (with support), institutional environment, and the viability of the report (in 
political, economic, and administrative terms).120 The study of policy influence from 
commissions of inquiry is important because it demonstrates the impacts of the design of 
the commission themselves. By identifying features of commissions, and the conditions 
under which these components influence the effectiveness of commissions, the 
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significance of the institutional design component of investigatory commissions is 
highlighted. It also demonstrates a similarities to such adjudications of truth commissions 
as discussed above. 
The rhetoric around commissions of inquiry can often be cynical. Justifications or 
explanations for the appointment of inquiries may centre on avoiding addressing particular 
issues. As Schwartz points out, “it is a paradoxical fact that a government can use public 
inquiries to deflect political accountability.”121 Marier categorizes efforts to delay, avoid, 
and influence support for particular policy ideas as partisan motivations for the 
appointment of inquiries.122 Governments create the mandates and as such can choose the 
scope of the investigation, the people to carry out the investigation, and a general 
timeframe.123 In situations where public or political crises are the impetus for the 
implementation, investigations can be riskier, as the response from the public can be much 
less certain.124  
 Despite the rhetoric associated with commissions/investigations as simply doing 
something, a symbolic dimension of commissions of inquiry has been identified. Parker 
and Dekker identify a symbolism of processes in investigations. They argue that 
investigations themselves help to illustrate that the government is working as it should. 
Additionally, Parker and Dekker suggest that investigation and deliberation into crises or 
                                                
121 Bryan Schwartz, "Public Inquiries," in Commissions of Inquiry: Praise or Reappraise ed. Allan Manson 
and David  Mullan (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003), 448. 
122 Marier, "The Power of Institutionalized Learning: the uses and practices of commissions to generate 
policy," 1208. 
123 Schwartz, "Public Inquiries," 448. 
124 Arjen Boin, Paul ’t Hart, and Allan McConnell, "Conclusions: The politics of crisis exploitation," in 
Governing After Crisis: The Politics of Investigation, Accountability and Learning, ed. Arjen Boin, Paul ’t 
Hart, and Allan McConnell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 285-303. 
 
 
61 
disasters enables “meaning-making” of the events.125 Ashforth describes commissions of 
inquiry as “schemes of legitimation” wherein commissions play a discursive role in 
shaping state power.126 By engaging in investigation, soliciting feedback from experts and 
compiling a report, the state produces “a realm of discourse in the terms of which the 
knowledge necessary for power can be discovered and expressed.”127 His argument about 
the state’s value of commissions of inquiry “beyond their expressed purposes” is 
particularly compelling given his recognition that “although governmental inquiries 
typically engage in fact-gathering and argumentation in order to produce policy-oriented 
recommendations, their labours rarely produce policy results commensurate with the effort 
and expense of inquiry.”128 Here, the parallels between investigatory commissions and 
truth commissions become increasingly apparent.  
3.5.2 Conceptual challenge of truth commissions  
 
The institutional foundations of truth commissions are often overshadowed by the framing 
of truth commissions as a unique way to achieve a moral requisite of transitional justice. 
As a tool that has garnered consensus as a morally acceptable option during periods of 
“extraordinary” politics, to use Teitel’s phrasing, truth commissions are often presented as 
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an emergent phenomenon of the 1980s.129 The similarity in the institutional skeletons that 
frame truth commissions and commissions of inquiries is evident from early analyses of 
truth commissions. This overlap is apparent both in terminology and lineage. 
Some of the earliest investigations that fall within the realm of ‘truth commissions’ 
were also referred to as “investigatory commissions”.130 As these types of investigations 
emerged, they became valuable as alternatives to what Popkin and Roht-Arriaza refer to as 
“‘normal’ investigatory channels.”131 The justification for using truth commissions has 
focused more on how they could negotiate a path contiguous to judicial processes without 
destabilizing the transitions and less on how their institutional predecessors may be 
implicated in their use.   
Hayner acknowledges that there are other types of investigations distinct from truth 
commissions and suggests that these non-truth commission forms of inquiry may better 
serve the needs of investigation. Presenting a variety examples from Australia, the US, and 
Canada, Hayner identifies that “there are a range of other kinds of official inquiries into 
past human rights abuses that have not been understood as truth commissions, but they 
have served a very important role and may be a better approach than a truth commission, 
in some moments and in some contexts.”132 How these processes affect truth-seeking 
warrants further attention and this project engages with this gap, recognizing the 
institutional lineage. 
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Freeman observes that “commonwealth commissions of inquiry greatly resemble 
the modern truth commission.”133 His observation of commissions in Uganda, Zimbabwe, 
Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Nigeria is that “in their particular contexts, they resembled 
something older and more familiar: standard commissions of inquiry into public 
controversies.”134 Freeman classifies truth commissions as one type of “ad hoc national 
human rights-related commissions of inquiry.”135 He distinguishes between four other 
types—“event-specific, thematic, sociohistorical, and institutional.”136 Commenting on 
each of these variations, Freeman differentiates them from truth commissions based on the 
centrality of victims in the event-specific and thematic variants. Freeman argues that the 
time elapsed between violence or crises and investigations distinguishes truth commissions 
from commissions of inquiry, the latter of which tend to be more immediate. In addition, 
the breadth of institutions under consideration by a truth commission compared separates 
it from an institutional commission of inquiry which tends to have a narrower focus.137 For 
Hayner, what sets apart a truth commission is the “their intention of affecting the social 
understanding and acceptance of the country’s past, not just to resolve specific facts.”138 
This distinction is one way that analysts differentiate between the two investigating bodies. 
Stanton, however, makes a strong case that truth commissions are a “specialized 
form of commission of inquiry,” in her study explaining why truth commissions are not 
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frequently established in established democracies.139 Stanton acknowledges that, 
generally, two features set truth commissions apart from commissions of inquiry: a truth 
commission’s “symbolic acknowledgement of historic injustices and its explicit social 
function of public education about those injustices.”140 Suggesting that it is the context or 
implications of the type of environment that truth commissions are usually implemented 
that hinders their adoption by democratic regimes, not the design or operational 
distinctiveness, Stanton argues that when undertaken in a certain way, the commission of 
inquiry can achieve what a truth commission is expected to achieve. Thus, Stanton argues 
that while the “social influence” and the symbolic nature of the truth commission set it 
apart from the commission of inquiry, this need not be the case.141 Rather Stanton suggests: 
The truth commission is expected to do explicitly what a commission of inquiry is 
capable of doing but which it is not obliged to do: to acknowledge the existence of 
the historical injustices and to embark upon a process that educates the public about 
those injustices in order to prevent recurrence… whichever form is used, both are 
capable of fulfilling this social function.142  
 
That the commission of inquiry can fulfill the functions associated with a truth commission 
is a reasonable assessment of its institutional similarities to the truth commission. The 
operational features of both forms of inquiry are similar and thus it is persuasive that 
through an engaging and socially focused investigation, acknowledgement can occur 
through the commission of inquiry.  
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 Stanton’s conceptualization is specific to established democracies, but the 
argument is applicable more broadly, in terms of the distinction between the commission 
of inquiry and truth commission (and less so the focus on the democratic adoption). To 
moderate this characterization to the context under consideration in this dissertation, the 
relationship between pre-transitional commissions of inquiry and post-transitional truth 
commissions, the negative fulfillment of mandates, or the negative experience with 
commissions of inquiry is also likely to bear on the truth commission process.  Thus, the 
question here is not whether it is possible for commissions of inquiry to fulfill the role 
associated with truth commissions, but how the earlier operation of a commission of 
inquiry affects the operation of a truth commission in both potentially positive and negative 
ways. 
 Even in advanced democracies, commissions of inquiry are not necessarily ‘game-
changers’. Boin et al. identify that the learning that emerges from investigations after crises 
is varied and difficult.143 Critically, other factors informing the environment at the time of 
crises and associated investigations can change how the public, and the government, 
respond.144 For example, to expect significant change from governments that are 
investigating human rights abuses in which they are known to be, or discovered to be, 
complicit, raises serious doubts about their ability to investigate violations and violence. 
However, such investigations are still likely to have some effect—be they positive or 
negative—on later truth commissions should they be convoked. 
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Freeman recognizes the relationship between commissions of inquiries as 
predecessors of truth commissions. Freeman identifies parallels in the existing legislation 
for inquiries and the legislation for truth commissions in countries that had a history of 
commissions. Importantly, though, Freeman identifies that “their long experiences with 
commissions of inquiry also made the countries cognizant of the commissions’ habitual 
limitations,” which helps to explain why governments sought new legislation for the 
creation of truth commissions in these environments.145 The significance of this pattern 
suggests an important potential influence of previous commissions on truth commission 
processes. By framing this project using a definition of a truth commission that 
characterizes it as a variation on the commission of inquiry, the potential that commissions 
of inquiry are implemented in a more skeptical vein, or in a repressive manner, must be 
addressed.  
3.5.3 Institutional histories  
Under certain conditions, commissions of inquiry or investigations are implemented with 
little output, and with potentially negative effects. Governments have initiated 
investigations into abuse or violations under both democratic and repressive regimes.146 
Such investigative commissions may be initiated under conditions that are not necessarily 
conducive to a credible investigation; for example, by a government complicit in violence 
or that purposefully undermines investigatory processes. Additionally, countries that 
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frequently use commissions of inquiry may undermine the value of such investigations.147 
This may be problematic for truth-seeking practices. The case of South Africa is taken up 
in more detail in from Chapter 5 onward. Other examples are presented here to illustrate 
situations in which commissions of inquiry may impact truth-seeking measures. For 
instance, a report evaluating the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) in Ghana, 
suggests that the practice of using commissions of inquiry to “discredit preceding 
administrations” impacted the operation of the NRC as a transitional justice mechanism, 
identifying that “it has been argued that the Commission did not do enough to break with 
the legacy of these past commissions.”148  
In Zimbabwe, for example, the government implemented the Commission of 
Inquiry into the Matabeleland Disturbances to investigate violence perpetrated by the 
military against civilian populations in the Matabeleland district. Not only did the 
government not release the report from this commission, the government’s denial of 1500 
civilian deaths meant that family members of the victims were unable to claim 
compensation.149 Zimbabwe’s case is instructive in this regard because it demonstrates the 
use of a commission of inquiry that had little impact on information gathering or 
dissemination for the people affected.  
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While Hayner argues that the government did not release the report allegedly based 
on fear of increasing violence between ethnic groups, Grodsky’s interpretation is that the 
contents of the report were simply “inconvenient” for then President Robert Mugabe.150 
The government’s refusal to release this report is unsurprising, given its use of repression. 
Carver argues that “the government was able to use the formation of the Commission as a 
device to divert criticism, at the same time as escaping any awkward consequences.”151 
The Zimbabwean example illustrates engagement with a commission or investigation that, 
though seemingly investigated, had little in the way of desire to uncover and rectify 
systemic or institutional shortcomings.  In the Zimbabwean case, human rights abuses 
continued to be committed in the decades of Mugabe’s rule.152 Mugabe was only 
succeeded in Zimbabwe in 2017, after coming to power in 1980.153  
The Zimbabwean case provides an illustration of the types of investigations that 
may be undertaken without intention of redress to begin to situate the discussion of the 
institutional lineage. While Zimbabwe has not implemented a truth commission, it 
demonstrates the undermining potential of investigations in contexts of human rights 
violations. This type of influence is problematic when a truth commission is under 
consideration or later established. Earlier commissions of inquiry may undermine the 
potential information gathering or symbolic acknowledgement anticipated with a truth 
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commission. It is this type of pattern that is under consideration in this project. The Kenyan 
case is unpacked briefly here as an example.  
In Kenya, a somewhat unconstructive history of commissions of inquiry preceded 
the truth commission. Some accounts suggest that this continuity of institutions affected 
the perception of the truth commission. Significant in this case is the use of commissions 
of inquiry in Kenya in such a way as to obfuscate responsibility for government misdeeds 
or perpetration of violence.154 As Lynch identifies, “commissions of inquiry in post-
colonial Kenya have become a performance of state power in a blunter sense, namely, the 
power to investigate and respond to problems, but also dismiss and ignore them if that suits 
vested interests.”155 This lineage has been identified as important in understanding the 
Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) that followed.   
According to Lynch, there was a concern among people in Kenya that “in the 
absence of a political transition, the TJRC would likely replicate previous commissions of 
inquiry in that it would write a detailed report that would then be relegated to dusty 
shelves.”156 In terms of operation, this lineage appears to have been reiterated with the 
TJRC. Bosire and Lynch speak to the “credibility crisis” of the TJRC.157 Factors 
contributing to this crisis included little support from civil society organizations at the time, 
and the problematic appointment of the chairperson, who had been implicated in 
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allegations of past abuses.158 Hayner suggests that advocacy groups critiqued the 
legislation enacting the truth commission for being unclear and the institution itself not 
impartial.159 Furthermore, a scandal on the appointed leadership of the Commission 
affected the perception of its operations.160  
In the Kenyan case, a commission of inquiry was established at the same time as 
the agreement to establish a truth commission. The Commission of Inquiry into the Post-
Election Violence (CIPEV), also known as the Waki Commission, was implemented as a 
component of the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation. The negotiating parties 
agreed to CIPEV, and another commission into electoral irregularities, the Independent 
Review Committee, on March 4, 2008.161 The Waki Commission itself completed its 
investigations, issued its report and even built in mechanisms to try and ensure its 
recommendations would be heeded. As Brown and Sriram outline, the Waki Commission 
attempted to prevent its recommendations from being ignored. It did this by including a 
‘stick’ should the government not implement the recommendations; the Waki Commission 
provided a list of alleged perpetrators to Kofi Annan and the other international mediators 
to give to the International Criminal Court.162 This is significant because there was a 
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recognition that the recommendations might be ignored, which raises questions about what 
the truth commission project could be expected to achieve.  
The institutional lineage for investigations or truth-seeking is compromising in the 
Kenyan case. The Waki Commission’s efforts to mitigate these experiences are 
compounded by another commission that was established specifically to determine whether 
a “truth commission was necessary for Kenya,” five years earlier in 2004.163 After broad 
consultation with the Kenyan population and research into other countries that had 
established truth commissions, the Task Force on the Establishment of a Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission, presented over twenty recommendations outlining the 
necessity of a truth commission and the operational parameters advocated based on these 
consultations.164 This is significant because this case demonstrates how the need for truth-
seeking might be set apart from the willingness or commitment to truth-seeking. 
Canada, with its Truth and Reconciliation Commission, established in 2008 to 
investigate the abuses of the Indian Residential School system, provides another example 
of a country that has used commissions of inquiries and established a truth commission.165 
Some commissions of inquiry may set a positive example for truth commissions that 
follow, as Stanton argues in the case of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry carried out 
                                                
163 Makau Mutua, "Republic of Kenya Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of a Truth, Justice 
and Reconciliation Commission," Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 10, no. 3 (2004): 15. 
164 Mutua, "Republic of Kenya Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of a Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission." 
165 For a brief overview of the Canadian TRC see: Ravi de Costa, "Discursive Institutions in Non-
Transitional Societies: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada," International Political 
Science Review 38, no. 2 (2016): 185-199; Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 72-73. 
 
 
72 
by Thomas Berger, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Canada.166 As an 
instance of the pattern under consideration in this dissertation, this example is illustrative 
of the potential for commissions of inquiry to act as a means to change structural 
components of investigations rather than perpetuate the status quo. Although established 
as an investigation into the potential effects of a pipeline in 1974, and not established as a 
formal investigation into violence, the inquiry resulted in an interrogation of the structural 
and cultural dimensions of the relationship between Canada and Indigenous people in the 
North.167  
Stanton’s focus is on the social function, the public education dimension, of both 
commissions and the innovative way that Berger conducted the Inquiry. The Inquiry held 
community hearings in communities that would be impacted by the pipeline, broadcasted 
hearings and sought to educate non-Indigenous people about the potential effects and 
existing injustices facing Northern communities.168 Berger also identifies that funding was 
made available to Indigenous groups to participate in the Inquiry’s hearings.169 Important 
for this discussion is Stanton’s recognition that “many of Berger’s innovations were 
incorporated into subsequent inquiries,” although these did not transform other political 
shortcomings with either the inquiries that followed, or the government’s response to 
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historical injustices against Indigenous people.170 This is still significant because it 
demonstrates both the continued use of the commission of inquiry and the ability to 
enhance the process. 
Although the Canadian TRC was established decades after Berger released his 
report, Stanton suggests that the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry had lessons for the 
Canadian TRC with respect to how to engage this social function of education and 
engagement.171 Stanton also identifies the legacy of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry 
on the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples that followed, and the eventual TRC 
suggesting that Berger’s report “began to lay the groundwork for their legacy to be 
discussed in public life.”172 This brief example cannot explore the depths of structural 
injustice imposed on Indigenous people in Canada, nor can it elucidate all the instances in 
which government investigations or inquiries fundamentally oppressed Indigenous people. 
However, this example illustrates the potential for negative experiences with investigative 
institutions to be addressed in order to lay a foundation for future investigations.  
These examples illustrate that institutional lineage may both enable and constrain 
truth-seeking measures that follow earlier investigative efforts. Experiences with measures 
of truth-seeking that serve as window-dressings, or as obfuscation, may set a different 
foundation for later truth-seeking measures that are used as a method of transitional justice. 
Alternatively, the commission of inquiry may itself be a vector of change.  This dissertation 
engages this observation to explore this pattern in South Africa. Before moving to the 
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discussion that explores this relationship as it plays out in the South African case, and the 
conditions under which negative histories can be adjusted, it is necessary to briefly discuss 
the colonial roots of the commission of inquiry.  
3.5.4    Colonial histories  
The commission of inquiry also has a colonial legacy. As such, conceptualizations of 
commissions/investigations can be understood as structures that aim to perpetuate the 
status quo. In this vein, they may do little to address structural factors that contribute to 
crises or investigations, but are rather framed as a legitimating tool. Balint, Evans, and 
McMillan identify that commissions can reinforce the status quo without dismantling 
structural inequality. The authors argue that “official discourses created through such 
commissions serve to produce and reproduce racialized identities that legitimise elite 
power and interests.”173 At the same time, such commissions work to commit legacies of 
violence to the past, failing to acknowledge ongoing structural injustice.174   
 Commissions of inquiry established by the Apartheid state in South Africa offer a 
clear example of this. The Theron Commission, officially called the Commission of 
Enquiry into Matters Relating to the Coloured Population Group, presented 
recommendations that could be construed as an attempt to rectify some of the inequalities 
under Apartheid in 1976. Waldmeir’s reading of this is as follows: 
So another government commission - that unlikely but effective instrument of change 
- was set up to study the problem. And in the very week that Soweto began to burn, it 
issued its report. Professor Erika Theron’s commission recommended that the National 
Party restore to coloureds what it had taken away in the heyday of Apartheid - direct 
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representation in Parliament… No one, not least Professor Theron, was suggesting that 
whites would have to live with, or learn with, coloureds.175 
 
While Waldmeir offers this as a demonstration of marginal change, the underlying power 
structures of Apartheid remained entrenched, since the state’s power over its racially 
delineated groups of citizens did not change. While acknowledging the recommendation 
for direct political representation, the perpetuation of classification according to racialized 
categories continues the injustice of Apartheid. Ashforth’s “scheme of legitimation”176 is 
clearly represented here in the normalized reproduction of the discourse of Apartheid’s 
population classification and segregation. 
 Adam Sitze traces the roots of the truth commission in South Africa through its 
colonial legacies. By focusing on South Africa’s use of commissions of inquiry prior to the 
TRC, Sitze explores the possibility that the TRC may not have been a departure from the 
status quo, although it is often claimed to be so. Sitze frames this discussion in critical 
Foucauldian terms, questioning the representation of the truth commission as a break with 
the colonial institutions of Apartheid.177 Sitze’s treatment of the truth commission and 
previous commissions is an illuminating account of power and hegemony in government 
inquiries in South Africa. This work draws parallels between the institutions and offers an 
account of the historical lineage of the truth commission’s influence in light of the 
influence of earlier investigations.178 
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If truth commissions are a type of commission of inquiry, the presence of an earlier 
investigatory commission could be expected to alter the expectations and operation of the 
later commission, since it provides a template for what to expect and how to operationalize 
a mandate, among other things. For example, if regimes and civil society have practice 
implementing such investigations, they may be better equipped to carry out the 
investigation on a larger scale. Yet, if the state has engaged numerous 
commission/investigations as more of a façade to appease international or public 
audiences, it seems plausible to continue this line of behaviour, particularly if there is 
continuity in regime structures.  
3.6 South Africa and the Truth Commission Literature 
South Africa’s TRC has been “hailed in many parts of the world as a new model for 
confronting a troubled and divisive history.”179 Rotberg claims that the “South African 
commission has become the model for all future commissions.”180 South Africa’s TRC 
also is the first of Hayner’s “Five Strongest Truth Commissions.”181 The South African 
TRC is one of the most well-known and heavily studied among the universe of cases of 
truth commissions. According to Freeman, “it was only with the experience of the South 
African TRC in the mid-1990s that truth commissions, for the first time, attained a 
worldwide prominence… to this day the South African TRC remains the most well-known 
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truth commission.”182 The operation of the South African TRC has influenced the adoption 
and design of truth commissions elsewhere. This is significant because much of the 
knowledge of truth commissions that been developed and assessed has relied heavily on 
this case. As Brahm notes, “much of what we do know about truth commissions comes 
from a small subsample of cases, most notably South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC), which raises questions about the generalizability of truth commission 
expectations.”183 The conditions of its emergence were unique, as is the case in all 
countries in transition. 
The themes under consideration in earlier parts of this chapter and as representative 
of the literature are particularly important for the South African TRC. While there is a 
significant literature on the South African TRC process, less attention has been paid to the 
significance of the historical institutional developments for truth-seeking in South Africa. 
This project makes a contribution to the literature on truth commissions by taking into 
account historical influences. Looking further back highlights additional explanatory 
factors in understanding how the South African TRC was able to operate with the 
successful institutional efficacy that it did. This ties into to a second contribution, which is 
to probe the influence of the prominence of the TRC itself in shaping the transitional justice 
literature. This is not to say that the TRC should not receive the praise or stature that it has 
secured, but rather to demonstrate how earlier unique and institutionally embedded features 
facilitated the TRC in the form that it took. In this way, this research joins existing literature 
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that dismantles assumptions or expectations that other countries can construct a similarly 
effective/effaced truth commission.  
Descriptive, empirical and theoretical work on truth commissions has centred 
significantly on the South African TRC. The influence of the South African TRC has been 
examined and articulated in terms of the increased adoption of truth commissions, 
particularly in African countries.184 In addition, analyses identify the influence in terms of 
design choices that countries make in establishing truth commissions. For instance, public 
hearings in truth commission processes gained significant notoriety based on their impact 
in the South African TRC process.185 The South African TRC’s approach to amnesty has 
influenced discussions elsewhere. Hayner’s report on the peace process in Liberia points 
to the South African experience as a reference point for discussions on amnesty.186 Slye 
suggests that elements dealing with amnesty in the Kenyan Truth, Justice, and 
Reconciliation Commission, were “cut and pasted from the South African legislation.”187 
This, despite the fact that the two commissions dealt with the question of amnesty very 
differently.188 While Freeman suggests that the South African TRC serves as a “starting 
point” for discussions on truth commission design in other countries, its impact on the 
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discourse and practice of truth-seeking is significant.189 Quantitative analyses of truth 
commission use, and effects, include the South African TRC as a dummy variable to 
account for its influence.190 The TRC’s role in the development of the field is crucial to 
understanding the bases of many assumptions about truth commissions.  
Despite the South African TRC’s weight in the field, there are still significant gaps 
in our understanding about the impacts of truth commissions, even in the South African 
case. The influence and notoriety of the TRC persists despite what Borer describes as 
“aspiration with empiricism.”191 The impacts of the South African TRC remain unclear in 
terms of the TRC’s influence on measures like reconciliation, democratization, and human 
rights.192 There is still little consensus on the impacts of the TRC on South African society.  
Despite the numerous investigations, there are still gaps in understandings of the more 
micro-level processes of the truth commission.193 While many have worked to elucidate 
the complex innovations, impacts, and challenges of the truth commission, less attention 
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190 Steven D. Roper and Lilian A. Barria, "Why Do states Commission the Truth? Political Considerations 
in the Establishment of African Truth and Reconciliation Commissions," Human Rights Review 10 (2009); 
Taylor and Dukalskis, "Old Truths and New Politics." Others, however, like Kim, focus on more broad 
geographical and transnational influences. See Hun Joon Kim, "Why Do States Adopt Truth Commissions 
After Transition?," Social Science Quarterly 100, no. 5 (2019). 
191 Tristan Anne Borer, "Reconciling South Africa or South Africans? Cautionary Notes from the TRC," 
African Studies Quarterly 8, no. 1 (2004): 20. 
192 See for example, Fanie du Toit, "A Broken Promise? Evaluating South Africa’s Reconciliation Process 
Twenty Years On," International Political Science Review 38, no. 2 (2017): 169-184; Brandon Hamber, 
"‘Ere their story die’: Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in South Africa," Race & Class 44, no. 1 (2002): 
61-79; Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies: The Impact on Human Rights 
and Democracy; Gibson, "Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation," 409-432. 
193 One valuable example of a work that focuses on the individual and internal components of the TRC is 
the collection from Deborah Posel and Graeme Simpson, eds., Commissioning the Past: Understanding 
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 
2002). 
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has been paid to the development and emergence of the TRC, specifically in light of the 
continuation of the previous regime. 
 The treatment of the TRC as a ‘miracle’ or ‘novel’ institution in studies or accounts 
of its operations reproduce a tautological account of its emergence. The idea for a truth 
commission is recognized as emerging prior to the 1994 election.194 But, the influence of 
earlier commissions and investigatory bodies is not well attended, Sitze’s exploration 
aside.195 As discussed above, Freeman recognizes the institutional similarities, and that 
countries’ previous experience elucidated limitations in their use, but the focus of his 
analysis is on assessing fairness in truth commission processes.196 Other references to 
earlier commissions of inquiry point to the relevance of the internal investigations carried 
out by the African National Congress in the early 1990s that were conducted before the 
truth commission was established.197  
This project focuses on these earlier influences on the truth commission process. In 
line with du Toit’s recognition that the literature on reconciliation in South Africa often 
neglects important political developments in the earlier 1990s as the transition began, this 
project engages with this time period to identify how this period matters for understanding 
the truth commission.198 In so doing, it speaks to the literature on truth commissions more 
                                                
194 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 27; Boraine, "Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way," 
144. 
195 The entirety of Sitze’s book addresses these themes, Sitze, The Impossible Machine. 
196 Freeman, Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness, 24. 
197 Marianne Geula, "South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission as an Alternate Means of 
Addressing Transitional Government Conflicts in a Divided Society," Boston University of International 
Law Journal 18 (2000): 63-64; Boraine, "Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way," 144. 
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broadly by clarifying how these earlier developments created conditions more favourable 
to truth commission. This is important because, as one ICTJ report states, sometimes truth 
commission “successes have been presented as a panacea, and some country experiences, 
especially South Africa’s, have been seen as universally applicable.”199 To be sure, the 
recognition that truth commissions ought to be constructed based on specific contextual 
factors and not transplanted is frequently recognized. However, specifying more clearly 
the process and highlighting that the timeframe of influence ought to be extended furthers 
this discussion.  
There is a question of periodization that affects these considerations. The 
confluence of norms around transitional justice more recently shifts some pressures for 
accountability to external and international actors as transitional justice has become 
institutionalized and spurned transnational advocacy efforts.200 The contemporary 
presence of transnational advocacy groups and experts on transitional justice adds 
additional interests to considerations of transitional justice.201 Given that the South African 
case influenced the debate and adoption of truth commission processes and that it was 
implemented prior to the normative uptake, these considerations may be less problematic 
for this project as it is framed. To be sure, there was international presence in civil society 
                                                
199 "Challenging the Conventional: Can Truth Commissions Strengthen Peace Processes?,"  (International 
Center for Transitional Justice and the Kofi Annan Foundation, June 2014), 89. 
200 Jelena Subotić, "The Transformation of International Transitional Justice Advocacy," The International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 6, no. 1 (2012): 107, 112-114. See also, Jelena Subotić, "The Paradox of 
International Justice Compliance," The International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 3 (2009): 362-
383.  
201 Jamie Rowen, "Searching for Truth," in Searching for Truth in the Transitional Justice Movement 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Subotić, "The Transformation of International 
Transitional Justice Advocacy," 106-125.  
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discussions about the prospect for truth commissions.202 However, the scale of the South 
African influence and the expertise developed from academics and practitioners has 
increased, leading to the consolidation of a what Theiden has referred to as a transitional 
justice “industry”.203 This illustrates the value in better understanding the process and 
relationship under consideration in this project. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has defined the truth commission and explained its use as a tool of transitional 
justice. The chapter identified how the literature on the South African TRC has shaped the 
field and associated assumptions about truth commissions. The chapter also used the 
literature on commissions of inquiry and truth commissions to position the difference 
between a truth commission and a commission of inquiry, albeit arguing that the truth 
commission is indeed a variation of a commission a commission of inquiry. With this 
recognition, the chapter explored examples in which commissions of inquiry have preceded 
formal truth-seeking processes and suggested importance in further understanding this 
relationship. The next chapter explores the potential relationships between earlier 
investigative practices and truth commissions, presenting a theoretical framework rooted 
in historical institutionalism, to specify the explanatory value of path dependence and 
incremental institutional change.  
                                                
202 See for example, Alex Boraine and Janet Levy, eds., The Healing of a Nation? (Cape Town: Justice in 
Transition, 1995).  
203 Kimberly Theidon, "Editorial Note," The International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 3 (2009): 
296. See also  Rowen, "Searching for Truth," 6; Subotić, "The Transformation of International Transitional 
Justice Advocacy," 117.  
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Chapter 4  
4 Theoretical Framework 
 
The previous chapter identified similarities in the institutional framework of commissions 
of inquiry and truth commissions. These similar institutional features are theoretically 
interesting in light of the potential for truth-seeking processes to retain positive or negative 
attributes from previous experiences with commissions of inquiry. Many of the historical 
institutionalist explanations of institutional operation broadly recognize the persistence of 
institutional practices once adopted, based on increasing returns that make change more 
difficult once a certain path is chosen.1 As Thelen recognizes, these explanations are 
“intuitively attractive” and help to explain why institutions often seem to be resistant to 
change.2 This historical institutional framework of path dependence helps to situate the 
problem of entrenchment of investigative practices under different regimes but does not 
satisfactorily account for the change under consideration in this project.  
Instead, theories of incremental change can be used to help explain how institutions 
that used the same institutional framework facilitate adjustments to strengthen information-
gathering measures. In order to explain changes in institutional configurations once 
established and entrenched, analysts identify changes in environmental features, the 
incorporation of actors with sufficient resources, different ideas and interests, or unforeseen 
                                                
1 James Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology," Theory and Society 29 (2000): 512; Paul 
Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," American Political Science 
Review 94, no. 2 (2000): 252. 
2 Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the 
United States, and Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 27-28.  
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emergent issues as explanatory factors for gradual institutional change.3 This approach 
highlights institutions as a site of contestation, not simply accepted practice.4 The empirical 
chapters that follow in the dissertation demonstrate that the successful development of the 
truth-seeking process in South Africa can be explained in part as a process of gradual 
institutional change. Framed as a process of incremental institutional change, changes 
made to the design of the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and 
Intimidation contributed to the successful redeployment of information-gathering measures 
leading up to the TRC by rebuilding credibility in the commission of inquiry in the 
transitional period, and, through the adoption of witness protection measures. The most 
celebrated component of the TRC, amnesty, is also explored as a process of incremental 
institution change. In each of these institutional modalities, existing institutions are put to 
work in different ways than how they had been used by the Apartheid regime, in this case, 
to strengthen information-gathering capacities.  
This chapter begins with a discussion of the transitional environments in which 
truth commissions are established, articulating theoretical justification for truth 
commissions and the influence of the transitional setting on their implementation. The next 
section analyzes the theoretical underpinning of institutional continuity within the 
historical institutionalist school of thought. The third and final section introduces theories 
                                                
3 James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," in Explaining 
Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, ed. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1-37; Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen, 
"Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies," in Beyond Continuity: Institutional 
Change in Advanced Political Economies, ed. Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen (New York and 
Oxford: 2005), 1-31. 
4 Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, 
and Japan, 32. 
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of incremental institutional change and demonstrates how the model of conversion helps 
to explain changes in the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and 
Intimidation and articulates a potential impact on the TRC.  
 
4.1 The Canvas for Transitional Truth-seeking 
 
Existing theoretical accounts for the establishment and design of truth commissions can be 
characterized as functionalist. A functionalist perspective usually takes as a starting point 
that institutions can be explained based on their apparent purpose for existing.5 In other 
words, institutions exist in the form that they do in order to solve particular problems. On 
the surface, truth commissions fit this characterization easily. Truth commissions are 
established for a particular purpose, such as truth-seeking and redress. Ideally, they are 
designed by actors to meet that purpose.6 Because of their narrowly defined mandates—
both in duties and scope—taking the truth commission as a rationally designed institution 
of redress, is in some ways, warranted.   
However, as Pierson outlines, functionalist accounts do not adequately consider 
three potential issues that affect institutional development and design. First, those 
establishing institutions may not be acting in terms of efficacy or rationality necessarily. 
Second, short-term payoffs in institutional development may have unintended 
consequences for later institutional operation. Third, there is no guarantee that those 
                                                
5 Paul Pierson, "The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change," Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions 13, no. 4 (2000): 477. 
6 Subotić notes that this instrumentalism has expanded beyond the pursuit of justice and into the realms of 
peacebuilding and democratization. See, Jelena Subotić, "The Transformation of International Transitional 
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establishing institutions get it right at the beginning.7 Similarly, in thinking about truth 
commission processes, a functionalist approach does not enable an accounting for truth 
commissions that are established without sufficient political will or as instrumental 
political maneuvers.8  
The transitional setting also influences how truth-seeking and information 
gathering can be undertaken. Theoretically, members of an outgoing regime are likely to 
be interested in minimal accountability measures for past human rights violations, and as 
Skaar recognizes, want to “avoid being given public blame for the violations.”9 
Significantly, in transitional settings, there is an element of flux or flexibility in political 
conditions, including the institutional configurations.10 O’Donnell and Schmitter identify 
that the rules shaping transitions are usually still those imposed by the previous regime, 
and that a transition is recognizable when these rules begin to be adjusted to extend rights 
guarantees.11 Critically, however, as Thelen observes, it is important to recognize that 
institutions persist in spite of transitions.12  
                                                
7 Pierson, "The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change," 483. 
8 On instrumental dimensions of transitional justice more broadly see Jelena Subotić, "The Paradox of 
International Justice Compliance," The International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 3 (2009): 362-
383. 
9 Skaar, "Truth commissions, trials - or nothing? Policy options in democratic transitions," 1111. 
10 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies," 
in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, ed. Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C 
Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 3. 
11 O’Donnell and Schmitter, "Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies," 6, 15. 
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and Japan, 7. 
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The crucial element here is that the process of transition opens the possibility for 
change, although which institutions change and how they change is not universal.13 Thus, 
the setting matters in the impetus to pursue information because outgoing regimes or 
powerholders have an interest in not exposing past deeds. The commitment to a truth 
commission, or the political will to facilitate truth-seeking, is influenced, at least in part, 
by the actions and behaviour of the old regime.  
The opening of a transitional space thus provides an opportunity for different ideas, 
conceptualizations of rules, and institutional praxis. These rules may represent popular 
demands, or may reflect a recognition of the need for reform from the “soft-liners” in a 
regime, in order to maintain regime durability.14 Many accounts of the South African 
transition focus on the role of elites in negotiating the transition, with both the National 
Party (NP) leadership and the African National Congress (ANC) leadership recognizing 
there were few other pathways forward without negotiation.15 Others do highlight different 
factors in precipitating the transition, but the transition itself is still identified as an elite-
led process. Wood, for example, investigates South Africa as a case of ‘transition from 
                                                
13 Geddes reminds us that the difficulties for “theoretical synthesis” in explanations for transitions to 
democracy is that the types of autocratic regime from which transitions are occurring also differ. See 
Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?," Annual Review of 
Political Science 2 (1999): 121. This logic extends to the discussion here given that transitional justice 
measures are established in different types of transitions. 
14 O’Donnell and Schmitter, "Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies," 15-16. 
15 See, Hermann Giliomee, "Democratization in South Africa," Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 1 
(1995): 83-104; Johannes Rantete and Hermann Giliomee, "Transition to Democracy through Transaction?: 
Bilateral Negotiations between the ANC and NP in South Africa," African Affairs 91, no. 365 (1992): 515-
542. For an overview of transitional arguments see: David R. Howarth, "Paradigms Gained? A Critique of 
Theories and Explanations of Democratic Transition in South Africa," in South Africa in Transition: New 
Theoretical Perspectives, ed. David R. Howarth and Aletta J. Norval (New York: St. Martin’s Press), 182-
214. 
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below,’ identifying the role of the masses in pressuring towards a transition.16 Price focuses 
on the economic structural conditions impelling the parties toward negotiation.17   
This project focuses on institutional persistence and change during the transition 
period. Concentrating on successive negotiated agreements and their associated 
institutional deployment means that the transitional explanations that focus on the political 
elite and associated institutional structures is beneficial for framing the patterns under 
investigation. The theoretical framing begins with the recognition that South Africa’s 
transition was negotiated by elites and that the measures towards the eventual democratic 
election were negotiated arrangements, agreed to successively until consensus could be 
reached on transitional arrangements themselves. The case is treated as a pacted 
transition.18  
In pacted transitions, the increased maneuverability of the elite actors theoretically 
enables greater bargaining potential and guarantees of participation.19 This is particularly 
relevant to the study here because of the origins of the Commission of Inquiry for the 
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation within a pact, the National Peace Accord. 
A pact is defined by O’Donnell and Schmitter as:  
An explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a 
select set of actors which seeks to define (or, better, to redefine) rules governing 
                                                
16 On popular pressures, see, Elisabeth Jean Wood, "An Insurgent Path to Democracy: Popular 
Mobilization, Economic Interests, and Regime Transition in South Africa and El Salvador," Comparative 
Political Studies 34, no. 8 (2001): 862-888. 
17 Robert M.  Price, The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa 1975-1990 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
18 See Timothy D. Sisk, "The Violence-Negotiation Nexus: South Africa in Transition and the Politics of 
Uncertainty," Negotiation Journal 9, no. 1 (1993): 77-94. 
19 Paige Arthur, "How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional 
Justice," Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009): 346. 
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the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of 
those entering into it.20  
 
Elite-driven models focus on the decision-making influence of those in positions of power. 
This perspective reflects the belief that “the origins of democracy are to be found in 
political choices rather than in structural conditions—and these choices are made by 
elites.”21 This is important because although transitional decisions are influenced by the 
structural and economic realities of the political realm at the time, the agency of elites in 
making agreements and compromises, in addition to the potential to renege, can change or 
alter the trajectory of political transitions.  
Pertinent to this discussion is the manner in which the transitional space enables 
the prospect of reform. de Klerk, in his moves to liberalize and dismantle the Apartheid 
system, can be characterized in O’Donnell and Schmitter’s terminology as a “soft-liner”; 
working within the regime to make changes toward transition.22 The transitional 
environment characterized by ongoing negotiations contributed to an overlapping space of 
governance and negotiation that persisted from 1990 to the eventual election in 1994.  
Offering an analysis of the potential pathways for a transition to democracy in 1992, Van 
Zyl Slabbert suggests that “there [was] nothing inevitable, nor arbitrary, about the 
transition in South Africa – it came about by deliberate political choice.”23 Giliomee also 
identifies a purposeful characterization stating that the National Party, “deliberately 
                                                
20 O’Donnell and Schmitter, "Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies," 37. 
21 This is Arthur’s analysis of O’Donnell and Schmitter and the Transitions Project, see Arthur, "How 
“Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice," 346. 
22 Horwath discusses this in Howarth, "Paradigms Gained? A Critique of Theories and Explanations of 
Democratic Transition in South Africa," 195. 
23 Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert, The Quest for Democracy: South Africa in transition (London: Penguin 
Books, 1992), 30. 
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embarked on a process that would end white minority rule.”24 The process of negotiations 
that began in 1990 and culminated in the 1993 Interim Constitution, which helped to 
facilitate the democratic election of 1994, thus opened a period of domestic politics which 
saw the structures of governance being used to respond to emergent issues in the 
negotiation period—including state-initiated investigations. These were the conditions that 
facilitated the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public 
Violence and Intimidation. The decision to implement this information-gathering 
institution, and the design of the process had impacts that continued through the transitional 
period and its aftermath. 
 
4.2 Institutional Continuities  
The historical institutional approach adopted for this study enables a better understanding 
of the persistence of institutional patterns through the transitional period in the form of a 
commission of inquiry. It also offers a framework for exploring how information-gathering 
institutions shape, and are shaped by, past use. Finally, it enables a way to account for 
gradual change in institutions that persisted through Apartheid and the transition. An 
historical institutionalist account is specifically useful as it expands the time-horizon under 
investigation and, in so doing, allows for the incorporation of potentially overlooked 
variables in explaining strengths in South Africa’s truth-seeking process. 
Historical institutionalist accounts of continuity and change highlight two 
important features in expectations about institutional behaviour. First, historical 
institutionalism recognizes that “history matters” in understanding later political 
                                                
24 Giliomee, "Democratization in South Africa," 83. 
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developments. Second, the literature on institutional persistence and change highlights a 
recognition that, once established, institutional practices are entrenched and become more 
resistant to change.25 These theoretical underpinnings help to articulate the applicability of 
historical institutionalism to the pattern identified in the previous chapter: although the 
truth commission is often deployed in a symbolically-laden and contextually specific 
manner, conceptually, it looks similar to, and borrows heavily from its institutional relative, 
the commission of inquiry. Taking more centrally the possibility that institutions may 
persist in transitional politics offers a different lens to consider factors influencing the 
operation of truth commissions. 
 Within the historical institutionalist approach, stability is framed in terms of path 
dependence.  Path dependence is rooted in the idea that decisions and actions made at an 
earlier point in time shape later decisions—based on positive feedback which makes it 
difficult to alter a path once a certain one is chosen.26 Positive feedback and institutional 
“stickiness” are central causal factors in institutions maintaining structure and stability over 
time.27 As Pierson suggests, the key causal mechanism at play in this explanation is rooted 
in the notion of “stickiness”:  
Exploring the sources and consequences of path dependence helps us to understand 
the powerful inertia or ‘stickiness’ that characterizes many aspects of political 
development – for instance, the enduring consequences that often stem from the 
emergence of particular institutional arrangements.28  
 
                                                
25 Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," 252. 
26 Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 21. 
27 Ibid., 11, 21, 40, 41, 43, 52.  
28 Ibid., 11. 
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Path dependence as a framing mechanism is useful in this context because it re-frames 
common assumptions about the establishment of truth commissions. It lengthens the time 
periods considered important from transition and post-transition periods to include 
elements in the pre-transitional phase that may have been overlooked in how truth 
commissions are structured.29 In addition, the stickiness of institutions helps to explain 
why investigative practices take similar shapes. Arguably, these earlier political institutions 
remain remarkably significant. Unless states experience full-fledged collapse or are placed 
under United Nations trusteeship, it is only possible to construct a transition using whole 
parts or pieces of these already existing institutions. As much as ethically and morally there 
is an urgent need to move away from corrupt or exclusive institutions, in many cases these 
are the very institutions charged with constructing transitional justice processes. Or else, it 
is through these institutions that incremental change is initiated towards peace and/or 
democracy. Advancing an argument that implicates the role of earlier institutional 
developments in the later functioning of truth commission processes seems somewhat 
incompatible with the “transitional” nature of their intended use, but the persistence of the 
investigatory institution over time warrants more attention.  
If patterns of path dependence are taken as a theoretical starting point for 
understanding the persistence of inquiries in relatively different environments, how then 
can the differences in their use be explained? Commissions of inquiry were used by the 
Apartheid regime to reinforce the Apartheid system, and also used during the transitional 
period to begin to address the legacies of that same system. The Goldstone Commission 
did this somewhat effectively and thus it is necessary to account for some variant of change. 
                                                
29 See Pierson on time horizons, Pierson, Politics in Time, 20. 
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Accounts of relatively rapid changes associated with path dependence are framed as critical 
junctures, which are defined as: 
relatively brief episodes during which: (a) the range of possible outcomes that 
might take place in the future briefly but dramatically expands; and (b) events occur 
that quickly close off future possibilities and set into motion processes that track 
specific future outcomes.30  
 
While the initiation of a political transition in South Africa may well be characterized as a 
critical juncture, this decisive moment did not bring about the implementation of an entirely 
new institutional configuration to investigate violence. Instead, the government returned to 
existing models of commissions of inquiry that were in many ways delegitimized by the 
Apartheid regime. Despite this persistence, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention 
of Public Violence and Intimidation was able to operate in a manner very different to its 
predecessors. This was in part based on the design of the Commission. Other innovations 
emerged through its operations.  Further, its innovations had important influences on later 
truth-seeking process. This tension suggests a need to direct more focus to the institutions 
for investigation and information gathering to explain why, despite institutional 
persistence, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and 
Intimidation operated more credibly.  
Incremental accounts of institutional change developed by Mahoney and Thelen as well 
as Streeck and Thelen argue that change can occur more gradually than is often afforded 
by proponents of critical junctures.31 Rather than seeing change as a result of moments of 
                                                
30 Giovanni Capoccia, "Critical Junctures," in The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism, ed. Karl 
Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia Gabriela Faletti, and Adam D. Sheingate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
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significant change, this approach to understanding institutional development focuses on the 
process of gradual and cumulative changes over time to explain changes in institutional 
composition and purpose. The value of the incremental change framework, in part, lies in 
is its complementarity to the observations of path dependence. Institutions change 
gradually because they persist over time. How this change occurs in light of the persistent 
or entrenched nature of institutions is demonstrated in the below discussion of theories of 
incremental change. 
 
4.3 Redeployment and Adjustment: Theories of 
Gradual Institutional Change 
 
Turning to historical institutional theories of incremental change offers a compelling lens 
to explain how an earlier investigative institution was deployed with a similar institutional 
framework to previous commissions of inquiry but contributed to the strength of the South 
African TRC, rather than repeating status-quo operations. Gradual or incremental change 
approaches to institutional change identify how and why institutional arrangements can be 
adjusted, in spite of the persistence of institutions. Thelen argues that path dependence still 
informs incremental change explanations, but “embed[s] these elements in an analysis of 
ongoing political contestation over institutional outcomes.”32 In doing so, incremental 
change frameworks highlight the processes through which institutional arrangements 
persist, yet are renegotiated periodically in ways that alter their form and functions, or 
continued use. 
                                                
32 Kathleen Thelen, "How Institutions Evolve: Insights From Comparative Historical Analysis," ed. James 
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This incremental change approach explains change in more gradual patterns, and 
offers insight into the smaller adjustments that are made to institutions that allow them to 
adapt or alter their function or purpose. Thelen, and, Mahoney and Thelen offer four 
models or variations to explain incremental change in institutions: “displacement,” “drift,” 
“layering,” and “conversion.”33 As is articulated below, the mechanics of conversion help 
to explain institutional persistence and redeployment of information-gathering institutions 
in South Africa.  
Displacement is conceptualized by Mahoney and Thelen as “the removal of existing 
rules and the introduction of new ones.”34 During the transitional period in South Africa, 
many of the institutional rules for information gathering stayed formally the same. As the 
coming chapters illustrate, although other Apartheid legislation was repealed, the effects 
on information gathering cannot be characterized as displacement because these remained 
intact. In processes of layering, existing institutional features continue to operate and 
structure relationships and decisions, but additional rules and features are added to these 
structures.35 Layering “occurs when new rules are attached to existing ones, thereby 
changing the ways in which the original rules structure behavior.”36 Analysts point to the 
addition of private pension rules in addition to public pension systems as an example of 
layering.37 In this example, although a public system often remains in place, the addition 
                                                
33 Mahoney and Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," 1-37; Thelen, "How Institutions 
Evolve: Insights From Comparative Historical Analysis," 213. 
34 Mahoney and Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," 15. 
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of a private system can change the behaviour of individuals and associated interest groups, 
which will ultimately introduce change to the institution itself.38 In the South African case 
under consideration, the tension is that the same institutions were deployed and redeployed, 
despite the transitional opening that may have facilitated the incorporation of new 
institutions that might illustrate other variations of change.  
Drift and conversion neither remove old rules, nor do they see new rules 
implemented. Rather, these incremental change processes occur when the impact or 
enactment of the existing rules changes.39 Drift occurs when institutional configurations 
are not adjusted to reflect changes in the environment.40 Institutional arrangements have 
different impacts because of the changed context.41 Onoma argues that the development of 
land-buying companies in Kenya is an example of “drift.”42 The initial purpose of the land-
buying companies was to enable Kenyans to purchase land that became available, yet 
remained unaffordable, as settlers left in 1960s and 1970s. However, as Onoma explains, 
in the years that followed, these companies were taken over by fraudsters who continued 
to engage in land transactions, which turned out to be false, channeling money into political 
campaigns and becoming tools to pressure shareholders for political support.43 In this 
example, the manipulation of the land title process was worsened by democratization given 
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39 Mahoney and Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," 16-18. 
40 Ibid., 17. 
41 Ibid., 17. 
42 Ato Kwamena Onoma, "The Contradictory Potential of Institutions: The Rise and Decline of Land 
Documentation in Kenya," in Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, ed. James 
Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010), 78.  
43 Ibid., 78-82. 
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the political value in fraudulent land holdings.44 The mechanics of ‘drift’ illustrate how 
institutions created for one purposes can end up serving entirely different ends.   
Conversion is defined as a change in goals, where institutional rules themselves are 
not changed.45 In this variant of incremental institutional change the “rules remain formally 
the same but are interpreted and enacted in new ways.”46 Institutional ambiguities can be 
used by well-positioned actors to change how institutional elements are implemented. As 
Mahoney and Thelen argue, “lacking the capacity to destroy an institution, institutional 
challengers may be able to exploit its inherent ambiguities in ways that allow them to 
redirect it toward more favourable functions and effects.”47  
In each of these variations, Mahoney and Thelen identify the role that actors have 
within particular institutional settings and the degree of ambiguity in the institution in order 
to explain the type of change that occurs. In settings where actors have the power and 
capability to change institutional configurations, layering and drift are possible. When 
actors are not positioned to make outright changes to institutions and rules, ambiguity in 
the design may enable actors to make adjustments in how institutions are deployed.48 
Mahoney and Thelen argue that high or strong veto capabilities exist when actors have 
“access to institutional or extra-institutional means of blocking change.”49 When there are 
                                                
44 Onoma, "The Contradictory Potential of Institutions: The Rise and Decline of Land Documentation in 
Kenya," 88.  
45 Mahoney and Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," 17. 
46 Ibid., 17. 
47 Ibid., 18. 
48 Ibid., 10-14. 
49 Ibid., 19. 
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no such capabilities to prevent or block change, gradual institutional change is likely to 
take place through displacement and conversion. Whether institutional change takes the 
form of displacement or conversion depends on the degree of ambiguity in interpreting or 
enforcing the rules.50 Low levels of space for interpretation and low veto capabilities are 
associated with displacement. High levels of interpretation and low levels of ambiguity are 
associated with conversion.51 
The four types of incremental institutional change are also differentiated based on 
their treatment of existing institutions and response to external environments.52 Two of 
these, displacement and layering, include the introduction of new rules or institutions.53 
Displacement is considered to occur when new rules are introduced and old ones 
removed.54 Since displacement involves the replacement of an old institution by a new one, 
its explanatory utility is limited for this discussion. Each of the institutions under 
consideration in the project—the commission of inquiry, witness protection, and 
amnesty—were adjusted, but not replaced outright. 
In the South African case under consideration, conversion offers a useful and 
relevant framework for assessing and explaining both the persistence of the commission of 
inquiry as an institution of information-gathering, and a process of gradual change, given 
the difficulty in changing the ‘locked-in’ institutional arrangements that structure state-led 
                                                
50 Mahoney and Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," 19. 
51 Ibid., 19. 
52 Ibid., 15. 
53 Ibid., 16-17. 
54 Mahoney and Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," 16; Streeck and Thelen, 
"Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies," 19. 
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investigations. The context of institutional enactment, including the circumstances of 
decision makers, influenced both the opening for change or persistence and the type of 
incremental change that may be attempted. This is significant for understanding change in 
the institutionalization of information-gathering measures because of the balance of power 
of the negotiating parties. In the transitional space under examination, neither side had 
strong veto capabilities given the negotiating environment and the persistent potential to 
derail the process without agreement and concession. This is not to suggest that there were 
no attempts to push their own interests, but rather that the negotiation environment itself 
was constrained by the shared pursuit of a democratic dispensation, thereby making some 
degree of change more likely.  
The value of the framing of conversion depends on the fact that the commission of 
inquiry was well-entrenched and “sticky” before and during South Africa’s transition. As 
will be explored in Chapters 6 and 7, the recurrent use of commissions of inquiry under 
Apartheid and the decision to adopt another commission to investigate violence during the 
transition demonstrate the persistence of the institution. In this case, the characteristics of 
conversion, the deployment of the same institutional rules but with sufficient ambiguity for 
actors to make adjustments, helps make sense of the emergence of a change-inducing 
commission of inquiry that remained housed in the existing institutional structures. 
Conversion helps to explain how the flexibility and opportunity in the opening of the 
transition were used to implement a familiar institution that was sufficiently malleable 
because of the changing environment. This opportunity was seized by Commission 
leadership in order to investigate ongoing violence. The effects of this gradual change are 
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evident in the Goldstone Commission’s mediating of the shortcomings of the commission 
of inquiry as an institutional practice.  
In addition, once the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence 
and Intimidation was deployed, the process of conversion continued to be identifiable in 
its operation. The Commission engaged other measures to change the way information 
gathering was carried out. As such, once established, the Commission underwent its own 
change variations; using the structures of the commission of inquiry to facilitate witness 
protection. Additionally, conversion is valuable in explaining how the institutions of 
indemnity and amnesty were used in different ways during the transitional period. As will 
be demonstrated in Chapter 9, the institution of amnesty itself did not change, but rather, 
was used by actors in different ways to achieve different ends. Thus, the persistence of 
indemnity/amnesty throughout the negotiations and through to the truth commission 
process presents, on the surface, as institutional continuity, but when unpacked, the 
justification for the use of this institutional modality suggests a gradual variation over time.   
4.4 Institutional Design  
 
The framework of path dependence and gradual institutional change situates the 
institutional continuities and the environment conducive to change in the institutions under 
consideration. Another important element in locating the potential for gradual change 
within the information-gathering institutions is the design of the Commission of Inquiry 
for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation at the time of its implementation in 
the early 1990s. The notion of institutional design is also important in understanding the 
adjustments that were made to the institution during its operation. The establishment of the 
Goldstone Commission within the negotiation period in South Africa helps to explain the 
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opportunity for gradual institutional change, but it is also important to recognize the 
importance of institutional design. The mandate for the Commission of Inquiry for the 
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation was influenced by the Government’s shift 
to negotiations which, in turn, helped to facilitate gradual institutional change.  
 In his overview of institutional design, Goodin relies on the following definition of 
design: “the creation of an actionable form to promote valued outcomes in a particular 
context.”55 The potential for institutions to be designed in specific and varied ways to meet 
social and political needs is a dominant concern in institutional theorizing. For instance, 
institutional design has been identified as one contributing factor in managing ethnically 
divided societies through constitutional engineering.56  
 Institutional design matters because of the important role institutions play in 
prescribing and facilitating interactions, making “behavior more stable and predictable.”57 
Characteristics of design influence how well an institution can perform its intended role, 
and, what Goodin refers to as the “‘goodness of fit’ between the designed object…and the 
larger context in which it is set.”58 The malleability of institutional design is an important 
consideration in the discussion of institutional persistence and change.  
                                                
55 Goodin uses Bobrow and Dryzek’s definition, see Goodin, "Institutions and Their Design," 31. 
56 Stefan Wolff, "Post-Conflict State Building: the debate on institutional change," Third World Quarterly 
32, no. 10 (2011): 1777-1802; Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "Addressing Ethnic Divisions in Post-Conflict 
Institution Building: Lessons from Recent Cases," Security Dialogue 36, no. 3 (2005): 297-317; Henry E. 
Hale, "Divided We Stand: Institutional Sources of Ethnofederal State Survival and Collapse," World 
Politics 56 (2004): 165-193; Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies," Journal of 
Democracy 15, no. 2 (2004): 96-109. 
57 Goodin, "Institutions and Their Design," 22. 
58 Ibid., 33-34. 
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Goodin suggests that institutional design matters not only in relation to the 
institution doing what is intended of it, but also in relation to the larger context in which 
institutions are embedded.59 In this way, Offe’s recognition that changing context results 
in critiques or the recognition of insufficiencies in existing institutions helps to explain 
adjustments or changes in design.60 However, Offe acknowledges that there are several 
ways for institutions to be altered, or tweaked, either in response to broader pressures or in 
order to survive.61 Although the persistence of institutions can be seen as an indicator of 
an institution that is well-established with regard to its domain or environment,62 change 
in the environment or social pressures may lead to changes in institutional design. This is 
important for understanding the design of the Goldstone Commission given the state’s 
initial efforts to begin dismantling Apartheid. 
Similar to explanations of institutional persistence through path dependence, 
theoretical accounts of institutional design recognize the importance of earlier institutional 
developments in shaping later iterations or redesigning institutions.63 A critical issue 
however, is the degree of intentionality in the design of institutions and the locus of this 
change.64 Offe recognizes, for example, that it is rare that an individual is pinpointed for 
                                                
59 Goodin, "Institutions and Their Design," 37. 
60 Claus Offe, "Designing Institutions in East European Transitions," in The Theory of Institutional Design, 
ed. Robert E. Goodin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 223-225. 
61 Ibid., 219-220. 
62 Goodin talks about the evolutionary parallels that are often used to explain a good fit to their 
environment based on institutional survival, Goodin, "Institutions and Their Design," 25. 
63 Goodin, "Institutions and Their Design," 30. 
64 Ibid., 27-30. 
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their establishment of particular variations of institutions.65 Rather, design decisions 
emerge from a combination of previous experience, fit within contextual needs, and the 
interaction of accidents or unintended consequences.66 Pierson also identifies that “actor-
centered rationalism” and other functionalist accounts for institutional emergence and 
design are insufficient for explaining design outcomes over time because of the interaction 
effects of other influencing factors.67 However, how institutions are structured influences 
how they achieve what it is they were implemented to do. The very possibility of 
influencing design or adjusting institutions suggests some potential for intentionality in 
design choices, acknowledging the interaction and unintended consequences that are also 
at play.68 
 Components of institutional design are addressed here because design alterations 
were made in the creation of the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public 
Violence and Intimidation. While the institution of the commission of inquiry itself 
persisted, this specific iteration was designed with different powers, ostensibly to address 
ongoing violence. The potential for the Goldstone Commission to carry out information 
gathering in a credible fashion can be explained, in part, by these institutional design 
features, as is argued in Chapter 7. Although certain institutional features were 
incorporated into the original legislation for the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention 
of Public Violence and Intimidation, an engagement with these design elements and the 
                                                
65 Offe, "Designing Institutions in East European Transitions," 214-215. 
66 Goodin, "Institutions and Their Design," 28-30. 
67 Pierson, Politics in Time, 103-132. 
68 Goodin, "Institutions and Their Design," 28. 
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characteristics that enabled the introduction of gradual institutional change required a 
recognition of the appropriate means and mechanisms to do so. Components of initial 
institutional design, and efforts made to undertake incremental change reflected past 
experience with these institutional modalities and the changing societal pressures on this 
particular information-gathering institution. In addition, effective choices in the design of 
these information-gathering institutions seem to have played a role in the design of the later 
truth commission process. 
  
Conclusion 
This chapter has identified how institutional theorizing in terms of path dependence and 
gradual institutional change structure this project. The chapter argues that the transitional 
environment shaped the potential for institutional continuity and change. It argues that the 
persistence of the commission of inquiry and eventually the adoption of a truth commission 
suggests path dependence in institutions. Yet, the successful implementation of truth-
seeking measures at the TRC is a development that should also be understood as gradual 
institutional change, specifically a process of conversion.  
 The next chapter provides a brief overview of the case of South Africa and its 
institutions for truth-seeking. Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate that path dependence helps 
account for the persistence of investigatory bodies over time.  However, as these chapters 
illustrate, while a path dependent framing helps to explain South Africa’s recurrent turn to 
commissions of inquiry, it does not adequately account for the adjustments made to the 
Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation in its 
deployment and operation nor its component institutional modalities. These considerations 
are taken up in the chapters that follow.  
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Chapter 5  
 
5 South Africa: Context and History  
 
The previous two chapters have established two elements that undergird the analysis of 
gradual institutional change in information-gathering institutions for this investigation of 
the South African case. First, Chapter 3 identified a tension in the literature in 
conceptualizations of truth commissions and commissions of inquiry and potential patterns 
in their successive use. Second, Chapter 4 articulated the theoretical value in this line of 
investigation into gradual change and the institutionalization of truth-seeking.  
This chapter provides a brief overview of South Africa’s Apartheid system, the 
political transition, and the information-gathering and truth-seeking institutions established 
during and  after the transition.1 There are many different possible narratives that could 
explain the Apartheid state and the eventual democratic transition. Not all of these can be 
explored in a study of this length. As such, the chapter is structured around violence and 
the responses to violence during Apartheid and during the transition. The chapter begins 
by considering the nature of Apartheid and resistance to it, and then identifies the state’s 
response to that resistance. The chapter then provides an overview of the peace and 
                                                
1 The Apartheid system and other policies were developed, implemented, and maintained based on 
determinations of race. With regards to terminology, following Gibson, I point to Stephen R. Graubard’s 
commentary in the preface to a journal’s issue about South Africa. Graubard writes, “Editorial note: In 
South Africa as in the United State, racial terminology is politically charged—and constantly changing. 
Many of the author in this issue observe the South African convention of dividing the country’s population 
into four facial categories: white (of European descent), colored (of mixed ancestry), Indian (forebears 
from the Indian subcontinent), and African. The official nomenclature for “Africans” has itself varied over 
the years, changing from ‘native’ to ‘Bantu’ in the middle of the apartheid era, and then changing again to 
‘black’ or, today ‘African/black.’ All of these terms appear in the essays that follow.” See Stephen R. 
Graubard, "Preface to the Issue “Why South Africa Matters”," Daedalus 130, no. 1 (2001): VIII. See also, 
James L. Gibson, "The Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 3 
(2006): 410-411, footnote 417. 
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constitutional negotiations that effectively brought about the end of Apartheid. The chapter 
ends with a discussion of the two institutions examined in this work: the Commission of 
Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. 
 
5.1 Apartheid, Conflict, and Violence 
 
Apartheid refers to the “system of institutionalised racism and racial social engineering” in 
South Africa.2  The National Party in South Africa implemented Apartheid as a policy in 
1948, although racism existed in the political system prior to Apartheid’s formal adoption.3 
The purported purpose of Apartheid was to ensure the strength and survival of the minority 
white Afrikaner population and the white population more broadly.4 Systematic legislation 
prevented the black majority from participating in political and economic structures. 
Apartheid policies were precisely legislated to create and reinforce racial segregation and 
dominance. In some ways, Apartheid policies drew upon or solidified earlier segregationist 
policies, although the National Party developed other elements that contributed to the 
totality of the system after their election in 1948.5  The systematic exclusion depended on 
the state’s ability to ensure its policies permeated all levels of society. Broad legislative 
                                                
2 Deborah Posel, "The Apartheid Project, 1948–1970," in The Cambridge History of South Africa, ed. 
Robert Ross, Anne Kelk Mager, and Bill Nasson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 319. 
3  Saul Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, First ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 11; Kristin 
Henrard, "Post-Apartheid South Africa: Transformation and Reconciliation," World Affairs 166, no. 1 
(2003): 37. 
4 Posel, "The Apartheid Project, 1948–1970," 321-322. 
5 See Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, 37. South Africa, since its union had been built on policies of 
exclusion and segregation. While Apartheid as a comprehensive policy was implemented in 1948, 
systemized racism had already been institutionalized to some degree. 
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developments affected personal freedoms, shaped society spatially, and created cleavages 
and disadvantage for the duration of the regime.   
 One of Apartheid’s undergirding pieces of legislation was the Population 
Registration Act of 1950.6 The law stipulated that “a white person, a coloured person or a 
native, as the case may be, and every coloured person and every native whose name is so 
included shall be classified by the Director according to the ethnic or other group to which 
he belongs.”7 By cementing racial categories, laws could then be enforced based on a 
person’s skin colour. These and other laws and policies dictated all facets of peoples’ lives.  
The legislation, Sitze suggests, “criminalized the very existence of ordinary Africans...”8 
Restrictions limited where the black population could live and when and under what 
conditions black people could travel into designated white areas.9 Legislation dictated 
racially specific educational institutions, demarcated hospitals, and prohibited relationships 
between races. Signs delineated spaces and services that were designated for whites only—
from post offices, to public transport, and most places in between.10 These restrictive 
policies stripped the majority of the population of political and civil rights and entrenched 
a disparate socio-economic system. 
                                                
6 Van Zyl Slabbert notes that the other legislation depends on this piece of implementation, see Frederik 
Van Zyl Slabbert, The Last White Parliament (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers and Hans Strydom 
Publishers, 1985), 43. 
7 Union of South Africa, Population Registration Act 1950, §5.  
8 Adam Sitze, "The Opposite of Apartheid: Further Notes on Mandela and the Law," Discourse 40, no. 2 
(2018): 149.  
9 For a comprehensive discussion of Apartheid laws see John Dugard, Human Rights and the South African 
Legal Order (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978). 
10 Dugard, Human Rights and the South African Legal Order, 63. 
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 To enforce Apartheid policies and maintain this prescribed order, a heavy state 
bureaucracy and security establishment developed.11 Posel captures the intersections 
between enforcement and governance under Apartheid:  
For an African person, all the minutiae of everyday life – where and with whom they 
lived, worked, had sex, travelled, shopped, walked or sat down, what they owned and 
consumed – were governed either by issue of appropriate permits or passes or by 
public prohibitions and proscriptions. So, encounters with police, charged with 
enforcing the racial boundaries that animated these regimes of surveillance, were 
inevitable, and breaches of the myriad regulations were legion.12 
 
State institutions, the bureaucracy, and policing expanded to enforce Apartheid policies. 
Opposition and resistance to the structures of oppression endured as Government 
entrenched regulation and enforcement.  
 With varying levels of organization, opposition to Apartheid developed early on. 
Apartheid resistance and opposition organizations including the African National Congress 
(ANC), the Pan-African Congress (PAC), and the United Democratic Front (UDF), for 
example organized and campaigned against the government with different approaches 
(violent and non-violent), levels of organization, and impact. In general, early largely non-
violent means including strikes, sit-ins, and protests characterized early opposition to 
Apartheid laws. The Campaign for the Defiance of Unjust Laws of 1952 is one example.13 
During this campaign, volunteers broke Apartheid laws to go to jail, rather than pay the 
fines associated with the criminalized acts they had committed.14 Dubow identifies that 
                                                
11 Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, 37, 60. 
12 Posel, "The Apartheid Project, 1948–1970," 347. 
13 Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, 42. 
14 Anne Kelk Mager and Maanda Mulaudzi, "Popular Responses to Apartheid: 1948-c. 1975," in The 
Cambridge History of South Africa, ed. Robert Ross, Anne Kelk Mager, and Bill Nasson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 372. 
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“the hope was that by inviting arrest and imposing intolerable burdens on the state’s 
capacity to police its own regulations, the system would be rendered inoperable.”15 The 
government responded to the campaign not by loosening Apartheid restrictions but rather 
with a re-entrenchment through the passage of laws that strengthened the Government’s 
hand in responding to resistance.16  
 The intersection of the forces of control and opposition is embodied in the 1960 
Sharpeville massacre, a critical turning point in South Africa’s history. A demonstration 
organized by the Pan-Africanist Congress to protest the pass laws resulted in 69 deaths and 
hundreds of injuries after the South African Police (SAP) opened fire on the crowd. Though 
the gathering was large, the protesters were unarmed. Many had been shot in the back, 
prompting the TRC to make the finding that “police deliberately opened fire on an unarmed 
crowd…the SAP failed to give the crowd an order to disperse…the police failed to facilitate 
access to medical and/or other assistance to those who were wounded immediately after 
the march.”17 This police response to protest was not novel, but the Sharpeville massacre 
had significant impacts.18 Frankel suggests that: 
The massacre was not, in the end, simply a question of the white police ‘getting at’ 
the people… On the contrary, Sharpeville is an example of wider moments in the 
universal experience where the political rulers and their ruled have been locked into 
tension, antagonism and irremediable conflict, elements which so frequently form 
the tragic backdrop to human atrocities.19 
                                                
15 Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, 43. 
16 Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, 43-45. As Dubow outlines, despite non-violence underpinning this 
demonstration of collective action resulted in violence, and the ANC decided to end the campaign. 
17 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume Three, Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of South Africa (29 October 1998), Chapter 6, 537. 
18 Tom Lodge, "Voices from a Massacre," in Sharpeville: an Apartheid Massacre and its Consequences 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 23-26. 
19 Philip Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity: Sharpeville and Its Massacre (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2001), 12-13. 
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The government responded to the events at Sharpeville by criminalizing opposition through 
the banning of organizations deemed to be threats (including the ANC and PAC); a formal 
inquiry into the massacre through a Commission of Inquiry;20 and the passing of indemnity 
legislation for state actors involved.21 The consensus of analysts is that after Sharpeville, 
Apartheid resisters decided that non-violent collective action was not likely to dismantle 
Apartheid.22  
 In the year following Sharpeville, the ANC formed a separate wing, Umkhonto we 
Sizwe (MK), with which to engage in armed struggle against the state.23 In the initial stages, 
MK directed its campaign of violence against the Apartheid state at symbolic government 
infrastructure.24 The rebellion against the regime became increasingly violent.25 Rallies, 
protests, and bombings were accompanied by profound violence targeting those alleged to 
                                                
20 Adam Sitze, The Impossible Machine: A Genealogy of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (Ann Arbour: The University of Michigan Press, 2013), 177-178. 
21 Stephen R. Davis, The ANC's War Against Apartheid: Umkhonto We Sizwe and the Liberation of South 
Africa (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2018), 4. See also: Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of South Africa Report: Volume One, Volume 1, Chapter 13, 458-459. 
22 See: Kader Asmal, Louise Asmal, and Ronald Suresh Roberts, Reconciliation Through Truth (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 122; Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, 72; Davis, The ANC's War Against 
Apartheid, 50-51; Mager and Mulaudzi, "Popular Responses to Apartheid: 1948-c. 1975," 396; Allister 
Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country (Sandton: Struik Book Distributors, 1994), 23. 
The TRC report of Sobukwe’s Testimony also reflects this relationship: Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of South Africa Report: Volume Two, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa 
(29 October 1998), Chapter 1, 11. 
23 Davis, The ANC's War Against Apartheid, 3-5. 
24 Ibid., 3-5. 
25 In general, two narratives have emerged surrounding the MK’s activities and they will not be evaluated 
here. These are complex and multifaceted with significant power influences. Much of the literature portrays 
the ANC and MK’s armed response to Apartheid as a necessary fight against an illegitimate state. In a 
counter-narrative, others have described the violence as a people’s war–a type of guerilla war modeled on 
the Vietnam war. For example see, Anthea Jeffrey, People’s War: New Light on the Struggle for South 
Africa (South Africa: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2009). 
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be allied with the government.26 The state responded by driving police and security forces 
beyond the mere enforcement of Apartheid’s rule to the adoption of a counter-revolutionary 
approach that brought with it differing degrees of repression.  
During the late 1980s, the security forces in South Africa had wide powers and 
reach. As the nature of the conflict between the state and opposition forces shifted, the 
state’s tools to enforce order and respond to opposition forces shifted. In the public eye, 
the ebb and flow of opposition and uprisings saw police and security forces gain significant 
power in their ability to arrest and detain without trial.27 Both ‘regular’ and covert policing 
operations demonstrated elements of violence. From the mid 1980s to the early 1990s, the 
security apparatus of the state developed the capabilities required to carry out organized 
and effective counter-insurgency operations often beyond the purview of the public. As 
Ellis states, “both Police and army were in time to create units, or adapt existing ones, to 
carry out the job of undertaking internal repression of the robust nature which the 
government required.”28 Vlakplaas, for example, was a covert police operation that 
conducted targeted assassinations, comprising the ‘hit squads’ of Apartheid.29  
 The pattern of violence changed with the initiation of the transition period. Guelke 
notes that “the period of the transition was [the] bloodiest in South Africa’s existence as a 
                                                
26 Davis, The ANC's War Against Apartheid, 5; see also, Jeffrey, People’s War: New Light on the Struggle 
for South Africa. 
27 Stephen Ellis, "The Historical Significance of South Africa’s Third Force," Journal of Southern African 
Studies 24, no. 2 (1998): 266. 
28 Ibid., 274. 
29 Anurima Bhargava, "Defining Political Crimes: A Case Study of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission," Columbia Law Review 102, no. 5 (2002): 1319; Piers Pigou, "The Apartheid 
State and Violence: What Has the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Found?," Politikon 28, no. 2 
(2001): 212; Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, 175. 
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political entity.”30 Political violence encroached on most elements of society through 
violent conflicts between opposing groups, assassinations, state and non-state attacks on 
civilians, and the destruction of infrastructure. It is estimated that approximately 15,000 
people died in political violence in the negotiation and transition period, between February 
1990 and April 1994.31 This number does not include the deaths that occurred through 
opposition and state response during the preceding decades of armed resistance. Violence 
increased dramatically during the transitional years.32  
 Classifying political violence during the transition in terms of dominant actors 
engaged in conflict assists in analyzing institutional responses to it. Guelke identifies four 
categories of violence during the transition: “aggressive action by the security forces; 
conflict between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the ANC; racial attacks by the 
Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA)…; and the spoiler violence by the extreme 
right.”33 These categories are not mutually exclusive nor do they capture the pervasiveness 
of violence within society. The value in this framing is a narrower scope to discuss the 
investigative institutional developments that followed because they illustrate the breadth 
of actors and associated violence. The conflict between the ANC and IFP, the security 
                                                
30 Adrian Guelke, "Interpretations of Political Violence During South Africa’s Transition," Politikon 27, 
no. 2 (2000): 241. 
31 Ibid., 241. 
32 Peter Gastrow, Bargaining for Peace: South Africa and the National Peace Accord (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Institute of Peace, 1995), 77; Guelke, "Interpretations of Political Violence," 241; Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume Two, Chapter 7, 585. 
33 Adrian Guelke, Rethinking the Rise and Fall of Apartheid: South Africa and World Politics (New York; 
Bakingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 179.  
The TRC Report separates political violence based on actors as well, including: Security Forces, the 
Homelands, the White Right Wing, the Liberation Movements, and the ‘Third Force’. See “Political 
Violence in the era of Negotiations and Transition 1990-1994,” Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
South Africa Report: Volume Two, Chapter 7. 
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forces, and the third force are examined briefly below. This is not an exhaustive account 
of political violence in South Africa’s transition, these are representations to contextualize 
the institutional responses that are discussed in the next chapters.  
 The violence between the ANC and IFP was a conflict over potential political power 
for black South Africans.34 ANC supporters and IFP supporters engaged in conflicts, 
clashes, and raids.35 Most often this violence took place within South Africa’s townships,36 
where both groups created self-defence units.37 In some cases, violence erupted between 
ANC-aligned residents and IFP aligned workers housed in accommodation for workers, 
known as hostels, in the township areas.38 In his study of the Thokoza and Katlehong 
townships, Kynoch describes the violent interaction between IFP aligned hostel residents 
and ANC residents in the township: “political marches and funerals were frequently 
interrupted by fighting; train and taxi commuters were slaughtered; prominent officials 
                                                
34  Guelke, "Interpretations of Political Violence," 250; Gary Kynoch, "Reassessing Transition Violence: 
Voices from South Africa’s Township Wars, 1990-4," African Affairs 112, no. 447 (2013): 285.  There are 
competing explanations for this violence, for an overview see, Guelke, "Interpretations of Political 
Violence," 245-250. 
35 Philip Bonner and Noor Nieftagodien, "The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Pursuit of 
‘Social Truth’: The Case of Kathorus," in Commissioning the Past: Understanding South Africa’s Truth 
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were assassinated; and, on many occasions, state police and soldiers contributed to the 
violence.”39 Investigations and the compilation of accounts of violence suggests that the 
conflict between the ANC and IFP is difficult to disentangle from the influence and support 
from state security forces. In numerous examples there is a web of complicity that 
complicates the representation of violence. 
 The security forces, comprising the police and the military, were associated with 
elements of the political violence that accompanied the South African transition. The 
security forces were implicated in transitional violence by providing weapons to the IFP, 
using problematic (and often fatal) tactics of crowd control, and failing to sufficiently 
investigate violence.40 Political detainees continued to die in police custody.41 Protests 
were dangerous for participants; the TRC Report indicates that “killing by the security 
forces, primarily in the course of public order policing, numbered 518 between July 1991 
and June 1993.”42 Beyond these tactics, the security forces were accused of participating 
in, and instigating violence, as a part of allegations of a “third force,” which had significant 
implications for investigations into violence. An example in which these elements are 
represented can helpfully elucidate the types of concerns associated with violence in the 
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South African transition, though one example does not portray the breadth of the issues. 
The Boipatong massacre can be used to illustrate these various elements of police 
involvement and negligence. Considerable attention has been paid to this event, but 
accounts and findings differ. The purpose in presenting this example is to illustrate the 
components and complexity of the violence.  
 The Boipatong Massacre occurred on June 17, 1992, when armed hostel dwellers 
from the KwaMadala hostel attacked residents in Boipatong killing 45 people and injuring 
22 people.43 In the TRC’s reporting of the incident, it is alleged that the police role in this 
violence included charges that the police were called to the scene and did not intervene, 
had been tipped off ahead of time and did not intervene, that police were near the centres 
of violence as the group carried out the attack, and that the police completed poor 
investigations.44 Accounts of the police’s role in the attack vary; implicated in this variation 
is the lack of concrete evidence of police involvement but eyewitness accounts recalled 
police vehicles near to, and white men participating in, the violence. Both accounts have 
been probed.45  
                                                
43 The number of casualties is different in different sources, these are the TRC Report number Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume Three, Chapter 6, 689. Ellis, for instance says 
38 people were  killed. See Ellis, "The Historical Significance of South Africa’s Third Force," 289. For 
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from a hidden war (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 74-78; Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, 140-
141. 
44 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume Three, Chapter 6, 683, 684, 685, 
687, 689. 
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of Southern African Studies 38, no. 3 (2012): 632-633; Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, 141. Kynoch 
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 The police investigation of the Boipatong massacre was itself problematic. James 
Simpson identifies that even after the attack, “no immediate effort was made to investigate 
its causes, beyond escorting a detective photographer.”46 The Goldstone Commission 
conducted an investigation assisted by two international  experts: a judge and policing 
expert.47 The latter, P.A.J. Waddington, investigated allegations of police involvement in 
the massacre.48 The admission that police had taped over the recordings from the night of 
the massacre increased suspicion of police involvement.49 Waddington’s report outlined 
extensive policing inadequacies and incompetence, but did not find evidence of police 
complicity.50 Sixteen KwaMadala residents were convicted for “involvement in the 
massacre.”51  
 The massacre at Boipatong illustrates one type of violence that accompanied the 
transition and the complex interaction of police in the violence. Witness accounts and 
follow up investigations differed in the perception about the role of police. The police were 
implicated not only in the violence but also in the conduct of the investigation, giving the 
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air of bias or indifference. This is significant when considering that investigations during 
the transitional period and in the preceding years relied upon the police. 
 James Simpson notes that “the Boipatong massacre is broadly viewed as evidence of 
a third force, comprising elements within the state security working covertly and illegally 
to undermine the ANC and its allies.”52 This view persists despite the different conclusions 
drawn by Waddington and the TRC. However, Boipatong is a symbolic reference point in 
the discussions of violence in South Africa and the third force is a persistent thread in these 
discussions.53  
 Discourse around the involvement of a “third force” in violence in South Africa 
emerged in the early 1990s.54 The third force remained a central feature on the discourse 
of violence before and during the transition. The “third force” refers to the belief that 
violence and destabilization efforts were being carried out covertly, particularly by the 
government, to weaken opposition. Ellis characterizes the third force as “state-organised 
or state-connected covert and clandestine networks” that developed from the mid 1980s.55 
It was “a nexus of SADF and Police units experienced in covert warfare.”56 At the time, 
efforts to establish the existence of a third force proved elusive. However, as investigations 
continued, evidence emerged of the security forces’ involvement in violence. The 
                                                
52 Simpson, "Boipatong: The Politics of a Massacre and the South African Transition," 626, emphasis in 
original. 
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55 Ibid., 264. 
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118 
Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation played a 
central role in uncovering evidence in this regard.57  
 Guelke criticizes the TRC report’s focus on the third force to interpret political 
violence as an effort to weaken the ANC’s hold on power because it does not account for 
persistent political violence after the election and the government’s response to violence 
during the ongoing negotiations.58 Ellis’ account, tracing the third force, suggests that 
specific security force units were involved in a centralized manner, but this organizational 
structure waned in 1992.59 Even without agreement on the extent of these operations, the 
allegations of a third force affected the perception of violence in the transitional period and 
the associated investigations. 
 The state’s perceived and actual role in carrying out violence and its role in violence 
through collusion or improper investigations are critical issues for understanding the state-
mandated investigations that inquired into these allegations. Negotiating the past will be 
an ongoing venture for South Africa, and the contested narratives of violence will continue 
to be part of the conversation.60 It is the institutional mechanisms that developed around 
the violence that are the focus here. The nature of the violence between the ANC and IFP, 
and the role of police in that violence are important to take into account in the establishment 
of investigative institutions to address these issues. As is illustrated below, some of the 
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components of the National Peace Accord (NPA) aimed to prevent and investigate violence 
that had taken hold in much of the country. 
5.2 The Political Transition 
 
The late 1980s and into the early 1990s saw the beginning of transformation and transition 
in South Africa. Major milestones in South Africa’s transition to democracy punctuate the 
political narrative of the transition. President de Klerk’s 1990 speech to parliament in which 
he announced the decision to remove the ban on the ANC and South African Communist 
Party (SACP), release Nelson Mandela from prison, and begin to repeal other elements of 
Apartheid legislation, was the turning point in the transformation of the South African 
political system.61 After 27 years, Nelson Mandela was released from prison and 
negotiations continued towards an inclusive, and non-racial democracy. Over four years, 
major political parties and groups in South Africa negotiated an Interim Constitution in 
1993 and held the first democratic election in April 1994. Despite the violence that had 
pervaded the country during the negotiations, the election itself was largely uninterrupted 
by violence. The 1994 democratic elections were cemented through a series of negotiated 
agreements that, at different stages, engaged government leaders, delegates of previously 
banned political organizations, and representatives of the independent homelands. 
The negotiations toward a democratic transition were precipitated by a number of 
core issues that suggest a “stalemate” brought the leadership to the negotiating table.62 The 
ANC was the Government’s most prominent negotiating partner.  The survival of South 
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Africa and the continued inclusion of the white minority induced the Government to the 
negotiating table. On the other side of the table, the ANC’s fight against the Apartheid 
regime had reached a point in the late 1980s where “winning” the struggle was increasingly 
unlikely.63 The ANC’s struggle against the regime using tactics of guerilla war and 
insurrection to overthrow the regime was proving untenable and unsuccessful.64 In 
addition, the costs of coercive response to opposition to Apartheid were becoming 
increasingly problematic for the regime.65 As Friedman outlines, “as long as order could 
be maintained by force alone, and sanctions remained, the country faced an inevitable 
economic decline.”66 The dynamics precipitating the negotiations and the process of 
negotiation itself illustrate that the transition in South Africa was neither imposed by the 
government nor a result of the overthrow of the government.67 Negotiations were 
recognized by both sides as the best chance at what Friedman calls “a post-apartheid 
order.”68 As such, the process of concession and agreement through which the transition 
was crafted is important for the development of the Commission of Inquiry for the 
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation.     
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According to Rantente and Giliomee, initially the government “assumed it could 
initiate a process of democratization on terms determined by the government.”69 These 
scholars suggest that the external pressures facing the Government were acted upon in such 
a manner as to try to ensure the government maintained control over the transition process, 
through a power-sharing arrangement with the ANC. Crucially, however, the negotiations 
did not unfold like this and the Government “needed the consent of the ANC for all kinds 
of transactions ranging from an interim government, constituent assembly and the rules of 
the first election.”70 This negotiation environment in which the information-gathering 
mechanisms were established and the forces affecting institutional entrenchment and 
change are significant for the considerations of gradual institutional change that are 
analyzed in the coming chapters.  
 Between the February 1990 release of Mandela and the start of the Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in late 1991, several other pacts were helped to 
facilitate the constitutional negotiations. Three agreements between the Government and 
the ANC preceded the National Peace Accord. These agreements were: the Groote Schuur 
Minute (1990), the Pretoria Minute (1990), and the D.F. Malan Accord (1991).71 
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71 Electronic copies of these accords can be found online through the Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory 
on the O’Malley archive complied by Padraig O’Malley. The O’Malley Archive, “Transition 1990-1994, 
Documents and Reports, 1990.” 
https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02103.htm, accessed 
December 30, 2018. 
 
 
122 
 In each of these agreements, there were provisions to manage violence.  The 
Government of South Africa and the African National Congress negotiated the Groote 
Schuur Minute in Cape Town in April 1990. The Groote Schuur Minute established a 
working group to investigate the release of political prisoners and identify legislation that 
could be used to determine what constituted political crimes. The same two parties then 
negotiated Pretoria Minute, which sketched the timeline for the release of political 
prisoners and set parameters for release. The early agreements at Groote Schuur and 
Pretoria included efforts to disarm MK.72 In addition, in the Pretoria Minute the ANC 
agreed to suspend activities of its armed wing in order to negotiate with the Government. 
Through the D.F. Malan Accord “it was agreed that the ANC would no longer infiltrate 
men and material into South Africa and that violence and intimidation accompanying mass 
action had to be eliminated.”73 These agreements were, in a sense, incremental steps 
towards the larger agreement.  
 Friedman identifies that the National Peace Accord “was the first formal multi-party 
accord, and it built sufficient confidence among the parties to persuade them to proceed to 
constitutional talks.”74 Even with these incremental steps, agreement on the National Peace 
Accord was not easily secured. Government proclamations and attempts at initiating 
dialogue were often received with a reasonable amount of scepticism.75 More than 40 
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groups signed the NPA on 14 September 1991 at the National Peace Conference in 
Johannesburg, South Africa.76 The ten chapters of the NPA included a range of provisions 
for political actors and members of various security forces, structured peace committees at 
a local, regional, and national level, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public 
Violence and Intimidation, and provisions for specific courts to deal with the peace 
agreement.77 It was a comprehensive agreement.78 The structures incorporated into the 
National Peace Accord laid out standards of behaviour and measures for monitoring that 
supported the next phases of negotiations, culminating in the multi-party negotiation 
process to design and implement multi-racial democracy in South Africa. Once the peace 
agreement was signed, it was anticipated that constitutional negotiations could proceed. 
Prior to the formal negotiations that began in December 1991, the parties had to agree on 
how the new democratic dispensation would be decided upon and designed.  
Over the years of negotiations, the necessary persistence of engagement is evident. 
Key issues in the negotiations included the issues of majority rule and the establishment of 
an interim government. On these points the Government’s aim was to protect the white 
minority interests and the ANC’s goal was securing full democratic rights for the majority 
who had been disenfranchised.79 From early on the ANC was persistent on the matter of 
majority rule. In addition, the ANC was against the negotiation of a new constitution by 
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unelected negotiating personnel.80  With regards to the possibility of an interim 
government, Rantete and Giliomee suggest that, “in the second half of 1991 the 
government began to explore new options, signalling its acceptance that it was impossible 
to dictate the process from above…”81 On both sides, concessions are evident in the 
eventual agreement. 
 The Government’s choice mechanism for establishing a democratic South Africa was 
through “a multi-party conference.”82 On the Government’s side, the critical issue 
underpinning the initiation of negotiations was that it would maintain protections for the 
white minority through a power-sharing arrangement, and did not want to agree to a 
majority rule system.83 As Rantente and Giliomee observed, “uppermost in De Klerk’s 
mind was the need to balance the transition process in such a way that he gave enough 
assurances to white without unduly alarming the ANC as main negotiating partner…”84 
The ANC’s stance was that the new constitutional order could only be established by a 
constituent assembly that had been elected by a majority.85 These issues persisted through 
the eventual multi-party negotiation process established as the Convention for Democratic 
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South Africa (CODESA) in December 1991, which brought together 19 negotiation 
parties.86  
 Two iterations of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA I and 
CODESA II) were established. These were multi-party talks for the establishment of a 
democratic constitution.87 The breakdown of the CODESA II talks resulted in the 
development of another new round of negotiations.88 The renewed negotiations, the Multi-
Party Negotiating Process, composed of the Negotiating Council and the Transitional 
Executive Council (as well as a Plenary body and Planning Committee).89 The transitional 
process and a draft constitution were developed within these structures.90 The Transitional 
Executive Council (TEC) administered the country in preparation for the democratic 
election held in April 1994.91 One representative from each party to the MPNP could serve 
on the TEC, and the TEC selected membership of the TEC sub-councils working in areas 
like defence and finance.92 
 In the end, in December 1993, an agreement to an Interim constitution was secured. 
The Government and the ANC agreed to a limited power-sharing arrangement during 
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which time a permanent constitution would be developed.93 Lingering issues in the 
negotiations were resolved late in the process of negotiating the 1993 Interim-Constitution, 
including the amnesty clause.94  
While it is beyond the scope of this project to outline all elements of the negotiation 
process, outlining some of the key preferences and demands of the negotiating parties 
illustrates the context in which the Commission was established. In addition, the theories 
of institutional change employed in this project highlight the significance of actors and 
coalitional dynamics.95 Particularly important is an accounting of the ability or inability of 
key actors and institutions to prevent change.96 Here then, it is helpful to identify the key 
actors in the negotiation process to illuminate the dynamic of the negotiation environment 
in which the institutions under investigation were operating.  
Both parties’ recognition that the only way to end the crisis was through negotiation 
established a sort of balance, limiting each party’s ability to move forward unilaterally and 
block changes without consensus.97 As Sisk recognized, “the preliminary negotiations 
phase shows that in the South African case it is political leaders who best understand the 
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maxim that ‘the alterative in any event it too ghastly to contemplate.’”98  This helps to 
illuminate the potential for parties to initiate, refuse, or block proposed changes.  
Despite this recognition, destabilizing violence threatened to move the negotiations 
off track throughout the process.99 Violence was an existential threat to negotiations with 
the Government insisting that the ANC abandon its armed struggle and the ANC insisting 
that it would not continue negotiations with ongoing violence continuing and with the 
suspicion that the government was funding or instigating violence through the IFP.100 As 
Rantete and Giliomee identify: 
Under severe pressure, De Klerk removed the ministers for defence and police from 
their positions and appointed a standing commission to investigate instances of 
violence. This cleared the air sufficiently for the government and the ANC to 
participate, along with other parties and bodies, in the launching of a peace initiative 
which culminated in a Peace Accord.101 
 
Sisk argues that the peace accord itself was a vehicle to manage violence, the structures 
which “reflect[ed] a recognition that the control of violence during the course of the 
transition [was] a long term prospect.”102 This proved accurate: even after the signing of 
the NPA, at several points during the constitutional negotiations that followed acts of 
violence—such as the Boipatong Massacre of 1992—threatened to derail negotiations. 
Indeed, the ANC suspended CODESA II after the massacre at Boipatong.103   
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The major negotiating parties had different ideas about how the negotiations should 
unfold and how a new constitution would be established. Van Zyl Slabbert argued that de 
Klerk’s efforts to initiate the transition and maintain control over it was not sustainable and 
dependent on the other side. Van Zyl Slabbert recognized “the agenda is open-ended and 
determined by the quality of interaction between the regime and the challengers to its 
authority who have entered the bargaining space created by the regime.”104 The process of 
designing the new constitution required engagement on issues of institutional design and 
processes of transitional decision-making and these issues were not easily settled. 
 Prior to the end of the negotiating period Sisk identified that the insecurity of the 
security forces in South Africa was an important consideration.105 This builds on 
O’Donnell and Schmitter’s recognition that “no political actor in a transition from 
authoritarian rule is more insecure than the old regime’s security forces.”106 Several 
sources have identified that the security forces’ pressure for amnesty was significant such 
that threats were made towards the end of the negotiations that threatened to prevent the 
election should amnesty not be provided.107 Ellis argues that “the evidence suggests that 
few senior officers actually wanted to sabotage negotiations for good simply because they 
knew this would not help them win the war. If they had wanted to do so it would have been 
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easy enough to sabotage the elections of April 1994.”108 This is significant because the 
negotiations and transition depended on the participation of the security forces and made 
the security forces the strongest veto player in the process. However, as Lodge recognizes, 
the majority of the state’s security forces remained loyal to the Government.109  
 The Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation 
operating during the constitutional negotiations. This Commission was established to 
investigate violence as part of the formal National Peace Accord in 1991. The Goldstone 
Commission is introduced here, followed by the 1995 Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission implemented after the democratic election.  
 
5.3 The Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of 
Public Violence and Intimidation  
The Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation played 
a crucial role in monitoring and reporting on transitional violence while South Africa 
dismantled Apartheid and prepared for democracy. The National Peace Accord provisions 
specified the establishment of this standing commission on violence. Chapter Six of the 
National Peace Accord stipulated the creation of a “Commission of Inquiry Regarding the 
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation (“the Commission”).110 The text 
introducing the provision for the standing commission rationalizes the inquiry based on an 
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acknowledgement that investigations decrease violence by exposing it.111 The agreement 
states: 
It is clear that violence and intimidation declines when it is investigated and when 
the background and reasons for it is exposed and given media attention. There is 
therefore need for an effective instrument to do just that. It is agreed that the 
Commission established by the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation 
Act, 1991, be used as an instrument to investigate and expose the background and 
reasons for violence, thereby reducing the incidence of violence and 
intimidation.112  
 
The Commission, chaired by Judge Richard Goldstone, conducted investigations 
into prominent episodes of public violence plaguing South Africa. The Commission 
produced over 40 reports (interim and final).113 These provided information on 
investigations into particular violent episodes, identification on causes where possible, and 
included recommendations. The legislation stipulated that reports would be provided to the 
State President, who would release them if “he deems necessary in the public interest.”114 
From the outset, the task ahead of the Commission was significant. When the 
Commission’s initial investigation launched, one media report quotes Judge Goldstone 
stating that the Commission “cannot possibly itself inquire into every incidence of political 
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This process was not always smooth, early in the Commission’s operation there was an incident in which 
the President delayed releasing one report such that its release coincided with another report causing 
consternation among the parties. See Goldstone, For Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Prosecutor, 
29-30. Media coverage illustrates some of the confusion see for example, John Perlman, “Goldstone Row 
one big mix-up,” Star 30 May 1992. Independent Board of Inquiry Collection AG2543,  D54 Goldstone 
Commission 1991-1992, Wits Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, Johannesburg South Africa. 
 
 
131 
violence.”115 Furthermore, the Commission recognized that it was “not the Commission’s 
function to investigate incidents of public violence where the cause thereof is known.”116 
Despite these limitations, the Goldstone Commission conducted investigations into 
significant and potentially destabilizing violent episodes and attacks.117 This included such 
incidents as the Boipatong massacre and the Bisho incidents, both of which impacted on 
the negotiations because of the violence.118 In addition, the Commission conducted 
hearings and released reports pertaining to thematic issues of violence facing South Africa, 
such as persistent violence on commuter taxis and trains.119  
The Commission’s investigations into violent episodes ascertained tangible 
evidential information. In some instances, the Commission confirmed information publicly 
for the first time. This was the case, most famously or perhaps most anticipated in the 
allegations of a ‘third force’ operating and instigating violence.120 Careful in its approach 
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to the issue of evidence, the Commission “consistently refused to make findings without 
adequate evidence.”121 However, when it was able to make findings, it did so.122 Goldstone 
later reflected that “the commission didn’t tell people things they did not really know.”123 
However, Goldstone also acknowledged that the commission played a role in creating the 
conditions for the establishment of the TRC.124   
In addition to the recommendations in the reports, the commission recommended 
guidelines to prevent future violence and intimidation. As per the Prevention of Public 
Violence and Intimidation Act, the Commission was to: 
make recommendations to the State President regarding–  
(i) the general policy which ought to be followed in respect of the prevention 
of public violence and intimidation; 
(ii) steps to prevent public violence or intimidation; 
(iii) any other steps it may deem necessary or expedient, including proposals for 
the passing of legislation, to prevent a repetition or continuation of any act 
or omission relating to public violence or intimidation…125 
 
The Commission made a number of such recommendations relating to marches and 
gatherings and the impending election. These are explored in further detail in Chapter 7. 
 The Commission’s investigation parameters are outlined here. Anyone could make a 
request of the Commission to address an element of public violence by following specified 
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procedures.126 Given its independence from the government, the Commission decided 
which incidences of violence to investigate.127 When the Commission decided that an issue 
or incident warranted investigation, it established a committee of the commission. These 
smaller committees enabled a wider reach for the commission, rather than requiring all 
members investigate all instances of violence.  
 The Commission was not a court and was only able to make recommendations to the 
Attorney General when it was “of the opinion that the facts disclose the commission of an 
offence by any person.”128 Established to investigate emergent violence, the Commission 
was precluded from investigating “any particular occurrence which took place and ended 
before the Commencement of this Act” or “occurrences in respect of which a prosecution, 
inquest or an inquiry by an official commission of inquiry was instated or completed before 
the commencement of this Act.”129  
Not all earlier investigative inquiries laid a positive foundation for truth-seeking 
and in South Africa, commissions of inquiry were frequently used to support the regime 
rather than produce change. The conditions that structured and influenced the Goldstone 
Commission were themselves distinctive, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 7. Having 
already initiated a path of reform, the Government established the Goldstone Commission 
as part of a negotiated agreement to address the increase in violence. That this Commission 
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was part of a peace agreement, and that it operated as constitutional negotiations were 
moving forward, resulted in a necessary consensus about its core operating components. 
Through its operation, the Goldstone Commission distinguished itself from earlier 
commissions of inquiry in important ways, thereby increasing its credibility. Furthermore, 
some of the elements included in the design of the Commission’s legislation enabled 
shortcomings that had been inherent in earlier commissions to be addressed. These 
components of gradual institutional change that are taken up in Chapters 7, 8, and 9. 
Adjustments in the institutional modalities  of the Goldstone Commission help to explain 
some of the institutional innovations in the South African TRC. 
 
5.4 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
South Africa 
 
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) continues to be heralded 
as one of the most successful truth commissions to date. Its operation has been lauded as a 
cornerstone of South Africa’s transition. Its notoriety as a response to the harms committed 
during Apartheid popularized the truth commission as an institution of redress. Though 
there were critics of the process at the time, the dominant perception, especially from 
international observers, was a positive one.130  
 The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995 founded and 
structured the TRC in South Africa. With the stated goals of “promoting national unity and 
reconciliation,” the commission’s tasks were: 
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Amnesty? The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Human Rights Abuses in South Africa," Irish 
Studies in International Affairs 10 (1999): 21-30. 
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a analysing and describing the ‘causes, nature and extent’ of gross violations 
of human rights that occurred between 1 March 1960 and 10 May 1994, 
including the identification of the individuals and organisations responsible 
for such violations; 
 
b making recommendations to the President on measures to prevent future  
violations of human rights; 
  
 c  the restoration of the human and civil dignity of victims of gross human    
rights violations through testimony and recommendations to the President 
concerning reparations for victims; 
 
d  granting amnesty to persons who made full disclosure of relevant facts 
relating to acts associated with a political objective.131 
 
The TRC was composed of three committees: the Human Rights Violations Committee 
(HRV), the Amnesty Committee, and the Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee.132 
The President appointed 17 commissioners to serve on the TRC, after public 
consultation.133 It is noteworthy that not only were the Commissioners selected based on 
extensive public engagement, but the legislation passed by Parliament was also subjected 
to extensive public debate and input.134  
The HRV Committee received statements and compiled information on abuses 
perpetrated during the period covered by the mandate. This committee also facilitated the 
public hearings and invited victims to testify. According to the TRC report, “the 
corroborated allegations of gross violations of human rights contained in these 21 000 
                                                
131 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume One, Chapter 4, 57. For the full 
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statements form the basis for the Human Rights Violations Committee’s conclusions about 
the nature of the conflict.”135 The public hearings that captured significant public and 
media attention were an innovation of the South African TRC. The HRV Committee and 
its staff determined which cases would be heard in the public hearings. Selected as 
“window cases,” these cases represented the breadth of abuses that took place, in an attempt 
to provide a cross-sectional overview of the patterns of violations without an ability to 
provide every case with a public hearing.136 The TRC also relied on statement takers that 
travelled to communities to record testimonies in written form.137  
The Amnesty Committee’s mandate was to receive and adjudicate applications 
from individuals to determine whether amnesty would be granted. The Amnesty 
Committee process and hearings were also an innovation in the realm of truth commissions. 
The South African TRC was the first truth commission invested with the powers to grant 
amnesty. The Amnesty Committee received applications for amnesty for crimes “with a 
political objective” committed between March 1, 1960 and May 10, 1994.138 Amnesty 
numbers are categorized based on whether individuals met the eligibility requirement to 
apply for amnesty and, whether those that met the criteria of political crimes were seeking 
amnesty for “gross human rights violations” or not.139 Public hearings were only required 
for those who committed “gross human rights violations,” with the others addressed 
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administratively.140 In total, 7116 people applied for amnesty. Of these, 4500 applications 
were “rejected administratively for mostly having no political agenda.”141 Of the 
remainder, 1167 people were granted full amnesty, and 145 partial amnesty.142  
The Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee was responsible for “developing a 
policy for long-term reparations as well as urgent interim relief.”143 The Reparations and 
Rehabilitation Committee was largely a recommending body, with Parliament responsible 
for the final decisions.144 As such, this committee engaged in processes to gather 
information about reparations, including with non-governmental organizations and 
churches and conducting research on the impact of human rights violations on victims.145 
The Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee also developed witness support programs, 
which worked to support those who provided testimony at public hearings, and associated 
training for statement takers.146 
The public testimonies to the HRV committee and the amnesties that garnered the 
most attention, and behind the scenes, the TRC collected, compiled, and investigated 
thousands of testimonies. Investigative and research staff supported the hearings, as well 
as a significant administrative staffing component. Despite the “serious powers of search, 
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seizure, and subpoena,” bestowed upon the Research Department, and the “sizeable and 
variegated structure established” in pursuit of the goals of the TRC,147 the TRC faced 
difficulties in collecting and evaluating the information it received.148 
The TRC also contended with a number of challenges that illustrate a significant 
interaction with other accountability institutions, particularly the legal system. Individuals 
and organizations brought a number of court cases against the TRC with regards to its 
constitutionality,149 review of amnesty decisions,150 and parameters surrounding 
notification of the accused.151 In a high profile case, former president P.W. Botha was 
charged and prosecuted after he “failed to appear” after being subpoenaed to appear before 
the commission.152 This is important when considering the variety of state structures that 
supported the TRC to achieve its independence and reliability. In the South African case, 
this demonstrates the availability and deployment of state structures to support truth-
seeking.  
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In October 1998, the TRC produced a five volume report detailing an overview of 
violence committed by the state and opposition forces.153 The contentiousness of the 
process is illustrated in these final moments of the commission: 
Former president F.W. de Klerk successfully sued to block the commission, at least 
temporarily, from naming him in the report. In addition, the ANC, unhappy with 
the commission’s conclusion about its past actions, attempted to block publication 
of the entire report with a clumsy, last-minute court challenge; the court ruled in 
favor of the commission just hours before the report was due to be released.154 
 
The Amnesty Committee completed its operations in 2002 after the rest of the TRC had 
concluded operations, and produced additional volumes to add to the Commission’s final 
report.155  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the South African TRC is considered one of the most 
successful truth commissions.156 Despite the lack of agreement on what ‘success’ 
means,157 the South African TRC is still presented as a model. Whereas most accounts of 
success look towards the impact of the TRC, this remains problematic because of a lack of 
empirical assessments of the relationship between truth and reconciliation and the difficulty 
assessing these claims.158 However, accounts of the TRC often speak to innovations in its 
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institutional components. The inclusion of powers of search and seizure, witness 
protection, and amnesty set the capacity of the truth commission apart from other truth 
commissions.159  The TRC had significant breadth of powers and was bestowed with 
institutional features to carry out its truth-seeking endeavours including subpoena powers 
and search and seizure powers.160 The procedural and institutional components of the TRC 
are indicators of success for its operation. The project does not extend the successful 
operation of the TRC to the potential outcomes of reconciliation or justice.  
Gibson articulates the TRC as a success because of the impact on reconciliation and 
he focuses, in part, on the institutional characteristics that informed the process. Gibson 
argues that the degree to which society engaged the process, the ability of the commission 
to draw in the attention of citizens, the TRC’s impartiality, even-handed blame attribution, 
the focus on restorative justice, and the leadership of the transition all contributed to its 
success. It was the credible manner in which the truth commission operated that contributed 
to reconciliation.161 For Gibson, institutional legitimacy is essential for effective truth 
commissions when explored in relation to reconciliation.162 Gibson argues that the success 
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of the truth commission was potentially also related to the existing political culture in South 
Africa that comprised rule of law and political pluralism.163 He also suggests that the 
proportion of victims and the leadership in the process contributed to its success.164   
According to Sarkin’s definitional components that are more likely to produce a 
successful truth commission, South Africa’s TRC performs well. Revisiting these 
institutional contributors to success, from Chapter 2, Sarkin includes characteristics such 
as independence, public support, wide accessibility, established after engagement with 
relevant actors, and designed in a way to meet the needs of the specific context.165 The 
South African TRC measures well against these metrics. Established by the Government 
through Parliamentary legislation, the TRC was independent. That the TRC’s operations 
and decisions were often contentious, is often used as an indicator that the TRC was not 
bound to specific parties. For example, there were criticisms that the TRC unevenly 
targeted the former regime, but on the whole the Commission operated independently.166  
The legislation that established the TRC was deliberated upon and the Government 
sought feedback from civil society.167 Similarly, the process of Commissioner selection 
was transparent and engaged the public.168 The Commission was also successful in its 
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accessibility, having established offices throughout the country and taking statements in 
communities.169 Additionally, the public hearings had extensive reach on television, an 
innovation which has contributed to the TRC’s public reputation.170  
Nichols identifies three characteristics that contribute to a truth commission’s 
legitimacy. Nichols is interested in understanding how these features influence truth 
commission impacts. With the supposition that legitimacy is a “precondition” for success, 
Nichols outlines three characteristics or “components” of legitimacy related to truth 
commission success.171 These are authority, demonstrating a break with the past, and 
transparency; higher levels of each make a truth commission more likely to be 
legitimate.172 The ability for the South African TRC to garner legitimacy is an important 
indicator of its strength.  
Nichols defines authority as being able to “carry out investigative functions, thus 
differentiating those bodies that merely whitewash crimes of the past from those that reveal 
difficult realities.”173 The South African TRC employed these capacities with extensive 
investigation and reporting as has been illustrated above. In Nichols’ analysis on effects, 
this characteristic, authority, had the most significant impact on human rights and 
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violence.174 The South African TRC was also established after a democratic transition, 
illustrating the “break with the past” that Nichols identifies. Finally, on the issue of 
transparency, which Nichols conceptualizes as a “holding public hearings and the release 
of a [truth commission’s] findings in a final report”, the South African TRC measures up 
well, having held extensive hearings and releasing a substantial report.175  
Against all of these metrics, the truth commission in South Africa can be considered 
successful. This is, of course, not to suggest that there were not shortcomings with the 
process. Some have questioned the degree to which the Commission actually used the 
powers that were granted to it, suggesting that the Commission did not make sufficient use 
of its powers to uncover information.176 Pigou suggests that despite the Investigation Unit 
having the right to conduct searches and the opportunities to do so, these provisions were 
not well used.177 The amnesty process, dealt with in-depth in Chapter 9 also raised 
concerns; the TRC faced criticisms for what seemed to be unequal applications of the 
criteria for amnesty.178 One of the most prominent blunders was the decision to provide 
amnesty for 37 ANC members, despite problematic disclosures and the criteria of 
individual and conditional amnesty.179 This decision was later reversed by the Courts.180 
Despite the prominence and significance of the public hearings, others point out that only 
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10% of people who provided statements to the TRC were able to share their stories in these 
hearings.181 Further, the process of statement taking has been criticized for stripping the 
narrative out of people’s statements to ensure consistency with coding.182  
Despite these shortcomings, the TRC was able to investigate violence of the past, 
acknowledge some of the injustices, and produce a report that could serve as historical 
record. Although the TRC captivated the attention of many in the field of transitional 
justice, and efforts have been made to demonstrate its effectiveness, why it was as 
successful as it was remains under-investigated. While the negotiations and political 
constraints on addressed the past help to explain why a truth commission was established, 
the particulars of the design decisions and operational dimensions warrant further attention. 
As the next four chapters demonstrate, the strength of the TRC, in terms of institutional 
innovations and capacities, can be explained in part with respect to its institutional 
predecessors.  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has offered an overview of the Apartheid system and outlined the context of 
the negotiation process and the political transition. The chapter also examined measures to 
manage political violence during the negotiating period and identified some of the main 
actors associated with violence. In the final section, the Commission of Inquiry for the 
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation and the South African TRC were 
                                                
181 Chapman and van der Merwe, "Introduction: Assessing the South African Transitional Justice Model," 
10. 
182 Buur, "Monumental Historical Memory: Managing Truth in the Everyday Work of the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission," 78-79. 
 
 
145 
introduced. The chapter concluded by specifying the parameters for success of the TRC 
focused on the institutional credibility of the truth commission process. 
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Chapter 6  
6 The Commission of Inquiry and Apartheid Violence 
 
Throughout its history, South Africa has used commissions of inquiry to respond to 
incidences of public outcry or to pre-empt such outcry. The government frequently relied 
on the commission of inquiry to be seen to be doing something about particular issues, 
without actually addressing the underlying discrimination, repression, and sources of social 
and political problems.1 There is thus a value is in situating the moments of change and 
continuity in the commission of inquiry, specifying where it relied on its institutional roots, 
and where there are indicators of gradual change. While the institutional framework and 
guidelines for commissions of inquiry were well institutionalized, the analysis presented 
here argues that the operation of the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public 
Violence and Intimidation illustrates important changes away from the Apartheid 
commissions of inquiry. 
 Chapters 3 and 4 discussed the potential that the persistence of the commission of 
inquiry is important to the operation of truth commissions. The commission of inquiry and 
the truth commission share institutional features. As illustrated in Chapters 3 and 4, there 
are theoretical reasons to consider that the persistent or entrenched use of commissions of 
inquiry can lead to the reproduction of the status quo in later truth-seeking measures. The 
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South African case demonstrates another variation, the deployment of existing 
information-gathering measures using the same institutional framework but that operates 
differently to strengthen information gathering. This chapter explores how a system of 
information-gathering in South Africa, the commission of inquiry, was entrenched and 
maintained reflecting path dependent characteristics. This sets up the analysis in the next 
chapter of the Goldstone Commission undergoing and facilitating gradual institutional 
change to strengthen information gathering.  
 The chapter first outlines the structural constraints that developed from operating 
commissions of inquiry under Apartheid.  Then the chapter identifies the ways in which 
the credibility of investigations were affected by their use under Apartheid. The chapter 
briefly touches on the internal inquiries undertaken by the African National Congress. 
Despite the fact that these were not state-led, the decision to implement a commission of 
inquiry illustrates the entrenchment of the institution. These elements situate enduring 
elements in the Apartheid regime’s recourse to the commission of inquiry to set up the 
discussion of the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and 
Intimidation in Chapter 7. 
6.1 Entrenchment and Maintenance  
 
To demonstrate how the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and 
Intimidation departed from its predecessors requires an investigation into how the patterns 
of investigation were entrenched under the Apartheid regime. Within the South African 
political system, commissions of inquiry were used fairly frequently. Between 1960 and 
1994 alone, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) report identifies 34 
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commissions of inquiry undertaken by the government.2 The government used various 
commissions of inquiry to respond to public crises and general questions of governance. 
Some of these were high profile investigations, including the commission established after 
the Sharpeville Massacre—the Commission of Inquiry into Sharpville, Evaton and 
Vanderbijlpark Location Riots in 1960. Other high profile examples include the 1976 
Commission of Inquiry into Matters relating to the Coloured Population Group, and the 
1979 Commission of Inquiry into the Riots at Soweto and Elsewhere from 16  June 1976 
to 28 February 1977.3 These types of commissions of inquiry played a prominent role in 
the entrenchment of Apartheid. As Sitze identifies: 
It was also a Commission of Inquiry (or, to be precise, two such commissions) that 
produced the epistemic field within which Apartheid policies would emerge and then 
dominate white public opinion during the late 1940s and 1950s: in 1947 the Sauer 
Commission would recommend ‘total Apartheid between Whites and Natives,’ and 
in 1955, the Tomlinson Commission would plot out the industrialization of the 
‘Black Areas’ created by the 1913 Native Land Act.4 
 
The Sauer Commission is often portrayed as the source of “blueprints” for the 
implementation of Apartheid.5 For instance, it is suggested that the National Party’s Sauer 
Commission was used to “add flesh to the bare bones of the concept” of Apartheid that 
informed the party’s 1948 platform.6 There is some dispute about the degree to which the 
Sauer Commission clarified the meaning of Apartheid, or instead reflected divisions in 
                                                
2 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume One, Chapter 13, 498-506. 
3 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume One, Chapter 13, 498, 501, 502. 
4 Sitze, The Impossible Machine, 132. 
5 Saul Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, First ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 14. 
6 Adrian Guelke, Rethinking the Rise and Fall of Apartheid: South Africa and World Politics (New York; 
Bakingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 85. 
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interpretations of how the idea of Apartheid might be implemented.7 The pertinent point 
here is that the Government relied on commissions of inquiry to determine how best to 
achieve and maintain white hegemony and economic success.  
 The recommendations emerging from these investigations were not evenly adopted 
by the Government. This helps to explain their value as “schemes of legitimation”, as 
Ashforth suggests.8 They produced findings through which the Government could justify 
its actions. These power relations served as positive-feedback for the use of this institution. 
As Pierson argues, “where certain actors are in a position to impose rules on others, the 
employment of power may be self-reinforcing. Actors may utilize political authority to 
change the rules of the game…to enhance their power.”9 These patterns help to explain the 
Apartheid regime’s use of commissions of inquiry, deployed by those in positions of power 
in order to strengthen and maintain that position. 
 The Tomlinson Commission, operating in the early 1950s, provides a useful 
example. The Tomlinson Commission was established to examine how Government policy 
toward the land-areas designated for the African population should be adjusted to manage 
growing urbanization, poverty, and overcrowding in the cities.10 The Tomlinson 
Commission recommended continued “separate development” for the races in South 
                                                
7 Deborah Posel, "The Meaning of Apartheid before 1948: Conflicting Interests and Forces within the 
Afrikaner Nationalist Alliance," Journal of Southern African Studies 14, no. 1 (1987): 136-139. See also, 
Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, 15. 
8 Adam Ashforth, The Politics of Official Discourse in Twentieth-Century South Africa (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), 3. 
9 Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 36. 
10 Deborah Posel, "The Apartheid Project, 1948–1970," in The Cambridge History of South Africa, ed. 
Robert Ross, Anne Kelk Mager, and Bill Nasson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 338. 
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Africa.11 As Posel notes, however, the Commission also recommended “a far-reaching and 
expensive programme of economic rehabilitation and development in the reserves. But 
these were rejected...”12 The introduction to the Tomlinson report illustrates the degree to 
which information was gathered and compiled in this endeavour. In just under five years, 
the Commission accepted oral evidence and memoranda, conducted tours to the African 
areas, and produced a 51 chapter report totalling almost 4,000 pages.13 This is important 
because it demonstrates state efforts to investigate, and illustrates that the machinery of the 
commission of inquiry was, accordingly, well-entrenched. 
 As a product of the oppressive system and a mechanism of enforcing state power, the 
commission of inquiry could be, and was, used over and over again to serve the aims of 
white interests. This purpose for the institution helps to explain why it endured. Successive 
uses of the commission of inquiry, as is demonstrated below, offered the government a 
means through which to enforce racially motivated policies.  
                                                
11 F.R. Tomlinson, Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the 
Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa, U.G.61/1955, 1955, A1906, Reverend Douglas Chadwick 
Thompson Papers, 1871-1985, ZA HPRA 1906, An1.6 - Part V Recommendations: 194, Historical Papers 
Research Archive, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, http://historicalpapers-
atom.wits.ac.za/uploads/r/historical-papers-research-archive-library-university-of-
witwatersrand/f/1/a/f1a5413309b25df3af1b02c099de51095663b5a2cbda02fe18c193369fa74f73/A1906-
An1-6-001-jpeg.pdf. 
12 Posel, "The Apartheid Project, 1948–1970," 338. 
13 F.R. Tomlinson, Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the 
Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa, U.G.61/1955, 1955, A1906, Reverend Douglas Chadwich 
Thompson Papers, 1871-1985, ZA HPRA A1906, An1.1 - Title Pages and Table of Contents: xvii-xviii, 
Historical Papers Research Archive, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg South Africa, 
http://historicalpapers-atom.wits.ac.za/uploads/r/historical-papers-research-archive-library-university-of-
witwatersrand/8/a/3/8a3fae005c5ad755e73978c80680bb549403124ae3897ae8c7ac663363727541/A1906-
An1-1-001-jpeg.pdf. 
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 The majority of South Africans had no legal avenue to protest against state laws and 
policy, and as such, the recourse to voice dissent was often physical protest and marches.14 
Often, peaceful marches ended in violence. The accompanying violence demanded a state 
response but did not, from the perspective of those in power, require redress or significant 
adjustment to power relations. But, to demonstrate some response, commissions of inquiry 
were often deployed. Their use strengthened government positions and often resulted in 
more restrictions.  
  Adam Sitze provides a comprehensive assessment of commissions of inquiry as an 
arbiter to reinforce state power.15 In South Africa, Sitze suggests, “Commissions tasked 
with gathering information about acts of violence committed by state officials were not the 
exception but the rule.”16 Freund points to the Beaumont and Godley Commissions as 
having played important roles in the development of the 1923 Native Urban Areas Act, 
which he describes as “the charter for racial segregation in the cities and towns of South 
Africa.”17  
 Both Sitze and Frankel recognize an underlying dimension of “balance” in the reports 
of such inquiries. This type of pattern that persisted across numerous commissions in order 
to reach conclusions that designated a shared blame—police were to blame insofar as 
                                                
14 Richard J. Goldstone, For Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Prosecutor (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 2000), 36. 
15 Sitze, The Impossible Machine, 157. 
16 Ibid., 132. 
17 Bill Freund, "South Africa: The Union Years, 1910-1948 – Political and Economic Foundations," in The 
Cambridge History of South Africa, ed. Robert Ross, Anne Kelk Mager, and Bill Nasson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 236. 
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civilians were to blame for their roles in violence.18 Frankel argues that the context of the 
inquiries shaped findings. According to Frankel, “while the police were technically under 
observation for an act of gross public violence, this took place within the context of a 
system with an inbuilt presumption that black protest was unacceptable if not demonic.”19 
This, despite the repressive nature of Apartheid’s enforcement. The legacies of these 
commissions’ reports are the absence of responsibility assigned to the system itself, the 
mechanisms of enforcement, and unsubstantial investigation and reporting on the role of 
the police and military.  
 One of the effects of the events at Sharpeville in 1960 which saw unarmed protestors 
shot by police was the international outcry that Sharpeville provoked.20 Frankel’s 
exploration of the Wessels commission, implemented to investigate the 1960 Sharpeville 
Massacre, illustrates how commissions, even in situations that caused international uproar, 
could be used by the Government to justify its use of force in maintaining the racist system. 
According to Frankel:   
The exact circumstances surrounding the actual shooting were never fully delved 
into, while the Commission, to its very end, avoided, circumvented, or lightly 
touched upon many of the important technical and brutal aspects of the killings - such 
as the type of ammunition used by the SAPS and the actions of the black police whom 
the SAP, in their official history of the events of the sixties, admit 'occasionally acted 
without self-restraint and in an undisciplined manner'. 
 
Many of these omissions could be put down to considerations of time rather than to 
conscious calculation. Like the Diemont Commission which considered the 
                                                
18 Sitze refers to this as ‘concomitant cause’ whereby all parties were to blame and restraint on the part of 
the  state could not really be expected given the ‘threat’ they were facing. Sitze, The Impossible Machine, 
164-165.  Frankel refers to the Wessel’s Commission production of an “inherent duality” about the events 
of Sharpeville that have persisted, Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 199.  
19 Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 193. 
20 Saul Dubow, "Were There Political Alternatives in the Wake of the Sharpeville-Langa Violence in South 
Africa, 1960?," Journal of African History 56, no. 1 (2015): 125. 
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simultaneous disturbances at Langa, the Wessels Commission was obliged to 
produce a publicly palatable set of conclusions in a very short time. Still, its overall 
findings, read four decades later, are so densely unintelligible, so ridden with double-
talk, qualifications, and refutable logic as to defy both legal reasoning and ordinary 
comprehension.21  
 
The undercurrent in Frankel’s analysis is that the state’s actions at Sharpeville at this time 
were not patently rebuked. The investigation found fault in the actions on both sides, but 
police were not blamed.22 Instead, the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre saw increased 
repression through existing legislation.23 It was in the aftermath of the protest and massacre 
that the African National Congress and Pan-African Congress were banned.24 Frankel’s 
passage is important in highlighting how the state’s engagement with the commission of 
inquiry could be used to strengthen its position on power. Sitze suggests that in the context 
of the Wessels commission, the commission of inquiry became a tool through which the 
government could achieve another dimension of control, “decreas[ing] the perception of 
racial hatred abroad.”25 This benefits of the commission of inquiry for the government 
were extensive and this helps to explain their continued use. 
 In some cases, observers suggest that the commission of inquiry did result in some 
change in government practice. That the commission of inquiry could open a space for 
change or reform is a complex representation given the comprehensive structures of 
Apartheid. Waldmeir, for example, describes government commissions as “that unlikely 
                                                
21 Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 192. 
22 Sitze, The Impossible Machine, 180. 
23 Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 189. 
24 Anne Kelk Mager and Maanda Mulaudzi, "Popular Responses to Apartheid: 1948-c. 1975," in The 
Cambridge History of South Africa, ed. Robert Ross, Anne Kelk Mager, and Bill Nasson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 396; Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, 23. 
25 Sitze, The Impossible Machine, 181. 
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but effective instrument of change.”26 Waldmeir’s analysis of the Cillie Commission, the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Riots at Soweto and Elsewhere, appointed to investigate 
the protest and police shooting at Soweto in 1976, illustrates this perspective:  
From a government-appointed commission headed by an Afrikaner judge, one might 
have expected a whitewash. But this, surprisingly, was never the National Party’s 
way; throughout the 1970s and 1980s, government was advised by commissions that 
told a fairly accurate version of the truth. The Cillie Commission presented 
Apartheid, for the first time, as part of the South African problem, and government 
accepted this diagnosis. Nearly a decade would pass before Pretoria would act on 
Cillie’s analysis; nonetheless, it sowed doubts.27 
 
This rather optimistic reading presents the commission as planting the seeds of necessary 
change. However, it also includes several assumptions that are somewhat difficult to 
connect, including a ten-year period between cause and effect.  
 The 1976 Soweto Uprising offers another example in which protest against Apartheid 
laws and repression was met with further suppression. Student-organized protest against 
the State’s enforcement of a law that stipulated that education had to be carried out in the 
Afrikaans language prompted waves of student protests. Initially, protests by students took 
the form of class boycotts.28 On June 16, 15,000 students began a march towards the school 
in Soweto that had been a site of contestation against the education ruling.29 According to 
the TRC Report, after firing teargas, the police opened fire in response to students throwing 
stones, and killed two students, which “fundamentally transformed the nature of the student 
protest from a peaceful march into a violent confrontation with government’s security 
                                                
26 Patti Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New South Africa 
(New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 1998), 31. 
27 Ibid., 24. 
28 Tom Lodge, "Resistance and Reform, 1973-1994," in The Cambridge History of South Africa, ed. Robert 
Ross, Anne Kelk Mager, and Bill Nasson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 419. 
29 Lodge, "Resistance and Reform, 1973-1994," 420. 
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forces.”30 The aftermath saw what Lodge describes as a “state of insurrection” in Soweto 
but the protests continued into 1977.31 The protests died down at the end of 1977,32 with 
575 fatalities and over 2000 injured during the period between 16 June 1976 and 28 
February 1977.33  
 Based on testimony it received and its review of the Cillie Commission testimony, 
the TRC Report found “the police and the former state responsible for creating the climate 
in which these deaths took place.”34 Specifically relating to the police, the TRC identified 
that “the police adopted a shoot-to-kill policy.”35 With respect to the Cillie Commission 
itself, the TRC made findings against the Commission for not taking student and 
community evidence into consideration it determining cause and creating a culture of 
impunity for the police.36 This is a significantly different assessment to Waldmeir’s above. 
 The tensions in these assumptions are magnified by Sitze’s reading of the 1979 Cillie 
Commission into the police shootings at Soweto. The difference in the interpretations lies 
in the overarching rationale for the commission of inquiry as an institution.37 Rather than 
interrogating the Apartheid system itself, as Waldmeir suggests, Sitze identifies that the 
issue was to be solved by focusing on the “agitators, intellectuals, and ‘radical student 
                                                
30 The aftermath saw the crowds murder two white men working in Soweto, see Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of South Africa Report: Volume Three, Chapter 6, page 559. 
31 Lodge, "Resistance and Reform, 1973-1994," 420. 
32 Ibid., 421. 
33 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume Three, Chapter 6, page 569. 
34 Ibid., 570. 
35 Ibid., 570. 
36 Ibid., 570. 
37 Sitze, The Impossible Machine, 182-183. 
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groups’ who persist in calling racist laws into question.”38 In Sitze’s evaluation, what 
Waldmeir identifies as not a “whitewash” was not grounded in an even-handed approach, 
nor did the commission of inquiry shed its repressive nature.39 Rather, the performative 
value of the commission of inquiry was, similar to the Wessels Commission, to speak to 
the international realm, to demonstrate to foreign investors that there was sufficient 
political stability.40  
 Commissions of inquiry set up to address labour relations are also identified as 
contributors to shifts in the economic dimension of race relations in Apartheid South 
Africa, despite their embeddedness in the racist structures. The government established the 
Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions in 1977, in the aftermath of massive worker strikes and 
the development of then-illegal black unions.41 Although the reforms proposed by these 
Commissions are identified as turning points, these seem to be the result of unintended 
consequences rather than concerted efforts at reform. Even these unexpected outcomes are 
mired in repressive goals.  
 Wood, for example, points to the unintended consequences of labour reforms as a 
factor that enabled mobilization towards democracy. She points to the labour inquiries as 
a factor recognizing that, “significant changes to labor regulations, influx controls, 
township governance, and other restrictions on African workers and residents were made 
                                                
38 Sitze, The Impossible Machine, 175. 
39 Ibid., 179. 
40 Ibid., 180. 
41 Danelle van Zyl-Hermann, "White Workers in the Late Apartheid Period: A Report on the Wiehahn 
Commission and Mineworkers’ Union Archival Collections," History in Africa 43 (2016): 237-238; W.J. 
Vose, "Wiehahn and Riekert revisited: A review of prevailing Black labour conditions in South Africa," 
International Labour Review 124, no. 4 (1985): 448. See also Lodge on worker strikes and uprisings, 
Lodge, "Resistance and Reform, 1973-1994," 411-415. 
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at the recommendations of the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions beginning in 1979.”42 
However, these examples also demonstrate the restrictive nature of commissions’ 
investigations and recommendations in light of the Apartheid system. Vose, for example, 
argues that the recommendations strengthened rather than loosened state control over 
labour. 43 
 A recommendation from the 1977 Wiehahn Commission, that black unions be 
legalized, had significant effects on the prospects for reform.44 As van Zyl-Hermann 
argues, however, although the reforms were “hailed as ‘major’ at the time, these reforms 
sought to offer concessions to sections of the African population in order to contain 
resistance and safeguard continued white, Afrikaner-led control over the state and 
economy.”45 The system of segregation itself was not addressed. For example, Vose’s 1985 
review of the two commissions states that “Riekert thus failed to challenge the system of 
separate development with its far-reaching labour policy implications.”46 The Wiehahn and 
Riekert Commissions are important because they help to illustrate how commissions of 
inquiry were established and conducted, efforts at reforms discussed, but with limited 
change to the system itself.47 These examples of commissions of inquiry in South Africa 
                                                
42 Wood, "An Insurgent Path to Democracy," 876. 
43 Vose, "Wiehahn and Riekert revisited: A review of prevailing Black labour conditions in South Africa," 
462. 
44 Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle, 27. 
45 van Zyl-Hermann, "White Workers in the Late Apartheid Period: A Report on the Wiehahn Commission 
and Mineworkers’ Union Archival Collections," 238-239. 
46 Vose, "Wiehahn and Riekert revisited: A review of prevailing Black labour conditions in South Africa," 
461. 
47 The Wiehahn Commission is particularly interesting in this regard because of its size with 11 white 
commissioners, and one black commissioner, one coloured commissioner, and one Indian commissioner. 
See, van Zyl-Hermann, "White Workers in the Late Apartheid Period: A Report on the Wiehahn 
Commission and Mineworkers’ Union Archival Collections," 241. 
 
 
158 
demonstrate their frequent use, with benefits for the government in terms of control. 
Commissions of inquiry served to strengthen the origins of Apartheid rules, and addressed 
protest and associated violence in a manner that protected the state. Some changes were 
ceded—but with an end toward regime preservation, not in an effort to dismantle or 
restructure the system of Apartheid itself. The frequent return to this institutional structure 
in response to unrest suggests it was well-entrenched as a state response and usually 
worked in the state’s favour. In line with Pierson’s argument that “the allocation of political 
authority to particular actors is a key source of positive feedback,” 48 these outcomes 
demonstrate the value of the commission of inquiry and its entrenchment over time. The 
regime used commissions of inquiry to maintain its hold on power.  
 Given shortcomings in commission of inquiry use in response to violence, selecting 
this same tool as part of the democratic transition raises important questions relating to 
their value for credible information gathering in response to violence. Further, state 
security forces were not only the subject of enquiries, these forces were also involved in 
the conduct of inquiries. The next section outlines investigation issues associated with these 
institutional structures in order to better situate the challenges facing the Commission of 
Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation.   
6.2 Credibility Problems   
The Apartheid system depended on significant policing to uphold Apartheid laws. The 
South African Police (SAP) had been used to enforce the unjust laws and segregation of 
Apartheid since its implementation in 1948. Even before the formal institutionalizing of 
                                                
48 Pierson, Politics in Time, 36. 
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Apartheid, racially differentiated practices were forcefully imposed.49 Policing and its 
associated violence was justified as necessary for maintaining the racist system.50  The 
powers of the security forces increased as perceived threats to the state grew from 
opposition forces. What limits there were on power decreased in the 1960s with the 
development of legislation that allowed for detention without charge and vague rules about 
the policing of opposition.51 Posel captures the undergirding relationship in stating that 
“the police were [thus] regarded as an arm of government, mandated to enforce its 
authority, rather than as a relatively independent agency to protect the populace.”52 As the 
armed struggle and negotiations continued, the police-community nexus was evermore 
enmeshed with distrust: under-resourced, disproportional responses, arbitrary arrest and 
detention, and numerous deaths in police custody.53 As a result, perceptions of police in 
the community, and among anti-Apartheid actors, were frequently negative.54  
 As discussed in the previous chapter, a significant problem facing South Africa 
preceding and during the transition years were allegations—proven and unproven—of 
                                                
49 Mike Brogden and Clifford D. Shearing, Policing for a New South Africa (Florence: Routledge, 1997), 
10-11. 
50 Brogden and Shearing, Policing for a New South Africa, 16. 
51 Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, 45. On vague ‘rules’ see Brogden and Shearing, Policing for a New 
South Africa, 17-18.  For instance, police policies of shoot to kill and allowing firearms as a means of 
crowd control.  
52 Posel, "The Apartheid Project, 1948–1970," 347. 
53 Posel, "The Apartheid Project, 1948–1970," 347. The TRC report and many of the TRC amnesty 
hearings of former security forces personnel illustrate the types of violence, and the entrenchment of 
clandestine security operations in the violence of the transition. See Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
of South Africa Report: Volume Six. 
54 Independent Board Of Inquiry Report, 16 August 1993, 5-7. IBI Collection. AG2543 3.7, file 
AG2543/3.3-3.7 IBI Memoranda, Wits Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, Johannesburg, South 
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police involvement in violence leading up to the transition.55 Allegations of police 
complicity in violence were pervasive as were allegations of police involvement in 
covering up the crimes that led to these allegations. The manner in which governance and 
policing were enmeshed under Apartheid raise considerable doubts for meaningful and 
impartial investigation capacities without a regime change.  
 A frequently cited example of security force involvement in violence is the case of 
the Trust Feed Killings.56 In this 1988 incident, 11 people were killed after an attack on a 
house that has since been found to have been planned and executed by the police in 
conjunction with Inkatha operatives. As the TRC report indicates:  
An attack on the Trust Feed area was planned for December 1988, involving 
members of Inkatha and special constables. After a police ‘clean-up’ operation to 
disarm and round up UDF suspects, the police would withdraw, leaving Inkatha 
members and the special constables to launch an attack on UDF members.57  
 
Sparks describes the aftermath as “an elaborate police cover-up”58 with police stalling the 
investigation until a “police officer with integrity and courage” got wind of the case and 
had arrested the key police players within two weeks.59 The Trust Feed case is significant 
in that it demonstrates both police involvement in violence along with the internal cover-
ups, but also the possibility that not all members of the security forces were complicit in 
                                                
55 Timothy D. Sisk, "The Violence-Negotiation Nexus: South Africa in Transition and the Politics of 
Uncertainty," Negotiation Journal 9, no. 1 (1993): 84-86. See also, Chris Spies, "South Africa’s National 
Peace Accord: its structures and functions," in Accord: an international review of peace initiatives, ed. 
Catherine Barnes (London: Conciliation Resources, 2002), 24. 
56 For summaries of the incident, see  Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, 165-168. Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume Three, Chapter 3, 198-202. 
57 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume Three, Chapter 3, 198. 
58 Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, 167. 
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the crimes committed. This last point is important for the analysis of gradual change to the 
structural conditions in the next chapter.    
The reliability of and public trust in the police are particularly important for the 
current discussion, given that investigations conducted by commissions of inquiry were 
supported, if not carried out, by investigators within the South African Police force. This 
meant that the police were directly involved in conducting investigations involving 
allegations against police and military personnel. Goldstone identifies that “the police had 
little if any credibility among the majority of South Africans.”60 Ellis suggests that even 
after the transition, “a far more difficult task faces the Police, trained by the outrages which 
they perpetrated before 1994…”61 To rely on police to investigate violence thus presented 
challenges for credibility and legitimacy.62  
This tension is particularly evident in the Harms Commission, the very purpose of 
the which was the investigation of hit-squad activity allegedly tied to the state. As discussed 
in Chapter 5, allegations of the so-called “third force” were difficult to prove though the 
phenomenon seemed pervasively to be known.63 Issues with investigations conducted by 
commissions and the involvement of the police speaks to the crux of the issue this project 
                                                
60 Richard J. Goldstone, For Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Prosecutor (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 2000), 33.  
61 Stephen Ellis, "The Historical Significance of South Africa’s Third Force," Journal of Southern African 
Studies 24, no. 2 (1998): 295. 
62 See also discussion by Daniel Terris, The Trials of Richard Goldstone (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 2019), 84. 
63 The Third Force is the dominant term used during the negotiations referring to instigators of violence, 
assumed to be state-led, that were responsible for often seemingly random attacks. See, Ellis, "The 
Historical Significance of South Africa’s Third Force," 261-264. 
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is investigating. The establishment of the Harms Commission by de Klerk in 1990 
illustrates the pervasiveness of the issue. 
The government established the Harms Commission of Inquiry, the Commission of 
Inquiry into Certain Alleged Murders, to investigate the allegations of death squads in the 
security forces. In the introduction of the Harms Commission report, the issue is taken up 
directly:  
At the opening of the commission I pointed out that it was valid question whether it 
was proper to use police in the investigation, especially in respect of the part of the 
investigation which deals with the allegations involving police. I said that I had no 
other solution available and that in the absence of a factual basis one could not 
condemn the SAP as a whole. I then stated that should any facts be brought to my 
attention which reflect upon the ability of any officer to assist the Commission, 
immediate action would be taken. Not once was the ability of any officer questioned. 
No-one presented an alternative. I can say without fear of contradiction that the 
Commission would not have been able to function properly without its officers. Their 
dedication and behaviour was exemplary.64    
 
The Harms Commission reported that it was unable to find evidence of the hit squad 
activity under investigation, based on the determination that witnesses were unreliable.65 
Evidence has since emerged that witnesses did not tell the truth to the Harms 
Commission.66 Media coverage of the report identifies that Harms “admitted it was likely 
that the police had committed crimes of violence, but said he found no evidence that ‘a 
                                                
64 L.T.C. Harms, Chairman and Sole Member, Commission of Inquiry into Certain Alleged Murders Report 
(Pretoria: September 1990), 31. NMAP, 4.2, folder 156, Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory, Johannesburg, 
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65 David B. Ottaway, "Hit-Squad Report Sparks Outcry in South Africa," The Washington Post, November 
17, 1990, accessed online, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/11/17/hit-squad-report-
sparks-outcry-in-south-africa/c83d2505-df49-45bd-93b6-14b39bf29f17/. 
66 James Gump, "Unveiling the Third Force: Toward Transitional Justice in the USA and South Africa, 
1973-1994," Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Studies 15, no. 1 (2014): 91. See also: 
"O’Malley’s Political Interviews, 25 Nov. 1996, Meyer, Roelf," The O’Malley Archive, O’Malley: The 
Heart of Hope, accessed April 16. 2020, 
https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv00017/04lv00344/05lv00965/06lv01078.h
tm. 
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particular policeman committed a particular crime of violence for a particular purpose.’”67 
That the report claims that hit-squads did not exist was not surprising to civil society 
organizations that had been reporting on violence with relative frequency. While the Harms 
Commission reported inconclusively, civil society organizations like the Independent 
Board of Inquiry continued to investigate and report on information related to such 
allegations.68  
 Media reports reported that “human rights and anti-Apartheid groups, the media 
and political commentators have lambasted the commission for failing to issue any 
indictments or shed much light on how so many activists over the past decade died under 
mysterious circumstance.”69 More pointedly, du Toit argues that with the Harms 
Commission the “legalistic facade” of commissions of inquiry “finally began to come apart 
in public.”70 Thus, the Harms Commission could not lay the issue of hit squads to rest. 
Moreover, the Harms Commission perpetuated the perception that the commission of 
inquiry was a means to maintain the status quo and not a change oriented instrument. This 
is important because it highlights the significance of the degree of change that the 
commission of inquiry underwent through the Goldstone Commission. Allegations of hit-
squads persisted and were later investigated by the Goldstone Commission when sufficient 
                                                
67 Christopher S. Wren, "Inquiry in South Africa Inconclusive," The New York Times, November 14, 1990, 
accessed online, https://www.nytimes.com/1990/11/14/world/inquiry-in-south-africa-inconclusive.html  
68 The reports of the IBI illustrate these allegations. Housed at Wits Historical Papers, some of the 
collection has been digitized and is available at: 
http://www.historicalpapers.wits.ac.za/?inventory/U/collections&c=AG2543/R/8125 
69 David B. Ottaway, “Hit-Squad Report Sparks Outcry in South Africa,” The Washington Post, November 
17, 1990. 
70 André du Toit, "A Need for ‘Truth’: Amnesty and the Origins and Consequences of the TRC Process," 
International Journal of Public Theology 8 (2014): 398. 
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evidence came to light to confirm their operation shortly before the election.71 
Procedurally, the Goldstone Commission also addressed the policing perception problem 
as is explored in the next chapter.  
6.3 ANC Inquiries  
Though the focus of this project is explicitly on state-initiated investigations, the issue of 
credibility necessitates a brief consideration of the ANC’s own internal inquiries. This also 
illustrates the entrenchment of the system of the commission of inquiry. When considering 
why a commission of inquiry would be the vehicle of choice in the transition despite South 
Africa’s history of oppression, it is worth noting that investigatory commissions could also 
be carried out, and were, without presidential authorization.72 They could be used by non-
governmental actors. Such commissions also played an important role in information 
gathering and considerations into violence. Commissions created by non-government 
bodies, had “no greater power or protection than that enjoyed by a private individual in the 
conduct of his affairs and must rely on the voluntary cooperation of witnesses.”73 This is 
particularly relevant in situating the ANC commissions of inquiry that preceded the 
democratic transition. The ANC established the Skweyiya and Motsuenyane commissions 
of inquiry in 1991 and 1993, respectively, to investigate complaints internal to the ANC 
                                                
71 There were other investigation efforts beyond the Goldstone Commission, another investigation into 
security force involvement in hit squads was appointed through the Attorney-General’s office. See: Piers 
Pigou, "False Promises and Wasted Opportunties? Inside South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission," in Commissioning the Past: Understanding South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 2002), 54-56. See also Goldstone, For 
Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Prosecutor, 57.  
72 A.J. Middleton, "Notes on the Nature and Conduct of Commission of Inquiry: South Africa," no. 19 
(1986): 253. 
73 Ibid., 253. 
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structures, particularly in military camps operated by the ANC.74 The ANC’s initiative in  
undertaking internal investigations has been praised, despite the criticisms levied by 
external observers to the process.75 While these commissions identified instances of 
significant rights violations and made recommendations, the processes, outcomes, and 
implementation of recommendations were entirely dependent on the ANC organization 
itself.  
 It is notable that the opposition forces viewed the inquiries or investigations as a 
mechanism that could shed light on the issues that were under investigation. While it has 
been noted that the ANC demonstrated a certain initiative in investigating human rights in 
this way, the chosen approach for the process has received less attention. Without the 
constraints of state-led investigations or challenges of governance, the ANC could, 
theoretically, have chosen any sort of investigation. In some senses, the ANC’s reliance on 
this type of investigation re-articulated the continuing utility or legitimacy of this type of 
institution. In the South African context, one indicator of the degree to which the 
institutionalization of commissions of inquiry had become entrenched as an appropriate 
means of investigation is its use even by non-state actors. This is significant because it 
illustrates a sense of legitimacy in the process of the commission of inquiry, which helps 
to demonstrate the degree to which it was entrenched.  
Though the circumstances of their implementation and operation are remarkably 
different from a state-led and state-financed inquiry, the value of this kind of unofficial 
                                                
74 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume Two, Chapter 4, 350-351. 
75 Priscilla B. Hayner, "Fifteen Truth Commissions —1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study," Human Rights 
Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1994): 625-626, 632-634.  
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investigation and reporting is still an important consideration. Key illustrations of both 
continuity and change suggest the ANC-led inquiries follow similar patterns in 
implementing successive inquiries. For example, as Ellis notes, the ANC established the 
Motsuenyane Commission after the Skweyiya Commission based on continuing pressures, 
“partly because of the limits to its terms of reference.”76 The Skweyiya Commission report 
identifies in its introduction that Mandela wanted the commission to investigate complaints 
and to “establish whether or not they are correct, and if they are, what action it should take 
in consequence thereof.”77 The investigation’s proceedings were not made public, though 
a public report was to be released with names removed at the discretion of the 
commission.78 According to an ANC circular, Mayibuye, the purpose of this was to ensure 
that the organization adequately addressed  people’s complaints.79  
The implementation of successive internal investigations, with panels of lawyers 
investigating allegations of abuse, has an important implication for this study. The use this 
type of investigative body suggests it had some legitimacy among members of the 
organization and sufficient credibility to satisfy external pressures to do something about 
the issue of potential human rights abuses against people in detention at the ANC camps. 
Though compelling, the influence of these commissions is beyond the scope of this project. 
They are mentioned here only to acknowledge the degree to which the commission of 
                                                
76 Stephen Ellis, "Mbokodo: Security in ANC Camps, 1961-1990," African Affairs 93, no. 371 (1994): 281. 
77 Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Complaints by Former African National Congress Prisoners 
and Detainees, August 1992, 6. Community Agency for Social Enquiry Records 1990-1996, AG2838, Wits 
Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
78 Ibid., 7,8.  
79 “Commission of inquiry into detentions,” Mayibuye, October 1991, 22. South African Institute of Race 
Relations, Press Cuttings, Part A, 1928-1998, AD1912, Folder GC 22, M.170.1 Multi-Party Conference 
1991, Wits Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, Johannesburg, South Africa.  
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inquiry was entrenched in the political landscape in South Africa. The inescapable 
discussions about the moral non-equivalence of forces struggling to end Apartheid and 
those operating to enforce Apartheid suggest that disentangling this influence will be 
difficult, though it is necessary.80 
 Neither the ANC’s internal commissions, nor the Commission of Inquiry for the 
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, nor the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, appear to be tools of acquiescence to the status quo despite similar 
institutional frameworks. However, government-initiated commissions had to be 
augmented for the transitional purposes for which they were intended, in order to avoid the 
legacies of government partiality. The next chapter demonstrates how the Commission 
achieved this credibility. Including the operating structure and mandate of the Commission 
of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation in the National Peace 
Accord, 1991, suggests that there was consensus on the utility of such an institution to 
investigate violence during the transition. Furthermore, the Goldstone Commission became 
operational within weeks of agreement to the National Peace Accord. This suggests that 
the Government furnished the Commission with the necessary resources to support the 
peace initiatives.81 The relative readiness of the Commission’s mandate and operational 
                                                
80 See TRC report for consideration of the moral dimension, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South 
Africa Report: Volume One, Chapter 1, 12-13. 
81 The National Peace Accord was signed on 21 September 1991. The first hearings of the Goldstone 
Commission started on November 15, 1991 according to Section 3 of the Commission of Inquiry for the 
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, “Report on the Violence at Tokoza.” Pretoria, 17 
November 1992. 
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capacity can be understood as a result of the familiarity with the process and available 
legislation.82  
Conclusion 
 
South Africa’s previous experience with commissions of inquiry was problematic. Used 
by the state to entrench the Apartheid system and maintain order, the use of another 
commission of inquiry to facilitate negotiations could have suffered the same institutional 
problems, supporting the status-quo for the regime rather than acting as an agent of change. 
This chapter has demonstrated that the commission of inquiry persisted during the 
Apartheid regime because it served the interests of those in power. The institution had some 
consensus as a means to investigate, as is illustrated by their use by non-governmental 
actors. The next chapter investigates how this institutional foundation underwent a process 
of gradual change, as illustrated in the operation of the Commission of Inquiry for the 
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation.  
                                                
82 Acknowledging that the legislation itself had been passed months earlier, discussed in more detail in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter 7  
7 Gradual Institutional Change and the Goldstone 
Commission 
 
As the previous chapter illustrated, commissions of inquiry usually failed to find fault with 
the system and state agents, police, and security forces were not held accountable for 
violence. This chapter examines how the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of 
Public Violence and Intimidation was able to address the legacies of the commission of 
inquiry in South Africa in order to restore credibility to the investigation process, in turn 
strengthening the operating conditions for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The 
argument is presented in two steps.  
First, the chapter argues that the context of the Commission’s establishment 
provided space for adjustments to be made to the familiar institutional structures of the 
commission of inquiry. The chapter argues that, as a product of the negotiated peace efforts 
that followed the transitional opening in South Africa, the Commission of Inquiry for the 
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation was able to be molded to the needs of the 
transition in a way that enabled the leadership of the Commission to strengthen the 
credibility of the Commission as an investigative process, despite the inherited legacy. The 
design of the founding legislation for the Goldstone Commission laid a necessary 
foundation for the Commission to be deployed towards credible information gathering. 
Second, the chapter articulates how the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public 
Violence and Intimidation was able to mediate the entrenched problems associated with 
similar such investigations into violence that preceded it and cultivate credibility in 
investigations. These adjustments can be understood using Mahoney and Thelen’s model 
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of conversion in their theorizing of gradual institutional change.1 To conclude, the chapter 
analyzes the two-fold impact of the Commission’s operation on the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The Commission did not only lay the foundation for 
the TRC by identifying the degree to which information was withheld. It also helped to 
prepare the environment for truth-seeking, as a result of gradual institutional change, 
demonstrating that investigations could be carried out in a credible and legitimate manner.    
7.1 The Context for Change: Transition and 
Negotiation  
 
The Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation had 
important effects, both on the ongoing negotiations and on the credibility of investigatory 
practices. Entrenched as an instrument to support the state’s power relations, a commission 
of inquiry into violence could have maintained its stature as a partial government 
institution. Rather, as this section illustrates, this commission of inquiry was redeployed in 
a manner that enabled credible investigations into violence and served the ends of 
negotiation and transition, rather than the state. Gradual change in the institution is evident 
in the operation and institutional adjustments of the Goldstone Commission. The 
conversion of these familiar institutional structures was facilitated, in part, by the 
transitional setting in which it was established.  
Mahoney and Thelen identify several dimensions that lead to gradual institutional 
change through conversion. One component is lower veto potentials, or few actors with 
                                                
1 James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," in Explaining 
Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, ed. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1-19. 
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means to block change, and the another is higher levels of ambiguity in the enforcement or 
implementation of rules.2 In addition, Thelen suggests that the incorporation of new actors 
or coalitions helps to account for change through conversion.3 The negotiating 
environment that produced the National Peace Accord and the Commission of Inquiry for 
the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation was important in creating conditions 
that facilitated gradual institutional change. As is demonstrated below, the negotiating 
environment lowered the veto points and veto players. The legislation for the Goldstone 
Commission was negotiated as part of the process and had built in ambiguity. In addition, 
the negotiating process brought new coalitions of actors into the fold.  
Most accounts of the South African transition recognize that de Klerk’s ascension 
to the party leadership in 1989 was significant in facilitating the transitional period because 
he was more liberal than his predecessors and recognized the need to incorporate the black 
majority into governing structures in order for South Africa to survive.4 In this way an 
ideological shift was discernable, although the 1990 speech still took most by surprise.5 As 
a soft-liner, who recognized that change was necessary, de Klerk thus endeavoured to 
engage in a transition process that he and the National Party could control.6 The initiation 
                                                
2 Mahoney and Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,” 19. 
3 Mahoney and Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," 29-31. See also, Kathleen Thelen, 
How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 32-33, 294-295. 
4 Steven Friedman, ed., The Long Journey: South Africa’s Quest for a Negotiated Settlement 
(Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1993), 10-12; Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert, The Quest for Democracy: South 
Africa in transition (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 31. 
5 Allister Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country (Sandton: Struik Book Distributors, 1994), 107; Van Zyl 
Slabbert, The Quest for Democracy: South Africa in transition, 34. 
6 Johannes Rantete and Hermann Giliomee, "Transition to Democracy through Transaction?: Bilateral 
Negotiations between the ANC and NP in South Africa," African Affairs 91, no. 365 (1992): 524; Van Zyl 
Slabbert, The Quest for Democracy: South Africa in transition, 39. 
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of the transition in 1990 was a critical point, but the governance structures in South Africa 
remained much the same. It was another two years before much of the Apartheid legislation 
was actually repealed.7 Further, the negotiations continued with the recognition of the 
sovereignty of the governance structures.8  
 The political violence and unrest that had increased in 1990 played an ongoing role 
in the direction, continuity and impasses of the negotiation processes. According to figures 
from the South African Institute of Race Relations, the year 1990 had more than double 
the fatalities as a result of political violence than the previous year.9 Distinct from the 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) negotiations, the earlier peace 
negotiations were impelled by efforts to find solutions for the violence. Complicating 
matters was the proliferation and multiple sites of violence.  Recalling the dynamics of 
violence discussed in Chapter 5, some pointed to issues of political rivalry between the 
African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party. Yet, there were persistent 
allegations that the state was also responsible for fomenting violence. To address the 
increasing violence the National Peace Accord was signed in 1991, by over 40 groups.10  
 The negotiating parties signed the 1991 National Peace Accord at a time when 
political violence was rampant. Including the provisions for a commission to investigate 
ongoing violence within the peace agreement itself conferred legitimacy on the process. 
                                                
7 John Hatchard and Peter Slinn, "The Path Towards a New Order in South Africa," International Relations 
12, no. 4 (1995): 6; James Hamill, "The Crossing of the Rubicon: South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Political 
Process 1990-1992," International Relations 12, no. 3 (1994): 9. 
8 Friedman, The Long Journey, 26. 
9 Adrian Guelke, "Interpretations of Political Violence During South Africa’s Transition," Politikon 27, no. 
2 (2000): 241. The year 1989 had 1403 deaths, 1990 had 3699 deaths, and 1991 had 2706 deaths. 
10 National Peace Accord, 1991. 
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This is important because the legislation for the establishment of a standing commission to 
investigate violence had already been passed by the South African parliament months prior 
to the signing of the NPA, but it had not been established. As such, the structures were in 
place for the relatively quick deployment of the Commission.11 In this way, the 
Government could be seen to be doing something about the violence, but unlike the 
commissions of inquiry of the past, established for similar such reasons, the Goldstone 
Commission was structured differently to increase its efficacy. 
The de Klerk government introduced legislation for a standing commission on 
violence to Parliament and discussed the proposed commission at a peace conference held 
by the government in early 1991.12 However, the ANC did not participate in the 
government-initiated conference, citing illegitimacy of the proceedings.13 It is notable, 
then, that the NPA provisions for a commission to investigate violence used the Prevention 
of Public Violence and Intimidation Act passed in April 1991 to structure the institution. 
Rather than simply being appointed by the Government at the time, the implementation of 
the legislation as part of a negotiated settlement demonstrated, at the outset, mutual 
agreement to this institution to address violence. According to media coverage, earlier 
drafts of the peace agreement included provisions for the Commission suggesting:  
It would link up with the proposed standing judicial commission on violence and 
intimidation proposed by President FW de Klerk in mid-June... The exact nature of 
                                                
11 The NPA identifies that a statute of some sort would be necessary for the powers proposed for the type of 
commission and thus it is suggested that the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act, 1991 be 
used because it was ready to go, National Peace Accord, 1991, §6.29. 
12 Memorandum on the Objects of the Prevention and of Public violence and Intimidation Bill, 1991, at the 
end of the Bill. 
13 David Breier and Brendan Seery, “Mass action as ANC quits talks,” Sunday Star 19 May 1991. South 
African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), Press Cuttings, Part A, 1928-1998, AD1912, 184, 
Negotiations 1991 and 1992, Wits Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, Johannesburg, South Africa.   
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the link is still being discussed but it is expected that it would be the chief 
enforcement mechanism of the peace code.14  
This demonstrates the significance of the inclusion and the continued discussion of this 
type of commission throughout the peace negotiations. 
In the memorandum that accompanied the publication of the bill in the Government 
Gazette, the commission is presented as an instrument to identify the causes of violence in 
order to address and reduce said violence. The Gazette reads:  
Provision is being made for the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry 
Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation. The object of the 
Commission will be to strive for a community free of public violence and 
intimidation. The main function of the Commission will be to inquire into the 
phenomenon of public violence and intimidation in the Republic and the nature of 
causes thereof.15 
 
It should also be noted that various organizations were calling for something like the 
Commission that was ultimately established. The ANC’s open letter to de Klerk of early 
1991 stipulated a standing investigatory commission into police and security force roles in 
violence.16 This is significant because not only did the NPA apply the already developed 
institutional framework, but this type of response had previously been identified as suitable 
by extra-parliamentary powers. Employing the commission out of a procedurally inclusive 
and negotiated dialogue lent credibility to the information-gathering process. 
 From the outset, its inclusion in the Agreement gave the Commission legitimacy. A 
                                                
14 Patrick Bulger, “Peace plan put to three key players,” Business Day, 14 August 1991, South African 
Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), Press Cuttings, Part A, 1928-1998, AD1912, 184.1a., Negotiations 
1991, file Neg. August 1991, Wits Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, Johannesburg, South Africa.   
15 Republic of South Africa. B0148-91 (GA). Memorandum on the Objects of the Prevention of Public 
Violence and Intimidation Bill, 1991, page 16. 
16 “Open letter to State President de Klerk and his Cabinet from the National Executive Committee of the 
ANC.” Star, 9 April 1991. Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS), Records, N2-N2a “Negotiations 
1993”, Wits Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
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media report from 1992 quotes Brian Currin, executive director of Lawyers for Human 
Rights, stating that “unlike the others it was born out of a process of negotiation which 
included the most relevant political actors. It’s a highly credible commission and has the 
support of the majority of people.”17 Beyond the structures being included in the NPA 
provisions, the appointment of commissioners and other important decisions stemmed 
from the negotiated arrangement. The NPA identifies: 
Fully aware of the fact that the composition of the proposed body will determine its 
relevancy and legitimacy, the Minister of Justice indicated during the Second 
Reading Debate of the Act that no appointments would be made without consultation 
and negotiation with the relevant role players. Consensus will be the key word. The 
group agrees that for this system to be effective, it needs to be credible.18 
 
Both the ANC and NP agreed upon the leadership of the Commission, thus cultivating an 
integral joint perception of credibility.19  
7.2 New Legislation, Similar Institutional Framework  
 
In South Africa, the implementation of the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of 
Public Violence and Intimidation during the negotiations for a democratic South Africa 
was unique in the timing of its application and the capacity of the commission. As 
demonstrated in Chapter 6, it was not exceptional in its institutional application to address 
elements of South African violence particularly. In 1990 alone, the Government the 
Commission of Inquiry into Certain Alleged Murders, the Commission of Enquiry into the 
                                                
17 Philipa Carson. “No Trust Without Enough Funds” WM, 10/1/92. Independent Board of Inquiry 
Collection AG2543,  D54 Goldstone Commission 1991-1992, Wits Historical Papers, William Cullen 
Library, Johannesburg South Africa.  
18 National Peace Accord, 1991, §6.26. 
19 Richard J. Goldstone, For Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Prosecutor (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 2000), 25. 
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Incidents at Sebokeng, Boipatong, Lekoa, Sharpeville and Evaton on 26 March 1990, and 
the Commission of Inquiry into the Death of Clayton Sizwe Sithole.20 As is demonstrated 
below, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation 
was distinctive because of the breadth of its powers and the extension of its guiding 
provisions beyond the Commissions Act that had structured previous inquiries.  
The Commissions Act (1947) and the Inquests Act (1959, amended 1977 and 1990) 
stipulated the processes, structures, and resources through which the government 
conducted inquiries into events and unexplained deaths. The investigations conducted 
under the Inquests Act were also particularly renowned for their cover-ups through the 
processes of investigations.21 The long term consequences of the partial and often absurd 
conclusions drawn to explain deaths are still playing out today as family members are still 
searching for information and acknowledgement.22 It is beyond the scope of this project to 
interrogate the influence of the Inquests Act, although it is necessary to recognize the 
pervasiveness of state involvement in manipulating the official record on repression. 
The Commissions Act 1947 still informs the structure of commissions of inquiry in 
South Africa. The disruption of the transitional period did not lead to an overhaul in the 
legislative framework of these inquiries. Though there were innumerable issues to address 
in the transition to a multi-racial democracy, the adjustments made to the Commissions 
Act included the removal of reference to “South-West Africa” and left the rest of the 
                                                
20 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume One, Chapter 13, 505. 
21 George Bizos, No One to Blame? In Pursuit of Justice in South Africa (Cape Town: David Philip 
Publishers, 1998). 
22 Newspaper reports, for example, Geoffrey York, "Apartheid victims’ long wait for justice nears an end as 
the crimes of South Africa’s past make their way to trial," The Globe and Mail, April 17, 2019, A10-A11. 
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legislation generally intact.23 Interestingly, the legacy of commissions outlined in the 
previous chapter did not upend their structuring framework. For example, Freeman argues 
that in South Africa “the influence of the Commonwealth commission of inquiry 
tradition…is apparent,” pointing to the Commissions Act of 1947 and the 1995 Promotion 
of National Unity and Reconciliation Act.24  This suggests that it was the usage and 
operation of commissions of inquiry, not just the legislation, that was responsible for the 
less than impartial outputs of investigations.  
 What needed to be undone in response to the legacies of earlier commissions of 
inquiry was societal distrust in the investigatory bodies and institutions. The potential for 
similar types of investigations and institutional components that had been used to 
consolidate repression to be used to monitor and redress that repression required a 
modification in delivery. The Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence 
and Intimidation, established in 1991, demonstrated gradual change than enabled a 
commission of inquiry to stimulate change, through adjustments to processes of 
investigation and reporting, and through engagement with the negotiating parties. One 
manner in which this can be assessed is the passage of new legislation for the standing 
commission into violence.  
Though operating as a commission of inquiry, Government established the Goldstone 
Commission under the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act (1991) and not 
the Commissions Act (1947). This new legislation suggests that the Commission needed 
                                                
23 Republic of South Africa Government Gazette Vol. 376, No. 17477, General Law Amendment Act, 
1996. 
24 Mark Freeman, Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 23-24, 24 note 85. 
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to be differently structured to investigate ongoing violence in the country. An introduction 
of the Bill, by the State President in a Joint Sitting of Parliament, locates the commission 
within a discussion of other negotiation efforts. The President’s statement included the 
following: 
Discussions following on the recent summit on violence and intimidation are 
continuing and will hopefully bear fruit soon. At the same time the hon members 
of this Parliament will be asked to dispose of legislation this week in order to 
establish a standing commission on violence and intimidation. The aim is the 
creation of an objective instrument to combat violence and intimidation which will 
have sufficient powers to be able to evaluate State action and evaluate unbiased 
security action.25  
 
Hansard debates days later illustrate discussion surrounding the necessity of the proposed 
commission and its legislation. Government rhetoric surrounding the proposed legislation 
indicated an acknowledgement of the toll of violence and government responsibility in 
addressing violence.26 It also acknowledged the lingering perception of past investigations 
with the Minister of Justice, suggesting that:  
This commission must not merely be seen as another State-instituted body. The 
commission will not only look into the conduct and involvement of those bodies, 
organisations or persons who have no ties with the State, but also at State 
institutions. In other words, if a State organisation is allegedly involved in violence, 
the commission will be able to and will indeed take cognisance of that.27  
 
The minister continued, demonstrating the fragility in the context of negotiations:   
However, I do want to emphasise again that the commission should not be seen as 
an instrument to bring the security forces into discredit. If mistakes have been made 
on that side, the commission will be failing in its duty if it does not bring its finding 
to the attention of the hon the State President.28  
                                                
25 Government of South Africa, Hansard, Joint Sitting, Monday 17 June 1991, 13064, Republic of South 
Africa, “Debates of Parliament (Hansard), 1991,” Volume 28, 5 June – 21 June. 
26 Government of South Africa, Hansard Thursday, Extended Public Committee Assembly, 20 June 1991, 
13658. 
27 Government of South Africa, Hansard Thursday, Extended Public Committee Assembly, Thursday 20 
June 1991, 13660. 
28 Ibid., 13660. 
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In response to queries about the creation of new structures, the Minister of Justice 
responded, “then the hon member must not come and tell me that I am building up a number 
of institutions, while he knows that a commission—according to the Commissions Act in 
its present form—is an imperfect legal concept.”29  
 The Government assented to the Bill on 27 June 1991.30 The provisions for a 
standing commission to investigate violence were already legislated when the National 
Peace Accord was negotiated and signed. Thus, the Commission of Inquiry for the 
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, was both the product of existing 
government structures and the product of negotiation. The text of the National Peace 
Accord specifically recognizes the value of having the commission ready to go, and, the 
Commission launched its first investigation within about a month of the NPA being 
signed.31 The violence that had persisted in South Africa—and which was the impetus for 
the peace accord—increased the urgency of a response. It is difficult to dismiss the value 
of the familiarity with the inquiry method, more so given that the Prevention of Public 
Violence and Intimidation Act, 1991 granted the commission expanded powers compared 
to the previous commissions of inquiry in South Africa, in addition to the fact that it was 
envisioned as a permanent commission.32  
The negotiating process led not only to the agreement to the Commission of Inquiry 
on the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, but also to agreement on the 
                                                
29 Ibid., 13721. 
30 National Peace Accord, 1991, text, addendum.  
31 The hearings started on November 15, 1991 according Section 3 of the “Report on the Inquiry Conducted 
by the Committee of Inquiry into the Violence at Tokoza,” of the Commission of Inquiry Regarding the 
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, 19 November 1992. 
32 National Peace Accord, 1991, Chapter 6, section 6.5. 
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appointed leadership. This had been recognized as an important dimension of credibility 
early in the process.33 There was an agreement between the Government and the ANC to 
choose someone perceived to be credible at the outset, given that “no appointments would 
be made without consultation and negotiation with the relevant role players.”34 This was 
not without contention. Prior to the signing of the peace agreement, opposition parties 
expressed dissatisfaction with the ANC involvement in an appointment. One critic in the 
discussion asked, “Why is the ANC at the fore when it comes to being consulted?... The 
ANC is not supposed to be governing the country, and I cannot understand this government 
behind the scenes.”35 However, the decision to ensure agreement on his appointment 
helped to shore up support for the Commission. According to Goldstone:  
de Klerk suggested to the negotiating bodies that he should set up that commission. 
Well the ANC and Mandela in particular didn’t want another government 
commission. And they agreed to it I think fairly reluctantly but on condition only 
that the chairman and four members would be appointed unanimously by all of 
the…parties of the negotiating process.36  
 
This was a significant distinguishing feature from earlier commissions of inquiry. 
The agreement to use the commission as a tool towards peace and negotiations as 
well as the consensus underlying the appointment of commission personnel are some of 
the components that did the most to address the legacies of ineffective, and often 
uninformative, inquiries of the past. Timothy Sisk’s early assessment of the National Peace 
Accord identifies the value in the approach:  
                                                
33 The parliamentary debates at the time indicate a concern from opposition parties that there be widespread 
consultation on appointment. Hansard Thursday 20 June 1991 Extended Public Committee, 13667, 13670, 
13679, 13685. 
34 National Peace Accord, 1991, Chapter 6, section 6.26. 
35 Government of South Africa, Hansard, Extended Public Committee - Assembly, Thursday, 20 June 1991, 
13670. 
36 Richard Goldstone, interview with author, April 2017. 
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A standing commission is constituted for three years to fully investigate the   
underlying causes of violence, specific incidents, and steps required to prevent 
further violence. The “independent and nonpartisan” commission is chaired by 
widely respected Appeals Court Judge Richard Goldstone. The commission 
includes members implicitly nominated by the major political parties, including the 
ANC and IFP, and is thus seen as much more representative than previous judicial 
commissions.37 
 
This is significant because the formal process of the state, and the institution it produced 
in the Goldstone Commission, were supported by important forces that had no 
representation in government. This agreement created the space for an independent 
investigatory body to operate.  
 Procedurally, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and 
Intimidation was bestowed with significant powers that other earlier commissions were 
not. Significantly, the Commission had the power of search and seizure.38 As will be 
explored further in the next chapter, the non-cooperation of state-aligned witnesses at the 
Harms commission resulted in significant limitations in that commissions investigations 
and findings. In briefly justifying the inclusion of more robust subpoena powers, The 
Minister of Justice continues to explain the adjustments made to the Bill, so that it would 
not be subject to the same criticisms leveled at the Harms Commission:  
We were criticised because the Harms Commission had no teeth, because it did not 
aim at more concrete results, because it revealed shortcomings, according to the 
hon members. I must say that I felt the same way. The protection of a commissioner, 
for example, is not adequate. I am not quite certain whether this commissioner is 
going to have adequate protection. This is something which I have to look at. It is 
one of the points that are worrying me, but the fact remains that here we are dealing 
in a bona fide way with the shortcomings in the Commissions Act and 
                                                
37 Timothy D. Sisk, "South Africa’s National Peace Accord," Peace & Change 19, no. 1 (January 1994): 
54. 
38 Government of South Africa, Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act, 1991. 
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supplementing them in a way which still protects the right of a person to remain 
silent.39 
 
This account highlights the recognition from the government that the Harms Commission 
did not satisfy the calls for investigation that had been made. While the media reports of 
the Harms Commission and the report focused on the ‘toothlessness’ of the process, the 
government recognized existing limitations.  
 The Goldstone Commission’s legislative framework allowed for the search and 
seizure of documents, and thus it could move beyond voluntary witness testimony in 
gathering evidence for its investigations.40 This power proved invaluable in uncovering the 
links between the South African Police and violence. The Goldstone Commission’s report 
on the issue directly referenced the powers of search and seizure in the ability to link the 
elements of violence under investigation.41 
Perhaps one of the most valuable features of the Prevention of Public Violence and 
Intimidation Act was the built-in capacity for the Commission to request adjustments and 
additions to its mandate as shortcomings became evident. Through these provisions, the 
Goldstone Commission adjusted its operating capacity by establishing additional units to 
gather information and report on ongoing violence. This illustrates a degree of “discretion” 
in the implementation of the process, which is significant in explaining the manner in which 
                                                
39 Government of South Africa Hansard, Extended Public Committee – Assembly, Thursday, 20 June 1991, 
13723. This also speaks to the complexity of compelling participation, with a recognition of the tension 
between testimony, implications of subpoena as related to the potential for self-incrimination. These 
tensions are important for consideration but beyond the scope of this project.  
40 Government of South Africa, Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act, 1991. 
41 Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, “Criminal 
Political Violence by Elements Within the South African Police, KwaZulu Police and the Inkatha Freedom 
Party,” (18 March 1994), 3.3. See also the earlier case of Joao Cuna,  in Goldstone, For Humanity 
Reflections of a War Crimes Prosecutor, and Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, 172-173.  
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the commission could enhance investigation credibility.42 The rationale for this component 
of the legislation is difficult to determine given the lack of access to documents surrounding 
this decision-making process.43 The impacts, however, are significant. Through an 
amendment to the legislation, the Commission was able to establish more committees to 
investigate violence.44 Other adjustments included the incorporation of investigation 
units,45 and the establishment of witness protection measures.46  
The passage of legislation for the standing commission illustrates that the previous 
forms of the commission of inquiry were not likely to be sufficient for the task at hand. 
Decades of experience with commissions created by the racist and repressive system 
resulted in the inclusion of different provisions in a Commission which was to eventually 
form a pillar of the negotiated agreement. The structure of the legislation meant that when 
the Commission faced operational limitations, there were provisions in place for requests 
and adjustments. In addition, at the outset, the Commission had more powers than previous 
commissions of inquiry. These features enabled the Goldstone Commission to operate 
within the parameters of the system but to achieve a greater degree of credibility than had 
been seen in previous commissions of inquiry. Iterative adjustments could be made to 
existing powers of investigation rather than attempting an entirely new investigative 
                                                
42 Mahoney and Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," 19. 
43 These documents were not able to be located at the Parliamentary Library. 
44 See Republic of South Africa, Hansard, Joint Meeting, Friday 3 April 1992, 3543-3551, Republic of 
South Africa, Debates of Parliament (Hansard), 1992, Volume 32, 24 March - 24 April. 
45 Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, “Report on the 
Investigation Units of the Goldstone Commission: 1 October 1992 – 30 September 1993,” 26 November 
1993.  
46 Regulations Made Under the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act (Act no. 139) of 1991, 
as amended by Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Amendment Act No. 50 of 1992, 
Government Gazette, No. 14197, Volume 325, 31 July 1992. 
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institution during a period of upheaval. Although the relationship between the Commission 
and the negotiating parties’ leadership was not always smooth and straightforward,47 the 
Commission was able to develop trust and credibility through its operation.48  
7.3 Innovations in the Prevention of Public Violence 
and Intimidation Act, 1991  
 
The innovations in the structure of the Commission were the result of the design of the 
legislation itself, alongside the implementation and operational decisions undertaken by 
the leadership of the Commission. These institutional design elements set the Commission 
apart from its predecessors and enabled the Goldstone Commission to demonstrate a 
different modus operandi for violence investigation. Three distinguishing features of the 
Commission will be taken up in turn. First, the legislation itself was designed in a way that 
increased the powers of the commission at the outset and that enabled modifications 
illustrating a degree of discretion in implementation. Second, and closely related, this 
amendment potential enabled operational innovations to be implemented. Finally, the 
element of timing and duration is important. The Commission’s mandate did not limit its 
operation to a specific time frame and thus the Commission had the time to determine its 
own limitations and suggest improvements. Each of these elements demonstrates a higher 
degree of interpretation which allowed the Commission’s leadership to interpret the rules 
towards stronger investigations, facilitating a process of conversion.49 
 The Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation 
                                                
47 Goldstone, For Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Prosecutor, 29-30. 
48 Sisk, "South Africa’s National Peace Accord," 56-57. 
49 Mahoney and Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," 18-33. 
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was not established under the usual Commissions Act, but through newly promulgated and 
specific legislation. It is difficult to trace the emergence and development of the Prevention 
of Violence and Intimidation Act of 1991 through Parliamentary channels. It is evident that 
the Government presented a draft of the bill at the Government’s April peace summit in 
order to solicit feedback.50 However, exactly how the decisions were made on what was 
included in the final version of the Bill is not clear. Despite this limitation in understanding 
of the processes’ development, parliamentary records indicate that, although there was 
support for the purpose of the Bill, political representatives expressed unease over the 
manner in which the Bill was developed and presented.51  
 In terms of procedure, parliamentary debates do indicate some concern by members 
of parliament over the applicability of the commission itself, the potential for self-
incrimination, and a lack of witness protection.52 The government justified the bill based 
on the need to do something to curb the violence, and identified that existing statutes may 
not have given the proposed Commission sufficient capacity to carry out the necessary 
functions in the face of ongoing violence.53 Thus, the development of the Act recognized 
the limitations of the existing legislation and that the ongoing violence needed to be 
addressed differently than it had been historically. This suggests that intentions behind the 
investigation and information-gathering process for the Goldstone Commission were 
                                                
50 §3 Memorandum on the Objects of the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Bill, 1991. 
51 See for example, the perception of rushed timing, Hansard, 1991 Extended Public Committee – 
Assembly, 20 June 1991,13664, 13682-13684, Joint Meeting, 21 June 1991, 13744.  
52 See for example, Republic of South Africa, Hansard, Joint Committee – Assembly, 20 June 1991, 13687. 
53 See Republic of South Africa, Hansard, 20 June 1991, Extended Public Committee – Assembly, 13680; 
Joint Sitting, Monday, 17 June 1991, 13064; Extended Public Committee, 20 June 1991, 13718, 13726. 
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different than those that had informed previous commissions. Although this intentionality 
is difficult to determine, the remainder of this section illustrates the different structure of 
the Commission for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation and the impact 
these institutional design elements had on its operation and later truth-seeking processes. 
The degree of power granted to the Commission in the establishing legislation is important.  
 While there are similarities between the Prevention of Public Violence and 
Intimidation Act and the Commissions Act 1947, there are key differences. Both legislative 
frameworks allow for the summoning of witnesses and the production of relevant 
documents or items.54 But, beyond this, the legislation diverges in substantial ways. The 
1991 Act conferred significant powers on the standing commission it crafted. The 
memorandum attached to the bill states: 
With a view to assisting the proposed Commission in the exercise and performance 
of its powers, duties and functions, provision is being made for – 
(i) the establishment of ad hoc committees and institutes; and 
(ii) powers of investigation.55  
 
The first element listed under the powers of the Commission is the ability for the 
Commission itself to determine the “nature and extent” of its mandated inquiries.56 This is 
significant because it illustrates the breadth of independence conferred.  
 Additionally, the Commission was bestowed with strong ‘powers of investigation.’ 
The provisions for search and seizure were, an “”unusual authority.”57 The Act stipulates 
                                                
54 Government of South Africa, “Commissions Act.” Act no. 8, 1947, Union Gazette Extraordinary, 18th 
April 1947. See also, Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act 1991, Section 8, “Powers of 
Commission for purposes of Inquiry.” 
55 Memorandum on the Objects of the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Bill, 1991. 
56 Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act 1991, Section 8, “Powers of Commission for 
purposes of Inquiry,” §1. 
57 Daniel Terris, The Trials of Richard Goldstone (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2019), 85. 
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that, “The Chairman or any member of the staff of the Commission may, for the purpose 
of an inquiry, at all reasonable times enter upon and inspect any premises and demand and 
seize any document on or kept on such premises.”58 Such powers were unique for a 
commission of inquiry. These provisions were invaluable in eventually helping the 
Commission discover evidence on security force involvement in violence.59 Evidence of a 
third force significantly impacted the recognition that further information gathering was 
necessary, as is discussed later in the chapter.60  
 The potential for modifications to the Bill under the purview of the Minister of Justice 
also had meaningful implications for the operation of the Commission. Entrenched in the 
Bill itself were stipulations enabling the Minister to make additional provisions:  
 15. (1) The Minister may make regulations as to– 
  (a) any matter required or permitted to be prescribed in terms of this Act 
        and 
  (b) generally, all matters which in his opinion are necessary or expedient to 
be prescribed to achieve the objects of this Act.61 
 
With this inclusion, an element of ambiguity was built into the Commission that enabled 
adjustments to strengthen information-gathering capacities—enabling the addition of 
institutional components or adjustments to those incorporated into the Bill at its 
                                                
58 Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act 1991, Section 8, “Powers of Commission for 
purposes of Inquiry,” §6. 
59 Goldstone, For Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Prosecutor, 41-42. See also Commission of 
Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, “Fourth Interim Report,” 6 
December 1993.  
60 Despite the value of this institutional feature, Terris identifies that “Goldstone was fighting a tyrannical 
system with a search and seizure power outside of the normal framework of checks and balances.” He cites 
Richard Goldstone who states, “I was doing many things on the Commission that in a democracy would 
have been unthinkable and unconstitutional. The fact that we could conduct a raid on government offices 
without a court order…. We were taking advantage of the undemocratic nature of the nature of the regime.”  
See Terris, The Trials of Richard Goldstone, 85. 
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establishment.  
 The witness protection program was established under these provisions. As will be 
explored in detail in Chapter 8, the Commission’s recognition of the limitations of witness 
protection for its investigations was thus addressed through the structures governing the 
legislation. Another institutional feature that aided the investigative capacities of the 
Commission was the establishment of the investigation units as part of the Commission. It 
is not clear whether the investigation units were established under the Section 15 provision, 
only that they were established in consultation with “relevant parties.”62 
 Also important was the Commission’s ability to create committees that would help 
the Commission complete its work.63 While the Committee structure was originally 
included in the bill, in April 1992, the Government amended legislation to adjust the 
Commission’s committee composition and structure. Where the initial legislation 
stipulated that each committee required a member of the Commission to sit on it, the 
amendment enabled committees to be established without a Commission member. The 
purpose of this expansion was to “make it possible to appoint committees more quickly to 
investigate violence where it may arise.”64 The composition of the committees was under 
the purview of the Commission itself.65 
 The permanent nature of its operation is the third element that set the Commission 
                                                
62 Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, “Report on the 
Investigation Units of the Goldstone Commission: 1 October 1992 – 30 September 1993,” 26 November 
1993.  
63  Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act 1991, Section 4. See also, Bill Memorandum 4.2.  
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apart from earlier commissions of inquiry. This permanence is specified in the Prevention 
of Public Violence and Intimidation Act, and in the National Peace Accord text. Thus, the 
adjustments to the Commission’s operation can be situated in the ability to learn from 
investigations. For example, multiple investigations into violence at Mooi River illustrated 
limitations in the earlier engagement of the Commission.66 The killing of witnesses who 
had testified during an early investigation and the difficulty in ascertaining evidence of the 
‘third force’ illustrated a need for witness protection measures.67 The creation of an 
independent investigation unit and bringing in international experts moderated limitations 
in investigations, which is discussed in further detail below. In addition, the longer timeline 
meant that public hearings could be held on multiple issues, strengthening the outputs of 
the Commission.  
 Its permanent nature also enabled the Commission to report more frequently since 
the reports did not have to wait until the end of the mandate. The Commission was thus 
able to demonstrate its work throughout its operation. Crucially, that incremental changes 
were made in light of these emergent limitations points to (1) the opening provided to make 
the desired changes, and (2) the leadership acting on these needs. The interaction of these 
elements is explored below. 
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7.4 Building Credibility and Demonstrating 
Effectiveness  
 
The incremental changes associated with negotiations and concessions enabled the space 
for the Goldstone Commission investigations to change the status quo. That an 
investigation could be more than a government-centric initiative changed the purpose of 
investigation, but relied on the associated structures through which investigations had been 
conducted previously. In his personal reflections, Goldstone acknowledged that: 
It was essential to demonstrate to the people of South Africa that this commission 
was different from preceding ones, all of which had been presided over by white 
male judges. It was essential that we conduct the affairs of this commission, to the 
extent possible, in a nonracist, nonsexist and impartial fashion.68  
 
Arguably, the Goldstone Commission succeeded in overcoming the state-centric legacy of 
the commission of inquiry, in part, because its investigations benefitted from the structures 
of the state but did not answer to them. From Judge Goldstone’s perspective, “I think the 
important thing was that I was sensitive to the importance of gaining the confidence of all 
South Africans in the independence of the Commission and its investigation units.”69 Not 
only was the Commission designed with sufficient ambiguity to facilitate the process of 
gradual institutional change, the leadership of the Commission capitalized on these 
measures to strengthen truth-seeking through the Commission’s operations.  
 
7.4.1 Consensus Building  
Throughout its period of operation, the Commission cultivated credibility, thus positioning 
itself to contribute to further investigations and other measures to address potential 
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violence. Writing close to the time of the Commission’s operation, Sisk suggests that the 
Goldstone Commission was one of the only elements of the National Peace Accord that 
could be described as an “unqualified” success.”70 Sisk recognized that:  
The Goldstone Commission’s investigations and reports are widely viewed as 
serious attempts to determine the nature and causes of political violence, including 
specific incidents. They appear unbiased, and the Commission has earned 
enormous legitimacy (judicial commissions have historically been perceived as 
biased toward the government). The investigations have been speedy and thorough, 
recommendations practical, and blame is perceived to be apportioned in a generally 
even-handed manner.71 
 
The Commission also received praise from Secretary-General of the United Nations. A 
1992 Report indicates that:  
It is neither necessary nor possible here to recount the far-reaching work being 
undertaken by Justice Richard Goldstone, Chairman of the Commission of Enquiry 
into Public Violence and Intimidation. Suffice it to say that it commands 
widespread respect in South Africa and abroad.72 
 
Goldstone recognized the significance of the participation of the various political groups. 
With respect to how the Goldstone Commission distinguished itself from its predecessors, 
Goldstone states: 
I suppose it’s a combination of things—certainly my independence, my concern for 
democracy in the future in South Africa, and crucially the cooperation of all the 
major political parties. Without all of them on board it would have failed. It 
wouldn’t have had credibility if I didn’t have the support of both the government 
and the ANC and Inkatha for that matter and that’s much to the credit of Mandela 
who immediately embraced the Commission on its appointment.73 
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The negotiated foundation on its own was not sufficient for its credible operation, as 
suggested in this passage. The independence in approach and operation further legitimized 
the process.  
The readiness of the Commission to conduct investigations when needed and the 
relative trust in the institution to do so when needed illustrate its importance. A report of a 
Multi-National Panel investigating and making recommendations for the election, speaks 
to these qualities in considering the role for the Commission through the election period: 
It is difficult to imagine that it would be possible, in the short time remaining before 
the election, to create another entity imbued with the credibility enjoyed by the 
Commission. Over the past two years, the very fact of the Commission’s existence 
and its availability to accept referrals of the most difficult and sensitive matters has 
provided an outlet for political tension. The investigation and hearing process itself 
has given the public some assurance that serious misconduct, even by the State, 
would be pursued.74  
 
Its contribution was also partially a result of both its ability to quickly deploy to 
troublesome situations and the powers granted to the Commission. One illustrative 
example of this was the Commission’s deployment in response to the “Events at the World 
Trade Centre on 25 June 1993.”75 During this incident, 3000 right-wing Afrikaner 
protestors forced their way into the World Trade Centre where the CODESA negotiations 
were taking place.76 The protest had been approved by the local authorities, with caveats 
to the location and a prohibition on firearms.77 The State President requested that the 
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Goldstone Commission investigate the matter. Significantly, though, the Negotiating 
Forum had debated implementing its own investigation/inquiry into the matter but decided 
to delegate the investigation to the Goldstone Commission because of its statutory 
powers.78 This is significant because it demonstrates the Commission’s response potential. 
It is notable that the Commission presented its report on this incident to the State President 
on 13 July 1993,79 only a few weeks after the incident itself had occurred. 
One of the strengths of the commission was its ability to cultivate support among 
key parties to the peace agreement, beyond the initial appointment on leadership. In this 
way, during its operation, it also acted as a legitimate source of ‘new rules’ that helped to 
structure behaviour conducive to peacebuilding and negotiation. Perhaps the clearest 
example of this is the role that the Commission played in the development of the guidelines 
and draft legislation for the Regulation of Marches and Gatherings. The Commission 
established a Committee to investigate “procedure to regulate the organisation, conduct 
and policing of mass demonstrations,” given that “in South Africa unpredictable or 
undisciplined behaviour by mass demonstrators or other members of the public and the 
police present at mass demonstration create a very real potential for violence.”80  
The Commission recognized the necessity of the investigation into these 
regulations in its first interim report, reporting the establishment of the Committee and the 
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value of international experts acknowledged.81 Soliciting feedback and operating hearings 
for parties to participate, the Committee first established guidelines to which the ANC and 
the SAP agreed to adhere.82 In the Final Report, the Commission recognizes the “almost 
universal adherence to the Interim Agreement.”83 From these guidelines, the Commission 
drafted and circulated draft legislation.84 This is an example of the Commission’s utility in 
establishing parameters for what it deemed to be a democratic right.85 It demonstrates the 
Commission’s ability to engage with the public and secure incremental agreements until 
consensus could be reached. The Commission first secured an agreement between the ANC 
and SAP and then worked to develop more comprehensive legislation. This example also 
illustrates gradual institutional change within the Goldstone Commission. 
The characteristics conducive to conversion within the commission of inquiry are 
also illustrated in this example. The element of interpretation is present on several levels. 
The mandate’s ability to propose legislation sets out the parameters for engagement with 
such regulations to prevent violence. However, the manner in which the Regulations on 
Gatherings guidelines were proposed itself demonstrates the flexibility in interpreting the 
process. The Commission engaged in a process of negotiation, soliciting feedback and buy-
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in from those with vested interests. Not only were the police consulted, but the engagement 
also incorporated the preferences of the former liberation movements, bringing different 
coalitional actors into the fold. The use of the commission to develop legislation to prevent 
further violence is a significant change from their use under the Apartheid state to reinforce 
unjust laws.  
The recognition that including all parties in the process would benefit investigations 
into violence illustrates how the leadership of the Commission navigated the ambiguity of 
the transitional environment to strengthen its credibility. Goldstone recounts that, “I 
decided that it was important politically for me to promptly report what the commission 
was doing. We were legally obliged to report to de Klerk so he would know what was 
happening and I decided to do the same with Mandela.”86 Accounts of Goldstone’s 
conversation with de Klerk, with respect to briefing Mandela on the Commission’s 
operations, suggest that despite de Klerk’s hesitancy, Goldstone advised on the need to 
keep Mandela informed given his likelihood of being in the government in the future.87 
This illustrates not only the choices made by Goldstone to deploy information-gathering 
measures in a more credible fashion to the historical use of commissions of inquiry. It also 
reiterates the degree to which the established rules were in-flux during the transitional 
period. 
The Commission was positioned such that when necessary, decisions could be 
made to investigate incidences with little delay. While the findings and recommendations 
were not binding, having an institution ready to investigate provided some immediate 
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acknowledgment of the incident. Additionally, simply having something done, some 
independent action taken, indicated a change in approach, given the circulating allegations 
of state involvement in violence. With respect to the political leadership of de Klerk and 
Mandela, Goldstone states, “in no way did either of them in any way try to influence what 
we were doing or which way we should go. But it was useful to get their input and 
obviously I needed more and more goodies from the government.”88 
The government demonstrated important commitment to the process, providing 
funding and provisions for adjustments to the mandate, as will be discussed further below. 
One Interim Report ends with a recognition that: 
The Commission’s needs with regard to staff, material and facilities are met by the 
Government. No important request in that regard from the Commission has been 
refused. For that the Commission would like to express publicly its appreciation to 
the Mister of Justice, Mr H J Coetsee, and to the appropriate members of his 
Department.89 
 
Here it is important to recognize that its actual capacity to operate influenced the credibility 
of the Commission. The capacity of the Commission, however, needs to be distinguished 
from the adoption of recommendations by the Government, which is beyond the scope of 
this discussion. 
This section has provided an overview of the elements of the Goldstone 
Commission that made it a credible violence-investigating institution during the 
negotiation period. This focus does not suggest that the process was without challenges or 
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Report,” 21 December 1992. 
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shortcomings. It, like many other such investigative commissions lacked “teeth”.90 Sisk 
identifies deficiencies in witness protection and investigations, as well as the lack of 
implementation powers for its own recommendations.91 Wilson equates the Goldstone 
Commission with the Harms Commission when suggesting that neither really 
demonstrated the Government’s willingness to do anything about violence. Wilson argues 
that both commissions were “under-resourced, overly legalistic, misled by police evasions 
and political party cover-ups, and disappointing in their  conclusions.”92 Given other 
government decisions pertaining to the negotiations and information gathering, such as the 
destruction of records or the police’s reticence and partiality in investigations, it is difficult 
to determine why, specifically, the Goldstone Commission received the Government 
support it did.93 Though these tensions cannot be resolved here, they are noted because 
they will benefit from further consideration in the future. Despite these shortcomings, the 
Goldstone Commission still had an impact on the institutionalization of truth-seeking in 
South Africa.  
                                                
90 Independent Board of Inquiry Memoranda, 16 August 1993, 10. Wits Historical Papers, AG2543, IBI 
Memoranda, File 3.3-3.7, Item 3.7, Wits Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, Johannesburg, South 
Africa. 
91 Sisk, "South Africa’s National Peace Accord," 56-57. 
92  Richard A. Wilson, The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimizing the Post-
Apartheid State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 65. 
93 Sriram identifies that the Commission was under-resourced, though does not expand on this. On this 
point, Mallinder suggests that perhaps Justice Goldstone did not request sufficient resources given that de 
Klerk contends the Commission got what it asked for, and much of the evidence suggests that it did. This 
contention is thus noted here. See: Louise Mallinder, "Indemnity, Amnesty, Pardon and Prosecution 
Guidelines in South Africa," in Working Paper No. 2 from Beyond Legalism: Amnesties, Transition and 
Conflict Transformation (Queens University Belfast: Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice, 2009), 
31-32; Chandra Lehka Sriram, Confronting Past Human Rights Violations: Justice vs Peace in Times of 
Transition (London and New York: Frank Cass, 2004), 157.  
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In order to investigate the mechanics of this impact in more detail, it is necessary 
to illustrate how the Goldstone Commission differentiated itself from earlier commissions 
of inquiry through gradual institutional change. Given the facilitating conditions for 
institutional change, one can trace evidence of conversion further in the investigative 
process.  In the South African case, the Goldstone Commission played an important role 
in the institutionalization of truth-seeking, by mediating and adjusting to the constraints 
imposed on investigations by the earlier use of commissions of inquiry. The constraints of 
the previous commissions of inquiry are reflected in the TRC Report’s accounting of 
political violence and the covert involvement of the state. The Report states that for many 
in the security forces the Harms and Goldstone Commissions, among other state 
investigations, “were seen by many as public relations exercises rather than determined 
initiatives to root out ‘dirty practices’. The long history of cover-ups and condonation of 
lying to such commissions merely reinforced this perception.”94 The next section argues 
that this mediating effect is illustrated in the change made to the investigation process.  
7.4.2 Investigative Credibility 
Demonstrating a recognition of the constraints on investigations, the Goldstone 
Commission instituted numerous provisions so that investigations could be conducted in a 
credible manner, even though it was difficult to move away from relying on the state 
security forces. The issue of police relations is addressed directly in the second interim 
report when presenting findings on information on the causes of violence that had been 
presented to the Commission to that point.  The report identifies:  
                                                
94 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume Two, Chapter 7, page 693. 
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A police force and army which, for many decades, have been the instruments of 
oppression by successive White governments in maintaining a society predicated 
upon racial discrimination. This involves a police force and an army that for the 
majority of South Africans have not been community based or orientated. For many 
South Africans, the police and the army are not perceived as fair, objective or friendly 
institutions.95  
 
The report continues to address the issue of state involvement in violence, particularly: 
 
A history over some years of State complicity in undercover activities, which include 
criminal conduct. Those activities have enabled critics of the Government and others, 
fairly or unfairly, to place the blame for much of the current violence at the door of 
the security forces. That and the well-documented criminal conduct by individual 
members of the South African Police and the KwaZulu Police exacerbate the 
perception of so many South Africans that the Government or its agencies are active 
parties responsible for the violence.96  
 
The Goldstone Commission did not have an operational investigation unit at the outset of 
its operations. The development of the investigation units demonstrates additional efforts 
by the Commission to interpret the mandate in a way that developed stronger information-
gathering capacities. The Commission established investigation units in Johannesburg, 
Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town in October of 1992.97 Each unit was 
composed of officers from the South African Police Service and at least one attorney. Most 
also had an international observer.98 Between October 1, 1992 and September 30, 1992, 
the investigation units conducted 245 investigations.99 
                                                
95 Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, “Second Interim 
Report,” (Cape Town, 29 April 1992), 2.3.2.  
96 Ibid., 2.3.7. 
97 Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, “Report on the 
Investigation Units of the Goldstone Commission: 1 October 1992 – 30 September 1993,” 26 November 
1993.  
98 Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, “Report on the 
Investigation Units of the Goldstone Commission: 1 October 1992 – 30 September 1993,” 26 November 
1993.  
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  An ex post facto accounting of the investigation process of the Commission suggests 
that clear evidence of the benefits of the investigation units is the number of investigations 
and reports completed before and after the establishment of the investigation units. 
According to Newham:  
Whereas in the first year of operation the Goldstone Commission had only completed 
four inquiries and released 11 reports, by the time the commission had come to an 
end three years later, four hundred and sixty seven investigations had been conducted 
and forty seven reports had been completed.100   
 
Reflecting on the constraints of police involvement in earlier investigations, the means by 
which the Goldstone Commission seconded police investigators in order to increase 
credibility and trust reflects adjustments in recognition of these earlier issues.  
The Goldstone Commission used a public vetting process to identify investigators 
when the investigation unit was established. The Commission announced publically the 
names of potential appointees from the police force and solicited feedback on whether 
anyone objected to any of the individuals so named. Through this process, the public had 
a chance to object to the credibility of particular officers.101 Rather than simply relying on 
existing state institutions, the Goldstone Commission publicized the names of police 
officers offered to it by the Commissioner of Police in order for any concerns to be raised 
by the public of the participating officers. Engaging the public in this way prevented one 
officer from joining the Commission and ensured the public were aware of who would be 
                                                
100 Gareth Newham, "Investigation Units: The teeth of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission," The 
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conducting the investigations.102 A 1994 press release suggests that the Commission 
followed a similar process to expand the team in the lead-up to the elections.103  
The addition of investigators was not the only factor that facilitated an increase in 
the number of investigations. Once the Government amended the legislation to enable 
single-member committees to undertake investigations, the overall number of ongoing 
investigations increased. Thus, the demand for, and adjustment to allow for, more 
investigators can be understood with respect to the ability to amend the legislation.  
The Commission also distinguished itself from its predecessors by using 
international investigators in partnership with local investigators. International 
investigators increased the credibility of investigation teams.104 Goldstone notes the 
significance of the government agreeing to this request given the reticence of any 
international involvement in the domestic affairs of South Africa under Apartheid.105 In 
particularly difficult cases, like the Boipatong Massacre, the Commission sought assistance 
from external sources as well. In this case, where multiple sources alleged police 
complicity—but insufficient evidence was available due to erased recordings—an external 
                                                
102 Richard J. Goldstone, "Quality Control in International Fact-Finding Outside Criminal Justice for Core 
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policing expert was appointed by the Commission to try to recover the recordings and to 
write an independent report.106 The decision to turn to external experts is innovative 
compared to earlier investigations into violence that were constrained by the regime. The 
Government’s agreement to international investigators reflects the opening in the regime 
that created the conditions for gradual institutional change undertaken by the Goldstone 
Commission.  
The Goldstone Commission was not set up as a precursor to the TRC at the time it 
was established. Despite this, the Goldstone Commission did influence the TRC in 
important ways. Framed in this way, the operation of the Goldstone Commission provided 
important lessons for the TRC. The innovations of the Goldstone Commission served as 
an example for later institutional modalities because of how the Commission changed to 
achieve its goals. 
7.5 Value as a Precursor to the TRC  
The transitional context and the pressure to do something about violence saw the 
implementation of a recognizable form of investigation, the commission of inquiry. 
However, it was implemented in such a way that demonstrated a departure from the status-
quo. In this way, it pre-empted some of the work that needed to be done by the TRC. The 
preceding discussion has illustrated one way that the Goldstone Commission laid a positive 
foundation for the TRC, by identifying and rectifying shortcomings in information-
                                                
106 Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, “Report of the Inquiry 
into the police response to, and investigation of, events in Boipatong on 17 June 1992,” Dr. P.A.J. 
Waddington, 20 July 1992. 
For another interpretation, see James G.R Simpson, "Boipatong: The Politics of a Massacre and the South 
African Transition," Journal of Southern African Studies 38, no. 3 (2012): 623-647.  
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gathering institutions. The Goldstone Commission made adjustments to the commission of 
inquiry and associated investigation practices. In so doing, the Commission of Inquiry for 
the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation adjusted its approach to investigation 
and rebuilt crucial credibility in investigations.  
The Goldstone Commission also demonstrated the need for further investigation. 
In this way, the information the Goldstone Commission investigated and made public 
played a valuable role in demonstrating the need for further truth-seeking. Richard 
Goldstone identifies that “it really laid the foundation and [in a] way it took the rug from 
under the feet of de Klerk in opposing it. You know de Klerk could credibly have argued 
to his people that there were no serious human rights violations for a TRC to 
investigate.”107 As Judge Goldstone identified after the election, there was a perception 
that violence was ethnically or politically motivated but in certain cases this violence was 
fomented by the security forces.108 Thus, he states, “the Commission uncovered third force 
activities from within the military and national police. Yet, it did nothing more than scratch 
the surface.”109 These initial investigations were themselves important. According to Judge 
Goldstone, “But I think the evidence we brought out, particularly the third force, made it 
impossible for de Klerk to say there’s nothing to investigate.”110 This demonstrates the 
value in the initial investigations. 
                                                
107 Richard Goldstone, interview with author, April 2017. 
108 Richard Goldstone, "Exposing Human Rights Abuses -- A Help or Hindrance to Reconciliation," 
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 22 (1995): 614. 
109 Ibid., 614. 
110 Richard Goldstone, interview with author, September 2017. 
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Even prior to the TRC, efforts to further investigate information uncovered by the 
Goldstone Commission emerged, indicating in part, the degree to which further 
investigations were necessary. For example, there was an investigation unit headed by the 
Attorney-General of the Transvaal, Jan D’Oliviera, to inquire into hit-squad activities.111 
The value of information and truth in the transitional period had been evident in discussions 
by civil society and activists.112 Entwined with the advocacy for truth for reasons of 
morality and acknowledgement then, was a recognition of the depths of the efforts to 
prevent this information from coming to light. Government destruction of records and 
security force efforts to disrupt Goldstone’s investigations highlight the interests in 
preventing information from being made public, let alone acknowledged.113 
Finally, the adjustments made by the Goldstone Commission demonstrated a 
change in institutional modalities used for information-gathering. Institutional components 
that worked well re-appeared in the TRC, for example, the inclusion of investigation units 
resembling those used by the Goldstone Commission. The institution of witness protection 
will be taken up directly in the next chapter to illustrate this continuity, but the example of 
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112 Overview discussion tracing the value of truth, see André du Toit, "A Need for ‘Truth’: Amnesty and 
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the investigation unit components in the two institutions is illustrative here. A comparison 
of the legislation for the creation of the Goldstone Commission and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission does not specifically highlight a legislative overlap in the 
inclusion of investigation units, because the Goldstone Commission added its 
investigations after it had been established. However, the Promotion of National Unity Act 
contained the provisions for an investigation unit, along with the codification of the power 
of search and seizure, which were unique to the Goldstone Commission. The Promotion of 
National Unity Act stipulates that the commission “may establish an investigating unit.”114 
Section 28 outlines the provisions for such a unit though most functional components of 
the investigation units are left to be determined by the Commission itself.115  
 The structure of the TRC’s investigation units was different from the Goldstone 
Commission’s. Both civilian and police personnel made up the TRC Investigation Unit. 
The civilian category included lawyers, researchers, NGO personnel, and journalists. 
Seconded members of the South African Police Services (SAPS) and the National 
Intelligence Agency comprised the police category.116 Whereas the Goldstone 
Commission developed its investigative arm through which investigation powers could be 
more frequently exercised, this feature was built into the TRC’s design at the outset.  
What stands out starkly in considering the South African TRC in light of its 
institutional framework is the resemblance to the earlier commission of inquiry in South 
Africa. The experience with commissions—unsatisfactory investigations and findings, and 
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difficulty separating state involvement in violence and investigations—suggests that the 
choice of tool could have been ill-suited to produce or engender change. The nature of the 
commission of inquiry in South Africa was well entrenched, sufficiently so to have a 
narrow set of expectations for what a commission of inquiry could be expected to produce.  
Significantly, efforts to address this particular type of investigatory commission 
established by the state at a critical turning point during the transition demonstrate that the 
limitations in the structure could be addressed and adjusted in a way that addressed past 
omissions and practices in the use of earlier inquiries. While the commission of inquiry in 
Apartheid South Africa was in many ways knowingly unjust, the means and mechanisms 
through which its operations could be adjusted to undo these structural injustices were not 
clear cut.117 The provisions made for the operational capacities of the Goldstone 
Commission, and the cultivated legitimacy by the leadership of the commission helped to 
build credibility in light of the earlier investigations.118 
Conclusion  
 
Efforts taken by the Commission leadership, in combination with the space provided in the 
mandate for adjustment, created conditions conducive to gradual change, specifically 
conversion, within the commission of inquiry. The Goldstone Commission is an important 
nodal point in the institutionalization of truth-seeking in South Africa. This chapter has 
argued that the operation of the Goldstone Commission facilitated a process of gradual 
                                                
117 On the surface, some adjustments are relatively clear– but given the embeddedness in a system of 
oppression, continued operation within the system means that perception problems were likely to be 
ubiquitous. 
118 For Justice Goldstone’s perspective on the achievements of the commission see, Goldstone, For 
Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Prosecutor, 57-58.  Here Goldstone suggests that the Goldstone 
Commission “assisted in creating the political climate in which the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
could be established with the agreement of the major parties.” 
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institutional change in the commission of inquiry. At the outset, in its creation in the 
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act, and then negotiation into the National 
Peace Accord, the Goldstone Commission was bestowed with wider powers than previous 
commissions of inquiry, including search and seizure. These institutional innovations 
provided the Commission with stronger information gathering capabilities. The legislation 
had built-in provisions for amendments illustrating interpretation possibilities that were 
used by the Commission leadership. With these capacities, the Commission developed 
credible investigation practices that helped to uncover information about political violence 
during South Africa’s transition. The Commission’s investigations contributed to the 
recognition that there was further information that needed to be uncovered. Gradual 
institutional change in the Goldstone Commission laid a foundation for South Africa’s 
TRC, demonstrating effectiveness in institutional design and innovative institutional 
modalities. In the next chapter, one of these modalities, witness protection is explored in 
depth. 
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Chapter 8  
8 Gradual Institutional Change: Incorporating Witness 
Protection 
The previous chapter argued that through the Goldstone Commission, the commission of 
inquiry underwent a process of gradual institutional change in order to serve the purposes 
of violence investigation during the transition. This chapter analyzes the institutional 
modality of witness protection to explore, in more depth, the way that institutions that had 
been utilized by the state for some time were redeployed for truth-seeking purposes. The 
chapter argues that the incorporation of witness protection measures illustrates the 
conversion process that took place within the Goldstone Commission. This saw the 
deployment of witness protection as a truth-seeking measure within the Goldstone 
Commission and eventually within the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC). Although highlighted as  an innovation of the South African TRC for 
its formal use as part of a truth commission process, the inclusion of witness protection can 
be better explained by taking into account the changes in the Goldstone Commission that 
laid the foundation for its deployment in the TRC. 
 In the historical institutionalist vein that directs attention to the significance of 
history, the institutionalization of witness protection in South Africa suggests its use less 
as an end towards information gathering than as a by-product of control measures in the 
context of Apartheid. The shortcomings of witness protection highlighted by the Goldstone 
Commission’s operations resulted in the development of measures of witness protection 
more conducive to truth-seeking. Thus, the institution of the commission of inquiry was 
adjusted to better meet the needs of information gathering by incorporating witness 
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protection measures. These adjustments were made possible by the structure and operation 
of the Goldstone Commission.  
 The chapter beings by discussing the role of witnesses and witness protection in 
truth-seeking and truth commission processes. The next section identifies how the 
protective structures of the state created conditions that prevented the uncovering of 
information based on the design of witness protection measures. Then, it provides an 
analysis into the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and 
Intimidation, which recognized the need to have protective measures to facilitate 
uncovering information based on the shortcomings in the existing processes. The final 
section identifies that these adjustments were adopted by the TRC process in South Africa. 
8.1 Truth-seeking and Witness Protection  
Many states that pursue truth-seeking do so in conditions of crisis and instability. As de 
Greiff identifies, “truth commissions have become ‘normal’ responses in both post-
authoritarian and post-conflict transitions. Indeed, some countries have implemented 
transitional justice measures not just in the absence of a political transition, but while 
conflict is still ongoing.”1 Truth commissions and other truth-seeking endeavours depend 
on the willingness and ability of witnesses to participate in the proceedings. However, for 
people to participate in truth-telling processes, there needs to be a reasonable expectation 
of their safety.  
                                                
1 Pablo de Greiff, "“Truth without Facts”: On the Erosion of the Fact-Finding Function of Truth 
Commissions," in The Transformation of Human Rights Fact-Finding, ed. Philip Alston and Sarah 
Knuckey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 283.  
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 In this chapter, witness protection refers to both the policies and programs used to 
protect witnesses who provide evidence and testimony to fact-finding and truth-seeking 
institutions.2 This includes formal witness protection programs operated by police within 
countries, or, organizations conducting investigations. It also includes other dimensions, 
such as adopting investigative practices that do not put witnesses at risk, structuring 
testimony collection in a way that can protect the identity of those who do not want to be 
identified, and reporting in a way that reduces the risk of intimidation or retribution for 
witnesses.3 
 International human rights organizations, fact-finding missions, and international 
commissions of inquiry rely on witness testimony to make determinations about ongoing 
human rights violations. Rothenberg identifies that “testimony infuses fact-finding reports 
with a sense of political and moral immediacy.”4 International commissions of inquiry 
depend on witness participation to collect evidence in order to make findings about human 
rights violations and abuses. Boutruche suggests that although witness testimony may 
suffer from concerns about objectivity, “first-hand accounts by direct eyewitnesses often 
constitute the easiest or most accessible way to clarify and establish the narrative and 
                                                
2 Chris Mahony uses both the formal and support measures analyzing witness protection in the judicial 
dimension in Africa. This breadth is useful and a similar approach has been adopted here in the truth-
seeking dimension. See Chris Mahony, The justice sector afterthought: Witness protection in Africa, 
Institute for Security Studies (Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa, 2010), 1-3. 
3 For example, the Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law: Guidance and Practice report identifies that one of the reasons that the Commission of 
Inquiry on Darfur did not publish the names of alleged perpetrators was to ensure the protection of 
witnesses, see United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Commissions of Inquiry 
and Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Guidance and Practice 
United Nations (New York and Geneva, 2015), 14. 
4 Daniel Rothenberg, "The Complex Truth of Testimony: A Case Study of Human Rights Fact-Finding in 
Iraq," in The Transformation of Human Rights Fact-Finding, ed. Philip Alston and Sarah Knuckey 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 193. 
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circumstances of what happened.”5  In addition, these inquiries often depend on the 
availability of witness evidence given the lack of other types of evidence.6 Unlike truth 
commissions, in international and domestic commissions of inquiries, the focus on 
testimony shifts. The focus is less on victims being given an opportunity to tell their story 
than it is about investigation and fact-finding to draw conclusions about cause and 
attribution of responsibility in public crises.7  
 Testimony from witnesses as a component of evidence is most frequently associated 
with legal proceedings. In the transitional justice realm, understanding and considerations 
of the role of witness testimony largely developed with the operation of international 
prosecutions particularly in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The prosecutorial 
approach of international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court, for 
example, often rely on witness participation to make findings of guilt or innocence.8  
 The availability of witness testimony can have a significant influence, including on 
the selection of cases for prosecution and the outcomes of trials. Wald, for example, 
                                                
5 Theo Boutruche, "Selectivity and Choices in Human Rights Fact-finding: Reconciling Subjectivity with 
Objectivity," in Commissions of Inquiry: Problems and Prospects, ed. Christian Henderson (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2017), 301. 
6 Rosette Muzigo-Morrison, "Victims and Witnesses in Fact-Finding Commissions," in The Transformation 
of Human Rights Fact-Finding, ed. Philip Alston and Sarah Knuckey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016), 175.  
7 Wayne A. Mackay and Monica G. McQuee, "Public Inquiries and the Legality of Blaming: Truth, Justice, 
and the Canadian Way," in Commissions of Inquiry: Praise or Reappraise?, ed. Allan Manson and David 
Mullan (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003). Christian Henderson, ed., Commissions of Inquiry: Problems and 
Prospects (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017). 
8 Robert Cryer, "Witness Tampering and International Criminal Tribunals," Leiden Journal of International 
Law 27, no. 1 (2014): 191-203. See also, Patricia M. Wald, "Dealing with Witnesses in War Crime Trials: 
Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal," Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 5 (2002): 217-
239. 
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recounts a case at the ICTY in which a massacre that had no survivors meant that “the 
episode could not be corroborated sufficiently to be included in the prosecutor’s case.”9 
Bass’s account of the first trial in the ICTY includes the observation, somewhat in passing, 
that “the tribunal had hoped to make history with rape charges, but they were dropped on 
the morning the trial started because a witness was afraid to testify in The Hague.”10 These 
brief examples help to illustrate the necessary role that witnesses play in making findings 
in legal settings.  
  In transitional justice, much of the focus on witness testimony in prosecutions has 
been on its limitations: the rather narrow amount of information accessible through trial 
proceedings and the constraints on the courts as a venue for victims to be heard.11 A 
distinction in the type of information being sought through these different venues helps to 
explain how the role of testimony can serve such different needs. As du Toit explains:  
The procedures typical of law in the determination of justice have different objectives 
and assumptions, and require a distinctive sense of forensic evidence and truth, on 
the one hand, compared to, on the other hand, the methods developed by historical 
or scientific inquiry in the quest for narrative or nomological truth.12  
 
Truth commissions are celebrated for their ability to include victims, to engage in a 
“narrative project” that identifies the structures and abuses of regimes.13 In trials, Minow 
                                                
9 Wald, "Dealing with Witnesses in War Crime Trials," 220. 
10 Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: the politics of war crimes tribunals (Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), 257. 
11 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: facing history after genocide and mass violence 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 58; Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the 
Challenge of Truth Commissions (New York: Routledge, 2002), 107 
12 André du Toit, "Experiments with Truth and Justice in South Africa: Stockenstrom, Gandhi and the 
TRC," Journal of Southern African Studies 31, no. 2 (2005): 445. 
13 Martha Minow, "The Hope for Healing: What Can Truth Commissions Do?," in Truth V. Justice, ed. 
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identifies that “victims and other witnesses undergo the ordeals of testifying and facing 
cross-examination. Usually they are given no simple opportunity to convey directly the 
narrative of their experience.”14 The truth commission, with its focus on collecting 
testimony, provides a different opportunity for participation from witnesses.  
 Crucially, though, the collection of testimony and the participation of witnesses is 
necessary for a truth commission to serve the purpose for which it is intended. There is also 
a significant information gathering and corroboration requirement, to try and record and 
report with as much accuracy as possible.15 Participating in a truth commission and 
providing testimony as a witness has ramifications, depending on whether participation is 
public and the identification of people believed to have been involved in the perpetration 
of violence.16  
 The variations of witnesses and witness testimony explored here demonstrate that 
transitional justice and truth-seeking measures rely on witnesses to achieve their intended 
goals. For those who have suffered and/or been witness to grave human rights violations, 
providing testimony and evidence to factfinders, in trials, and in truth commissions can put 
individuals and their families at risk. These risks may be psychological as the burden of 
recounting trauma has the potential to inflict continued hardship.17 There are also physical 
                                                
14 Minow, "Hope for Healing," 238. 
15 de Greiff, "“Truth without Facts”," 282-283. 
16 Yazir Henry, "Where healing begins," in Looking Back Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, ed. Charles Villa-Vicencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd (Cape 
Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2000), 166-183. 
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safety and security risks. Witnesses face threats and intimidation to their own lives, and the 
lives of family and friends. 
 Witness protection measures have taken different forms. Fear from participating as a 
witness was a theme that reappeared throughout the operation of the ICTY and ICTR.18 As 
such, guidelines and programs were established to protect witnesses who participate in 
prosecutions. Witness protection at the ICTY includes administrative support to get to 
proceedings, counselling, escorts to The Hague, and relocation programs where 
necessary.19 Protection is also attempted by holding proceedings in camera, changing 
voices and hiding the identities of people testifying.20 The ICTY and the ICTR set 
important precedents in this regard. Both of these judicial tribunals demonstrated the value 
of witness testimony and the pressures of witness protection and witness identification in 
proceedings.21 These deliberations have continued at the ICC, where protection for 
witnesses is separated into two types: measures taken to protect witnesses where they live, 
and measures taken during court proceedings to protect witness identity.22 Investigations 
also ought to be structured in a way that protects those who are willing to give evidence or 
information.23 
                                                
18 Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance, 261. 
19 Wald, "Dealing with Witnesses in War Crime Trials," 221. 
20 Wald, "Dealing with Witnesses in War Crime Trials," 221. For a comprehensive discussion on the 
tension between the right to a fair trial and the protection of witnesses see: Joanna Pozen, "Justice 
obscured: the non-disclosure of witnesses' identities in ICTR trials," New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 38, no. 1-2 (2005). 
21 Goran Sluiter, "The ICTR and the Protection of Witnesses," Journal of International Criminal Justice 3 
(2005): 281-322; Pozen, "Justice obscured," 281-322. 
22 "Witnesses,"  (Webpage), International Criminal Court, accessed April 10, 2019, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/about/witnesses.  
23 Muzigo-Morrison, "Victims and Witnesses," 183. 
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 The same considerations are evident, though not yet entirely engrained, in 
international commissions of inquiry. Bisset points to a series of international documents, 
principles and guidelines which inform the structure of international commissions of 
inquiry and associated witness protection mechanisms. This includes instruments such as 
the UN Manual on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary 
and Summary Executions (1991), the updated Minnesota Protocol (2016)  and the Set of 
Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat 
Impunity (1997, updated in 2005) which guide international commissions of inquiry.24 For 
example, the Minnesota Protocol states: “An effective witness-protection programme is 
essential for some investigations and should be in place before the investigation begins... 
States should ensure that the authorities in charge of witness protection should in no way 
be involved in the alleged death.”25 There has not yet been universal application of these 
types of guiding principles.26  
Choices made in the design of truth commission processes can be structured to 
provide protection to witnesses. In truth commissions and other investigative commissions, 
decisions made in the mandate, in terms of how testimony is collected and in the production 
of the report, are implicated in the treatment and protection of witnesses.27 South Africa 
was the first truth commission to provide a formal witness protection program in its 
                                                
24 Alison Bisset, "Commissions of Inquiry and Procedural Fairness," in Commissions of Inquiry: Problems 
and Prospects, ed. Christian Henderson (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2017), 320-321.  
25 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Minnesota Protocol on The 
Investigation of Potentially Unlawful Death (2016) (New York and Geneva, 2017), 18. 
26 The pieces in this collection speak to the challenge of such applications: Henderson, Commissions of 
Inquiry: Problems and Prospects. 
27 Mark Freeman, Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 258-265. 
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founding legislation.28 Other truth commissions have made provisions for safety in the 
process of data collection and dissemination that are less comprehensive. Hayner suggests 
that commissions that lack formal witness protection programs can provide security to 
people who testify by “providing strict confidentiality.”29 Another element that many truth 
commissions include in their mandates the ability for testimony to be heard in camera or 
in private.  For example, the mandate for the Kenyan Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission outlines the protocol for the hearings as public, unless: 
(a) the security of perpetrators, victims, or witnesses is threatened: 
(b) it would be in the interests of justice; or  
(c) there is a likelihood that harm may ensue to any person as a result of      
      proceedings being open to the public.30  
 
As with many institutional developments, particularly in states emerging from repression 
and conflict, there is a difference between the design of a truth commission in its mandate 
and its development in practice. Often, countries seek assistance from transitional justice 
experts and others with experience with truth commissions as they proceed to establish 
their own. Mandates, therefore, have a tendency to incorporate many ‘ideal type’ elements 
that have been identified as best practice in truth commissions.31  
 For truth commissions to encourage participation and support testimony from those 
who have direct involvement with the issues under investigation (either as witnesses or 
alleged perpetrators), processes and structures need to be in place to protect them from the 
                                                
28 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume One, Chapter 4, 55. 
29 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 233. 
30 Parliament of Kenya, The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Bill, 2008.  
31 See for example, International Center for Transitional Justice, "Truth Seeking: Elements of Creating an 
Effective Truth Commission." 
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dangers of participation. Without these structures the capacity to carry out credible 
investigations is seriously challenged. Fear about participating in truth commission 
processes has been identified as a harmful factor that can undermine their efforts.32 
Witnesses are targeted to prevent information from being made public. Hayner identifies 
that witnesses in Uganda often returned to retract testimony, and that some witnesses in El 
Salvador would only provide testimony outside of the country for fear of reprisal.33 
 Witness protection measures are further dependent on the state’s ability to deliver the 
necessary security and safety.34 Institutional conditions play a role in whether witnesses 
are able to participate. In order to support witness participation, the creation or 
entrenchment of witness protection measures is an illustration of an entrenchment of truth-
seeking or an institutionalization of the truth-seeking process.  
8.2 Information Gathering and Witness Protection in 
South Africa  
Given the reliance on witnesses and testimony, the operation of credible witness protection 
is a valuable indicator for the institutionalization of conditions conducive to truth-seeking. 
The South African TRC is notable in that it was the first truth commission to establish a 
witness protection program. The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 
included provisions for the establishment of a “limited witness protection program.”35 
                                                
32 Joanna R. Quinn and Mark Freeman, "Lessons Learned: Practical Lessons Gleaned from Inside the Truth 
Commissions of Guatemala and South Africa," Human Rights Quarterly 25, no. 4 (Nov. 2003): 1120. 
33 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 231, 233. 
34 Mahony identifies the challenges in African countries, Mahony, Justice sector afterthought, 4-5. 
35 See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 
Act 95-34 (1995), section 35. See also: Gareth Newham, Keeping the Wolves at Bay: Issues and Concerns 
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However, the seeds of this inclusion are found in earlier institutional developments. 
Witness protection policies developed in South Africa through incremental changes in 
earlier investigative processes. The Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public 
Violence and Intimidation identified the gaps in witness protection and, based on the 
characteristics discussion in Chapter 7, had a uniquely iterative capacity to adjust to fill 
these gaps.  
 Prior to the ad hoc measures adopted out of necessity by the Goldstone Commission, 
witness protection in South Africa operated at a very basic level. Newham identifies that 
“until 1992, statutory provision was made for the protection of witnesses under section 185 
of the Criminal Procedure Act… witnesses who were deemed by the Attorney General to 
be in need of protective custody, were kept in the same conditions as prisoners awaiting 
trial.”36  The National Peace Accord mentions measures for witnesses in Chapter 10, on 
Special Criminal Courts, referencing the provisions made in the Criminal Law Amendment 
Act of 1991.37 The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1991, still provided for the protection 
of witnesses in protective custody.38 The final report of the Goldstone Commission 
captures the problems of the witness protection measures offered by the state. The report 
states:  
Witness protection schemes presently in operation, eg under section 185 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act (No 51 of 1977), deal mainly with recalcitrant witnesses. 
Without delay provision should be made for witnesses who are willing to give 
evidence but are in fear of their lives; before, during and after testimony. The 
                                                
in Establishing a Witness Protection Programme in South Africa, The Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation (October 1995). 
36 Gareth Newham, “Keeping the Wolves at Bay: Issues and Concerns in Establishing a Witness Protection 
Programme in South Africa,” The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (October 1995). 
37 National Peace Accord, 1991, §10.5. 
38 Republic of South Africa, Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1991, Act no. 135, 1991. 
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incarceration of such witnesses in cells or lock-ups is completely inappropriate; their 
fears cause stress calling for proper counselling. Programmes need to be devised for 
relocation after witnesses have testified, where necessary.39  
 
The subject of the Goldstone Commission investigations exacerbated the challenges of 
these conditions. Given the allegations of security force involvement in the violence in 
South Africa at that time, placing witnesses in this type of protection was not only 
undesirable, but potentially dangerous, given high numbers of death or injury of people in 
custody as discussed in Chapter 3 and 7. 
 The effect of minimal or questionable witness participation in such investigations is 
illustrated in the Harms Commission, which the Government appointed to look into 
allegations of state political murders, or hit squads, in South Africa in 1990. The limitations 
of this Commission are fairly well-established: the mandate was narrow, limiting the 
investigation to what had taken place within the country’s borders and there was no follow-
through on state organs under investigation to produce necessary documents.40 
Assessments of the commission and its associated report point to a weak mandate and 
almost satirical gathering of testimony. One media report described the situation as follows:  
Some members of the [Civil Cooperation Bureau] and the police refused to testify 
unless their identities were protected - and the result was that the commission was at 
times turned into a comedy when some appeared in the commission room dressed in 
outlandish disguises, including false wigs and moustaches. Most used code names.41  
                                                
39 Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, “Final Report of 
the Goldstone Commission,” 27 October 1994, 4.2. 
40 Steve McQuillan, David Breier and Carolyn McGibbon, “The holes in Harms,” Sunday Star 18/ 11/ 
1990.  Peter Harris, “The danger in letting the police off the hook,” Sunday Star 18/11/1990. South Africa 
Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), Press Cuttings, Part A, 1928-1998,  AD 1912, H110, Harms 
Commission 1990-1991, file  J3, Wits Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, Johannesburg, South 
Africa. 
41 Norman Chandler, “Findings of ‘most difficult task’ awaited,’ Saturday Star, 25/8/1990. South Africa 
Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), Press Cuttings, Part A, 1928-1998,  AD 1912, H110, Harms 
Commission 1990-1991, file  J3, Wits Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, Johannesburg, South 
Africa. 
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The findings of the report were relatively underwhelming, with Justice Harms finding no 
evidence of a hit squad at Vlakplaas, although the CCB “was linked to other crimes of 
violence.”42 The conclusion of the report partially implicated witnesses participation in the 
deficiency of evidence: 
In the course of the Commission it also appeared that although allegations and 
accusations are rife as to who did what and why, there is a basic lack of evidential 
material that might put some flesh on the bones. In general, victims failed to furnish 
information. Willing trustworthy witnesses did not come to the fore.43 
 
The behaviour of witnesses in this case is not particularly surprising, given the alleged state 
involvement in the political murders under investigation. Indeed, the report acknowledges 
the potential issues with a reliance on the police more generally for the Commission’s 
operation.44 At this time, the South African Police Service (SAPS) provided witness 
protection in South Africa. The Goldstone Commission was a significant turning point for 
witness protection in such investigations.45 Through a process of gradual institutional 
change within the Goldstone Commission, witness protection was incorporated into 
Commission structures to strengthen violence investigation during the transition.  
                                                
42 L.T.C. Harms, Chairman and Sole Member, Commission of Inquiry into Certain Alleged Murders Report 
(Pretoria: September 1990), 196. Goldstone Commission Collection, NMAP 2015/52, NMAP, 4.2, folder 
156, Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory, Johannesburg, South Africa . 
43 Ibid., 196-197, emphasis added. 
44 L.T.C. Harms, Chairman and Sole Member, Commission of Inquiry into Certain Alleged Murders Report 
(Pretoria: September 1990), 31.  
45 The Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Incidents at Sebokeng, Boipatong, Lekoa, Sharpeville 
and Evaton on 26 March 1990 did not identify the willingness of witnesses to participate as a challenge, 
though it did pass comment on the Commission’s perception of the calibre of participation. R.J. Goldstone, 
Chairman and Sole Member, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Incidents at Sebokeng, 
Boipatong, Lekoa, Sharpeville and Evaton on 26 March 1990 (27 June 1990).  
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8.3 Witness Protection in the Goldstone Commission  
 
The Goldstone Commission initiated and operated its own witness protection program 
from 1992 until the end of its operations in 1994.46 The Commission’s findings relied, in 
part, on witness testimony. In one of the first reports into violence, the Goldstone 
Commission acknowledged, “we would like to pay tribute to the courage of the many 
people who testified before us, to record that without them we could not have made any 
progress at all, and to stress the importance of giving all possible protection to them and 
their families.”47 As laid out above, without witness testimony, information and 
examination of instances of violence is difficult to substantiate and make public. The 
second interim report, of 29 April 1992, echoes the importance of witness testimony: 
The Commission has at all times been convinced, and remains so, that factual 
findings cannot be made against individuals, groups or organizations on the basis of 
untested evidence. For this reason, the hearings of the Commission and of 
committees of the Commission have been held in public and witnesses have been 
subjected to cross-examination by lawyers representing interested parties.48 
 
However, by the time the Commission released this second interim report, and before the 
Goldstone Commission had established its witness protection program, one person slated 
to provide testimony was murdered, as was a family member of another potential witness. 
The second interim report states: 
Then there is the issue concerning the safety of witnesses who testify before the 
Commission. The murder of the leader of the “Black Cats” in Wesselton and the 
apparent revenge murder of the mother of a renegade “Black Cat” witness in the same 
                                                
46 Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, “Fifth Interim 
Report” (Cape Town: 30 May 1994): § 5. 
47 Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, Report on the 
Violence at Tokoza, (Pretoria: 17 November 1992): §59. 
48 Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, “Second Interim Report,” 
(Cape Town, 29 April 1992), §1.2. 
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township highlight this problem. These murders took place during the course of the 
investigation into the “Black Cats” and are therefore likely to severely diminish the 
willingness of the members of the public to come forward and testify.49 
 
The nature of the investigations conducted by the Goldstone Commission and the 
environment in which particularly divisive facts were being uncovered necessitated the 
creation of structures to protect people testifying before the commission. More broadly, to 
be seen to be working with police or investigators could also impact relationships between 
community members. Those known or thought to be providing information or ‘colluding’ 
with the regime faced backlash and violence.50 The volatile situation of the day 
necessitated a distinction between the police, writ large, and the Commission that was 
investigating instances of violence in which police were perceived to be involved. These 
concerns were not unique to the Goldstone Commission. However, the Goldstone 
Commission had both the statutory ability and leadership support to address these concerns, 
reflecting conditions conducive to the process of conversion. In the recommendations, the 
second interim report states: 
The investigative functions of the Commission will continue to play an important 
role in relation to the curbing of ongoing violence. In this regard, the Commission 
should as soon as possible be granted adequate means and procedures for offering 
protection to witnesses who testify before it or its committees.51 
                                                
49 Ibid., §1.4. 
50 Many writers reference a fear of police, police complicity in violence, and the perception of collusion 
with police being part of violence. This is a complex issue. For example, see: Stephen Ellis, "The Historical 
Significance of South Africa’s Third Force," Journal of Southern African Studies 24, no. 2 (1998): 267. 
Wilson refers to this in the discussion of Winnie Madikizela-Mandela’s football club, See: Richard A. 
Wilson, The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimizing the Post-Apartheid State 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 165-167. Kynoch interrogates the early narratives, see 
Gary Kynoch, "Reassessing Transition Violence: Voices from South Africa’s Township Wars, 1990-4," 
African Affairs 112, no. 447 (2013): 283-303. See also, Janet  Cherry, "Historical Truth: Something to 
Fight For," in Looking Back Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
of South Africa ed. Charles Villa-Vicencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd (Cape Town: University of Cape Town 
Press, 2000), 140. 
51 Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, “Second Interim Report,” 
(Cape Town, 29 April 1992), 3.2.3. 
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Although witness protection was not incorporated into the original mandate/legislation of 
the Goldstone Commission, Chapter 6 of the National Peace Accord empowered the 
Commission to “order that the relevant authority provide appropriate protection to a 
person…if his life is endangered because of his assistance to the Commission.”52 This was 
bolstered in 1992 with an amendment to the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation 
Act, 1991. With this amendment, the Goldstone Commission used its powers to propose 
adjustments to its operations, as discussed in Chapter 7, to respond to the limitations in its 
ability to protect witness testimony, illustrating incremental adjustment towards stronger 
information-gathering measures.  
 Witness protection that functioned as part of the Goldstone Commission was  thus 
operational within a year after the Commission began operations.53 According to a 
statement made by Judge Goldstone at the preliminary hearing into the Boipatong 
Massacre, the Commission had recommended to the government that the Commission be:  
empower[ed] to offer adequate witness protection to persons testifying before the 
Commission. The Minister of Justice has informed the Commission that this 
recommendation has been accepted and discussions are presently being conducted 
by the Commission with officials of the Department of Justice with regard to 
appropriate regulations. It is hoped that the regulations will be in force by 4 August 
1992.54  
 
                                                
52 South Africa, National Peace Accord, 1991, 6.18.4. 
53 Lawyers for Human Rights advocated for a witness protection programme directly to the National Peace 
Secretariat. The request was initially declined. A letter from 10 November 1993 states that the proposed 
witness protection program to strengthen the National Peace Accord was “deemed inappropriate. ​.” The 
Brian Currin Collection, AL3065, A51-A89, South African History Archive, Constitution Hill, 
Johannesburg, South Africa. 
54 Goldstone Commission, Boipatong Records 1990-1992. Records of Proceedings Volume 1, 
AK2672.A1.1, Wits Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
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On 31 July 1992, the Government Gazette published an annexure to the Prevention of 
Public Violence and Intimidation Act that spelled out the provisions for the protection of 
witnesses and their families where necessary.55 The provisions outlined the appointment 
of a security director, and stipulated that witnesses were to be protected at locations as 
determined by the security director and Chair of the commission. These regulations 
included “offences and penalties” for false representations, attempts to make protected 
persons known, or for contravening orders as a protected person. 
 The records of the opening proceedings identify that provisions had been made in 
time for the Boipatong investigation: 
The committee is accessible to any member of the public at any time. In addition, I 
would like to make it clear that such a person may, if they have good reason to do so, 
approach the committee on the basis of confidentiality and secrecy. If they require 
protection because they fear reprisals or intimidation, suitable steps can be taken in 
terms of powers which have recently been given to this commission, for the 
protection of witnesses. In particular the commission is now enabled to arrange at no 
cost to a witness, housing at a secret venue for an appropriate period after the person 
has given evidence. I would appreciate if this aspect of the proceedings is brought to 
the attention of the people of Boipatong and to the residents of KwaMadala Hostel.56 
 
The incorporation of witness protection measures into the institutional structures of the 
Goldstone Commission illustrates how truth-seeking efforts were strengthened through the 
operation of the Commission. Rather than relying on inadequate state-provided protection, 
the Commission used its built in powers to modify the Commission in a manner conducive 
to information gathering. 
                                                
55 Regulations Made Under the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act (Act no. 139) of 1991, 
Government Gazette, No. 14197, Volume 325, 31 July 1992. 
56 Goldstone Commission, Boipatong Records 1990-1992. Records of Proceedings Volume 1, 
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 Part of the challenge with witness protection and the Goldstone Commission was that 
it had to rely on the existing state structures in order to be enacted. The initial reticence of 
the Commission to create a witness protection program was that the police would need to 
be heavily involved in the process. The discussion on investigation credibility in the 
previous chapter is beneficial here. At a time when there were serious allegations of police 
involvement in the perpetration of violence, police involvement was problematic. In a letter 
sent to the Goldstone Commission on 5 February 1992, a non-governmental monitoring 
organization, Peace Action Network, identified concerns with the Commission’s 
operations as it related to investigations and witnesses, requesting “consideration be [sic] 
given for their protection.” A handwritten note on the bottom of the document reads, 
“10/02/92 Goldstone phoned impossible to run a witness protect[sic] programme. The 
Commission wants to maintain some distance from the police, and the police are the people 
to use in the programmes.”57 However, when the need became increasingly urgent, the 
Commission established certain work-around arrangements to offer protection to 
witnesses. Here again the persistence, or path dependence, of the repressive institutional 
framework demonstrates how problematic institutions formed the foundation of the 
Goldstone Commission and against which the process of conversion is evident.  
 It is important to note that the Goldstone Commission’s identification of a need for 
witness protection schemes was not the only influencing factor in the establishment of a 
witness protection process. Newham identifies that Lawyers for Human Rights had 
established an independent witness protection program that played an important role in the 
                                                
57 Peace Action Letter to Justice Goldstone, Feb 5, 1992. Peace Action Collection AG2515, file D5. Wits 
Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
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establishment of a witness protection program by the Goldstone Commission.58 Archival 
evidence points to pressure from non-governmental organizations to establish a witness 
protection program. For example, the correspondence with Peace Action Network 
referenced above, a non-governmental monitoring organization, suggests that the potential 
for a witness protection program had been under discussion by civil society members prior 
to the Goldstone Commission adopting protection measures.59 
 According to reports, the Commissions’ program protected 37 witnesses and 40 
family members.60 The challenges and critiques of the witness protection program under 
the Goldstone Commission largely centre on the fact that the provisions had not been 
planned at the outset. Even though the witness protection has been criticized as 
“reactionary,” its development within the commission of inquiry strengthened truth-
seeking in South Africa. 61  
 The Commission’s mandate incorporated other measures to protect witnesses as part 
of the investigations into violence. The Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act 
of 1991 stipulated that the hearings of the Commission would be held in public, except 
when there was a risk to a person or their family associated with being required to provide 
evidence to the Commission.62 The provisions in the National Peace Accord refined these 
                                                
58 Newham, Keeping the Wolves at Bay. 
59 Peace Action Letter to Justice Goldstone, Feb 5, 1992. Peace Action Collection AG2515, file D5. Wits 
Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
60 Jenny Irish et al., Testifying Without Fear: A Report on Witness Management and the National Witness 
Protection Programme in South Africa, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (2000). 
61 Newham uses the word “reactionary” to describe the witness protection program, Newham, Keeping the 
Wolves at Bay. 
62 §9 of the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Bill, B148-91 (GA). 
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parameters, outlining that the identity of a person providing evidence could not be 
identified, the contents of documents had to be kept confidential, and that hearings could 
be held in private when there was a threat or danger to participants.63 The basis for the 
caveat pertaining to public proceedings explicitly refers to the “safety of witnesses.”64 
 By incorporating witness protection, as a result of both heeding the demands from 
civil society and recognizing the impact that witness participation had on information 
gathering, the Goldstone Commission stoked a conversation that was eventually taken up 
by the TRC. The use of witnesses, and the dependence on witness protection to access 
information, laid a foundation for the role of witness protection elements in the TRC. In 
the final report of the Goldstone Commission, the Commission acknowledges the lingering 
inadequacies of state-run witness protection for further truth-seeking. The report states: 
Even if the immediate needs of the international investigation team led by the 
Attorney-General of Transvaal or the proposed commission for truth and 
reconciliation are not taken into account, the Commission is convinced of the dire 
necessity of an adequate witness protection programme to be properly established 
and expanded to provide for needs throughout the country.65 
 
This suggests that there was a need for witness protection measures within the information-
gathering institutions that followed the Goldstone Commission, and beyond. With the 
gradual changes that took place under the Goldstone Commission, the value of witness 
protection operating this way helps to explain its persistence in truth-seeking in the 
aftermath of the transition.  
                                                
63 National Peace Accord, 1991, 6.18.3-6.19. 
64 National Peace Accord, 1991, 6.19. 
65 Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, “Final Report of 
the Goldstone Commission,” 27 October 1994, 4.1. 
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8.4 From the Goldstone Commission to the TRC  
The South African TRC was the first truth commission to incorporate witness protection 
into its structures.66 By looking further back in the institutional foundations for the truth 
commission, one can trace the development of witness protection, as part of an 
investigatory commission to the Goldstone Commission. Also evident are 
acknowledgments by civil society organizations of the potential for institutional continuity 
between the Goldstone Commission and the TRC.  
 As early as 1995 Gareth Newham identified that the lessons learned from the 
Goldstone Commission’s work ought to inform the TRC’s implementation of witness 
protection policies.67 A submission from Lawyers for Human Rights on the Promotion of 
National Unity and Reconciliation Act details things that the Goldstone Commission had 
learned in terms of witness protection. The document suggests that, “it has been our 
experience during the Goldstone Commission that unless we were able to provide adequate 
protection for witnesses, we were unable to secure their attendance at the Commission for 
the purposes of procuring their testimony.”68 The Network of Independent Monitors’ 
submission to the Minister of Justice on the establishment of the truth commission 
identifies that, “there has never been any effective witness protection programme in South 
Africa and this is an area that will need to be addressed seriously by the Truth 
                                                
66 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume One, Chapter 4, 55. 
67 Newham, Keeping the Wolves at Bay. 
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Commission.”69 These examples demonstrate that civil society actors raised the issue and 
necessity of a witness protection program in the TRC. Further, the minutes of a technical 
workshop of civil society actors that took place in 1995, identify that the witness protection 
program must make clear that “witness protection” means “protective custody”.70 This is a 
similar structure to that used by the Goldstone Commission, despite criticism of the 
process. Although the design of the witness protection program for the truth commission 
eventually developed into something more comprehensive,71 the links to previous witness 
protection schemes are evident. 
 Other elements of the TRC also influenced the development of witness protection 
measures. The decision to widely publicize the proceedings of the TRC and to name 
perpetrators in the process would, in part, have necessitated the development of processes 
and structures to protect those who provided testimony. The witness protection program 
was operational beginning May 1, 1996.72 According to the TRC Report, those who sought 
witness protection in the beginning were victims, witnesses who were concerned about 
safety based on details they could provide to the commission.73 In October 1996, amnesty 
applicants increasingly sought protection, fearing “reprisals when testifying at public 
                                                
69 The Network of Independent Monitors Submissions to the Minster of Justice on the Establishment of a 
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hearings.”74 The presence of protection provisions for people who testified at the 
commission strengthened the truth-seeking project by enabling people to come forward 
and provide evidence, and to have that evidence corroborated. 150 people used the witness 
protection program offered by the TRC.75 
 The South African TRC also included other elements of protection for people to 
testify at the truth commission. Under certain circumstances, the Commission conducted 
hearings in camera. Its founding Act provided for enhanced information-seeking potential 
through Section 29: 
Essentially, section 29 allowed the Commission to issue a subpoena calling on a 
person to appear before it and answer questions relating to a matter under 
investigation. Unless otherwise determined by the Commission, the enquiry would 
take place in camera and the witness would be compelled to answer questions, even 
though the answers might be self-incriminating.76  
 
Under Section 29, investigations and hearings could be held in private; the information and 
evidence provided to these investigations and hearings would only be made public at the 
discretion of the Commission according to the legislation.77 The TRC used information 
gathered in these proceedings to corroborate evidence received through other information-
gathering practices conducted by the truth commission. While there is some skepticism 
                                                
74 Ibid., 390. 
75 Paul van Zyl, "Dilemmas of Transitional Justice: The Case of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission," Journal of International Affairs 52, no. 2 (1999): 656. 
76 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume One, Chapter 11, 334.  
77 See National Unity and Reconciliation Act, §29. 
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about what was accomplished in these hearings,78 the TRC Report identifies that the 
Section 29 hearings played an important role in substantiating evidence.79 
 The TRC also had other protection measures in place for people testifying or for those 
who would be identified publicly in its proceedings. If people were going to name people 
alleged to have been involved in incidents, the legislation dictated that the person 
implicated had to be notified that they would be named. This included for public hearings 
and in making findings.80 Though the names of people who had been granted amnesty were 
to be published in the Government Gazette, the Human Rights Violations Committee had 
to grapple perpetrators named in hearings.81 The recourse for accused who did not want to 
be named was to apply to the courts for interdicts preventing the hearings from moving 
forward.82 Sarkin notes that the courts did require the TRC to provide adequate notice to 
those who would be named, the TRC “stat[ed] that it would not necessarily disclose the 
identity of witnesses that may name such perpetrators.”83  
In these design decisions, the interplay between the goals of truth-seeking, and the 
institutional components that facilitated truth-seeking are clearly illustrated. The Goldstone 
                                                
78 Piers Pigou, "The Apartheid State and Violence: What Has the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Found?," Politikon 28, no. 2 (2001): 208-209. 
79 Section 29 hearings are listed as a type of evidence which could be used to evaluate the probability of 
evidence, see Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume One, Chapter 4, 91. 
See also, Chapter 10, 270.  
80 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume One, Chapter 6, 143-144.  See 
also the discussion of legal challenges faced by the TRC in in Volume 1, Chapter 7. 
81 Jeremy Sarkin, Carrots and Sticks: The TRC and the South African Amnesty Process (Antwerp and 
Oxford: Intersentia Publishers, 2004), 93. 
82 Sarkin, Carrots and Sticks, 93-94. See also Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa 
Report: Volume One, Chapter 7. 
83 Sarkin, Carrots and Sticks, 95. 
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Commission and the South African TRC provide a valuable example of how this space for 
interpretation in legislation and mandates can facilitate the truth-seeking processes with the 
incremental institutional change in the Goldstone Commission enabling the development 
of witness protection measures and the TRC refining it. The impact of the incremental 
institutional change is evident in two ways. First, earlier investigations highlighted some 
limitations of incorporating witnesses into the existing information-gathering processes. 
When the leadership of the Goldstone Commission had the capabilities adjust to identified 
limitations, and the resources to respond, the Commission developed modalities that were 
innovative in the South African context. Second, the adoption of similar witness protection 
measures at the TRC suggests a recognition of the value of the institutional conversion 
toward truth-seeking and information gathering within commission structures.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter first highlighted the importance of witnesses in transitional justice and in the 
process of information gathering. Then, it demonstrated how the Goldstone Commission 
responded to limitations in its operating structure, recognizing the danger for witness 
participation and the limitations on information gathering during the transitional period. 
Framed as a process of incremental change, the witness protection component of the 
Goldstone Commission illustrates the manner in which the process of conversion better 
positioned the Goldstone Commission for information gathering. In the final section, this 
chapter demonstrated how the TRC was shaped and enabled by what came before it.  
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Chapter 9  
 
9 Institutional Conversion: The Question of Amnesty 
The previous chapters have demonstrated that the institutionalization of truth-seeking 
processes in South Africa can be explained using a path dependence framework coupled 
with theories of gradual institutional change. Thus far, two examples of institutional re-
deployment in information-gathering institutions have been presented. Chapters 6 and 7 
demonstrated that under certain conditions, the commission of inquiry, having been used 
historically to reinforce the Apartheid system was transformed, illustrating a process of 
‘conversion’ in institutional adjustments. Chapter 7 illustrated that the commission of 
inquiry was re-deployed in a manner conducive to truth-seeking, despite the perceptions it 
had developed as part of the repressive system. Chapter 8 explored one example of 
institutional deployment that illustrated gradual institutional change in the commission of 
inquiry, through the institution of witness protection. This chapter explores how the 
institution of indemnity, and later amnesty was differently implemented and justified over 
the course of the South African transition, from the initiation of negotiations, through the 
constitutional negotiations, and eventually as a component of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC). 
  Scholars such as du Bois-Pedain and Sarkin articulate and demonstrate the 
persistence of amnesty from the early negotiations to the TRC’s power to grant amnesty.1 
Sitze recognizes, for example, that initial proposals about the amnesty process were similar 
                                                
1 Antje du Bois-Pedain, Transitional Amnesty in South Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 40-43; Jeremy Sarkin, Carrots and Sticks: The TRC and the South African Amnesty Process 
(Antwerp and Oxford: Intersentia Publishers, 2004), 194-198. 
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in every component to a piece of earlier indemnity legislation, the 1990 Indemnity Act, 
except for one element which referenced the newly established 1993 Interim Constitution.2  
 The question of amnesty within the transition was contentious until the end of the 
negotiations.3 South Africa’s agreement to amnesty was included in the postamble to the 
1993 Interim Constitution. The 1993 Interim Constitution included the following 
provision:  
In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted 
in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and 
committed in the course of the conflicts of the past. To this end, Parliament under 
this Constitution shall adopt a law determining a firm cut-off date, which shall be a 
date after 8 October 1990 and before 6 December 1993, and providing for the 
mechanisms, criteria and procedures, including tribunals, if any, through which such 
amnesty shall be dealt with at any time after the law has been passed.4 
 
After the democratic election, the TRC was the chosen vehicle to address this clause of the 
Constitution.  
This chapter traces the evolution of amnesty from the indemnity process under 
Apartheid, through the transitional negotiations, identifying the shift in instrumentality 
from the earlier negotiations to truth-seeking in the transitional period. It raises an 
important observation relating to institutional continuity and change. This chapter argues 
that the development and continued relevance of amnesty in this historical period can be 
explained as a product of persistence and change. We can trace a shift in amnesty’s goals 
from its utility as a negotiation chip to the value placed on amnesty to access information 
                                                
2 Adam Sitze, The Impossible Machine: A Genealogy of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (Ann Arbour: The University of Michigan Press, 2013), 30-31. 
3 André du Toit, "A Need for ‘Truth’: Amnesty and the Origins and Consequences of the TRC Process," 
International Journal of Public Theology 8 (2014): 402. 
4 Neil J. Kritz, ed., Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, vol. 
III: Laws, Rulings, and Reports (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 597. 
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at the TRC.5 This account offers a different perspective in analyzing the persistence of the 
institution of amnesty through the democratic election and into the TRC space, offering an 
explanation for the process as an illustration of incremental institutional change. 
 This chapter sets the context for the amnesty discussion, first, by situating how 
amnesty is theorized in truth-seeking and truth commissions. After a brief overview of 
indemnity under Apartheid, the chapter traces the development of the indemnity process in 
the early negotiating period, outlining elements of continuity in the decision-making and 
implementing arrangements. Mahoney and Thelen outline the significance of the 
coalitional dynamics, veto points or players in an environment, and the discretion in the 
interpretation of the rules as important features of gradual institutional change.6 The next 
three sections demonstrate how the interaction of these characteristics explains the gradual 
change in the purpose and application of amnesty in the South African transition focusing 
on the negotiating period, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence 
and Intimidation, and the TRC. The chapter argues that amnesty-in-exchange-for-
information was not deployed with the Goldstone Commission because of the political 
conditions. However, these conditions were ripe for amnesty’s conversation through the 
TRC. In the final sections, the chapter explores how amnesty was employed by the TRC in 
                                                
5 Mallinder points to amnesty as a bargaining chip, but situates the discussion after the negotiations and 
then in discussions of bargaining for information. I suggest that the bargaining occurred with regards to 
early negotiations for political prisoners and that the exchange of information for amnesty represents a 
different goal to bargaining. See Louise Mallinder, "Indemnity, Amnesty, Pardon and Prosecution 
Guidelines in South Africa," in Working Paper No. 2 from Beyond Legalism: Amnesties, Transition and 
Conflict Transformation (Queens University Belfast: Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice, 2009), 
31-45. 
6 James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," in Explaining 
Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, ed. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 18-19. 
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light of its previous use and analyzes how these influences affected the amnesty process in 
the TRC.  
 A note on terminology is necessary. During the South African transition period 
under investigation, the terms indemnity and amnesty were sometimes used 
interchangeably.7 As discussed below, prior to the amnesty arrangement at the TRC, the 
Government of South Africa used indemnities to prevent charges being brought against 
individuals. In the early drafts of the legislation for the TRC, Minister of Justice Dullah 
Omar distinguishes between indemnity and amnesty based on whether or not an individual 
had been tried and convicted for acts of a political objective.8 According to this text, 
“indemnity is to be given to persons who have not yet been tried for any offence committed 
with a political object. Amnesty is granted to persons who have been convicted of an 
offense and who are serving or have served a period of imprisonment.”9 At the Healing of 
a Nation Conference in 1994, put on by civil society organizations to discuss the potential 
for a truth commission, the Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, uses both terms in his 
remarks.10 Earlier legislation, both under Apartheid and during the negotiations, nominally 
refers to indemnity. However, with respect to information-gathering the concept of 
indemnity was replaced with amnesty—in exchange for truth.11 Parker identifies that: 
no important distinction was drawn between amnesties for those convicted of 
crimes and indemnities protecting violators from criminal and civil liability. 
                                                
7 Sitze dedicates an entire chapter to the genealogy of these terms, see Sitze, The Impossible Machine, 23-
49. 
8 Sitze, The Impossible Machine, 33, 36. 
9 Ibid., 33. 
10 Alex Boraine and Janet Levy, eds., The Healing of a Nation? (Cape Town: Justice in Transition, 1995), 
2-8. 
11 Sitze, The Impossible Machine, 40. 
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Indeed, the 1995 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act uses the word 
amnesty for both.12  
In the end, amnesty within the TRC included the components of indemnity. If granted 
amnesty, those already serving prison sentences for crimes that fell under the TRC’s 
criteria would be released and those granted amnesty would be protected from criminal or 
civil liability for those acts.13  
9.1 Amnesty and Truth-Seeking 
 
In the field of transitional justice, the viability of amnesty in processes of redress is strongly 
debated. The debates on amnesty consider the legality of amnesties,14 questions of 
accountability and the prioritizing of retributive justice (and closely related arguments 
about deterrence),15 and the dimensions of morality that comprise deliberations over types 
of justice and amnesty.16 As Dugard points out, these discussions and debates are far from 
‘settled’.17 Furthermore, the moral complexity at the core of the discussions is not easily 
                                                
12 Peter Parker, "The Politics of Indemnities, Truth Telling and Reconciliation in South Africa: Ending 
Apartheid Without Forgetting," Human Rights Law Journal 17, no. 1-2 (1996): 1. 
13 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Act 95-
34 (1995), 20 (27); Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume Six, Chapter 1, 
page 14. 
14 Diane F. Orentlicher, "‘Settling Accounts’ Revisited: Reconciling Global Norms with Local Agency," 
The International Journal of Transitional Justice 1 (2007): 18. See also, Mark Freeman and Max Pensky, 
"The Amnesty Controversy in International Law," in Amnesty in the Age of Human Rights Accountability, 
ed. Francesca Lessa and Leigh A. Payne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
15 Chandra Lehka Sriram, Confronting Past Human Rights Violations: Justice vs Peace in Times of 
Transition (London and New York: Frank Cass, 2004), 6-12. 
16 Colleen Murphy, The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), 12-21 particularly. Stuart Wilson, "The Myth of Restorative Justice: Truth, 
reconciliation and the ethics of amnesty," South African Journal on Human Rights 17, no. 4 (2001): 531-
562. 
17 John Dugard, "Dealing with Crimes of a Past Regime. Is Amnesty Still an Option?," Leiden Journal of 
International Law 12 (1999): 1015. 
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mapped; theorizing the value of prosecution and accountability is necessarily different 
from implementing these ideals in practice.18 The issue is further complicated by ideas of 
non-retributive justice. Since the South African TRC particularly, the association of truth-
seeking with amnesty has changed the parameters of the discussion, building on nuances 
of conditionality for disclosing information, and incentivizing participation in truth-
seeking processes. 
 Leigh and Payne define amnesty as “legal measures adopted by states that have the 
effect of prospectively barring criminal prosecution against certain individuals accused of 
committing human rights violations.”19 An ongoing debate in the human rights community 
is whether amnesties can be justified in cases of human rights abuses or whether 
prosecution is always required. The entrenchment of an “accountability” norm has 
channeled much of the discussion into when amnesty might be justified, if ever, and what 
the limits of amnesty ought to be.20 Pertinent to this framing is Dugard’s recognition that 
amnesties should not all be treated the same.21 Contextual differences may facilitate 
prosecution, and in some cases, prosecution may not be deemed the ‘right’ path of justice 
for human rights violations. 
 For those who contend that the impunity associated with amnesty is detrimental to 
the development of human rights and democratization, amnesties are considered 
                                                
18 Sriram, Confronting Past Human Rights Violations: Justice vs Peace in Times of Transition, 7. 
19 Francesca Lessa and Leigh A. Payne, "Introduction," in Amnesty in the Age of Human Rights 
Accountability: Comparative and International Perspectives, ed. Francesca Lessa and Leigh A. Payne 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 4. 
20 Kathryn Sikkink and Hun Joon Kim, "The Justice Cascade: The Origins and Effectiveness of 
Prosecutions of Human Rights Violations," Annual Review of Law and Social Science 9 (2013): 269-285. 
21 Dugard, "Dealing with Crimes of a Past Regime," 1009. 
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unjustifiable.22 Others, however, suggest that amnesties considered and granted under 
certain conditions have an instrumental role to play in addressing past human rights 
violations. This may be in the very possibility of a transition itself, or, in enabling other 
transitional justice mechanisms to operate.23 Amnesty can facilitate transitions where 
parties may be otherwise unwilling to negotiate.24 A demand for amnesty or an amnesty 
agreement is sometimes the contingency on which transitions or agreements are made. The 
intention here is not to situate my argument along the continuum of the morality or utility 
of amnesty. Rather, by presenting the broad strokes of amnesty’s role in transitional justice, 
the link between amnesty and truth commissions itself can be more clearly articulated.  
 In the facilitator line of reasoning, amnesty can expedite the uncovering of 
information. Amnesty is identified as an incentive, in this regard, for disclosing information 
about past events.25 South Africa’s conditional amnesty, that is, the granting of amnesty 
only when individuals presented the complete details of crimes, influenced considerations 
of the application of amnesty mediated by truth commissions in transitional justice.26  
                                                
22 Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter, "Conclusion: Amnesty in the Age of 
Accountability," in Amnesty in Age of Human Rights Accountability: Comparative and International 
Perspectives, ed. Francesca Lessa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 337-339. 
23 Olsen, Payne, and Reiter, "Conclusion: Amnesty in the Age of Accountability," 340-341. 
24 Orentlicher, "‘Settling Accounts’ Revisited," 11. 
25 Louise Mallinder and Kieran McEvoy, "Rethinking amnesties: atrocity, accountability and impunity in 
post-conflict societies," Contemporary Social Science 6, no. 1 (2011): 113. On the amnesty process as 
conditional see du Bois-Pedain, Transitional Amnesty in South Africa, 20-23. Antje du Bois-Pedain, 
"Accountability Through Conditional Amnesty: The Case of South Africa," in Amnesty in the Age of 
Human Rights Accountability: Comparative and International Perspectives, ed. Francesca Lessa and Leigh 
A. Payne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). See also, Ronald C. Slye, "Amnesty, Truth, and 
Reconciliation: Reflection on the South African Amnesty Process," in Truth V. Justice, ed. Robert I. 
Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 170-188. 
26 Slye, "Amnesty, Truth, and Reconciliation: Reflection on the South African Amnesty Process," 172. 
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 Amnesty agreements do not necessitate the establishment of a truth commission, 
however the relationship between amnesties, truth commissions, and prosecutions is 
complex. When they first emerged, new governments often established truth commissions 
because prosecution was not possible. Thus, truth commissions may have been operating 
with amnesties already in place, as was the case in Chile, for example.27 In Chile, an 
amnesty law passed in 1978 prevented the new regime from pursuing prosecutions for 
human rights violations committed under the regime of Augusto Pinochet.28 The amnesty 
law was one of the factors that steered the new regime to adopt a truth commission in order 
to address the human rights violations under the previous regime.29 The report of one of 
the truth commissions established in Chile, the Rettig Commission, recognizes that “the 
worst and most systematic human rights violations perpetrated by the military government 
occurred in the period covered by the amnesty.”30 In this case, the truth commission was 
not structured to grant amnesty, but had been informed by the existing amnesty 
arrangement and the balance of power.  
  Hayner points out that the direct relationship between truth commissions and 
amnesty is frequently magnified based on the notoriety of the South African case.31 The 
                                                
27 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions 
(New York: Routledge, 2002), 47. 
28 Mark Ensalaco, "Truth Commissions for Chile and El Salvador: A Report and Assessment," Human 
Rights Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1994): 657-659; Jose Zalaquett, Introduction to the English Edition, Report of 
the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, via United States Institute of Peace, 9. 
29 Ensalaco, "Truth Commissions for Chile and El Salvador," 657; Margaret Popkin and Naomi Roht-
Arriaza, "Truth as Justice: Investigatory Commissions in Latin America," Law & Social Inquiry 20, no. 1 
(Winter 1995): 84. 
30 Zalaquett, Introduction to the English Edition, Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and 
Reconciliation, 9. 
31 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 104-105. 
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South African experience has also shaped perceptions about amnesty processes in other 
commissions, causing confusion at times.32 As Slye recognizes, however, the unique South 
African amnesty process has “not been adopted by any other country undergoing a similar 
transition, and it seems unlikely that it will.”33 The characteristics of the South African 
transition enabled the production of a transitional process that was amenable to the 
negotiating parties, that could facilitate the disclosure of information, and that could 
facilitate the granting of amnesty. Less attention has been paid to how the gradual changes 
in the institution of amnesty explain, in part, its redeployment at the TRC. The institutional 
predecessors to the TRC in South Africa shaped its institutionalization and incremental 
change in important ways.34 
9.2 Indemnity/Amnesty: Apartheid and Transition  
The institution of indemnity was relatively extensive for the security forces of the 
Apartheid state, reflecting a pattern of path-dependence. Similar to the commission of 
                                                
32 Slye identifies that much of the text in the Kenyan TJRC mandate borrowed the language used in the 
South African TRC, despite the fact that that amnesty could only be recommended in the Kenyan case and 
the South African guidelines for determining amnesty were vastly different than those in Kenya. Ronald C. 
Slye, The Kenyan TJRC: An Outsider’s View from the Inside (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2018), 64-67. 
33 Slye, The Kenyan TJRC: An Outsider’s View from the Inside, 50. 
34 Many discussions of amnesty in the South African transition focus on the debate between amnesty and 
impunity or the legacy of impunity. See, for example, Ole Bubenzer, Post-TRC Prosecutions in South 
Africa: Accountability for Political Crimes after the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Amnesty 
Process (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009); Jonathan Klaaren and Howard Varney, "A Second 
Bite at the Amnesty Cherry? Constitutional and Policy Issues Around Legislation for a Second Amnesty," 
in The Provocations of Amnesty: Memory, Justice and Impunity, ed. Charles Villa-Vicencio and Eric 
Doxtader (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, Inc., 2003), 265-293; Mahmood Mamdani, "Amnesty or 
Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South 
Africa (TRC)," Diacritics 32, no. 3/4 (2002), 32-59; Wilson, "The Myth of Restorative Justice," 531-562. 
The analysis here does not address the debates on the morality of amnesty nor on the potential for a legacy 
of impunity. The focus of this discussion is on the persistence of the institution of amnesty and the ways in 
which it was adjusted and redeployed over time.  
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inquiry, indemnity offered a means through which the state could enforce public order, and 
contain opposition. State security forces in South Africa were afforded several protections 
under law and one of these was indemnity from liability. Major pieces of legislation to 
facilitate indemnity were implemented after violent events that were condemned by 
international and domestic actors, like police involvement in the Sharpeville Massacre in 
1960 and the police shooting of protestors during the Soweto Uprising in 1976.35 Sitze 
traces the institution of indemnity using the historical jurisprudence of the concept 
suggesting that the TRC’s use of amnesty was a continuation of the practice of indemnity 
that, under Apartheid, had become normalized.36  
Entrenched in law were provisions that police and defence forces could not be held 
liable for crimes committed in the pursuit of their duty. Bogden and Shearing characterize 
this as the “right to kill within rules,” pointing to the 1977 Criminal Procedure Act 51, 
which allowed shoot to kill responses to prevent suspects from getting away.37 The 1982 
Internal Security Act provided “officers in the SAP of the rank of lieutenant-colonel or 
above the power to order preventive detention, detention of witnesses, and for 
interrogation.”38 A 1979 amendment to the Police Act provided for wider powers for the 
police, in terms of search powers.39  
 In addition to the protection for state officers provided by the laws of policing and 
enforcement, the Government of South Africa passed Indemnity Bills in 1961 and 1977 to 
                                                
35 Sitze, The Impossible Machine, 47. 
36 Ibid., 8. 
37 Mike Brogden and Clifford D. Shearing, Policing for a New South Africa (Florence: Routledge, 1997), 
17. 
38 John D. Brewer, Black and Blue: Policing in South Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 291. 
39 Brewer, Black and Blue: Policing in South Africa, 291. 
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protect members of the police, and other state officials, from being held accountable for 
the police-involved shootings at Sharpeville and Soweto.40 The state justified these 
indemnity provisions in terms of necessary action to maintain public order, provided 
officials acted in good faith.41 Although passed in July 1961, the 1961 Indemnity Act was 
given effect from March 21, 1960 (the day of the Sharpeville Massacre). The legislation 
was:  
To indemnify the Government, its officers and all other persons acting under its or 
their authority in respect of acts, announcements, statements or information 
advised, commanded, ordered, directed, done, made or published in good faith for 
the prevention or suppression of internal disorder or the maintenance or restoration 
of good order or public safety or essential services or the preservation of life or 
property in any part of South Africa included in the Republic or the termination of 
a state of emergency in certain areas included in the Republic, and to provide for 
matters incidental thereto.42 
 
Similarly, the provisions of the Indemnity Act of 1977 covered 16 June 1976 (the day of 
the start of the Soweto Uprising) onward: 
To indemnify the State, members of the Executive Council of the Republic, persons 
in the service of the State and persons acting under their authority in respect of acts, 
announcements, statements or information advised, commanded, ordered, directed, 
done, made or published in good faith for the prevention, suppression or 
termination of internal disorder or the maintenance or restoration of good order or 
public safety or essential services of the preservation of life or property in any part 
of the Republic and to provide for matters connected there-with.43  
 
Both of these Acts highlight the prevention of disorder by state officials as justification for 
indemnity, despite the deadly outcomes of their actions. In both Sharpeville and the Soweto 
                                                
40 Sitze, The Impossible Machine, 72-80. See also, Brogden and Shearing, Policing for a New South Africa, 
18. 
41 Sitze, The Impossible Machine, 72-83. 
42 Indemnity Act No. 61 of 1961, accessed April 13, 2020 at 
https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1961-061.pdf. See also, Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
of South Africa Report: Volume One, Chapter 13, 459. 
43 Indemnity Act, No. 13 of 1977, Republic of South Africa Government Gazette, 141, no. 5445, 16 March 
1977.  
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violence, the police were indemnified for shooting on crowds of civilians. These actions 
were justified by the state in terms of maintaining control, despite the discrepancy in threat 
versus response.44 Sitze argues that,  
initially theorized under imperial conditions as a technique for the suppression of 
anticolonial rebellion, indemnity functioned under apartheid as a carte blanche 
endorsement for the police to wage ‘low-intensity war’ against individuals and 
populations opposed to apartheid.45  
 
Using indemnity during Apartheid achieved the Government’s ambition of public order in 
the face of opposition.  
Indemnity’s purpose at this time was not information gathering, nor conciliation. 
The goal was to protect state agents in the pursuit of ‘order’ at all costs, as the legislation 
passages above suggest. As Frankel notes in his assessment of the Wessels Commission 
after the Sharpeville Massacre, there was little expectation for information. Frankel 
suggests that “the police drew strength from the fact that they knew they were untouchable 
in the context of the times.”46 Frankel recognizes that the prospective of amnesty in 
exchange for information emerged later, with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.47  
Under Apartheid, indemnity was used by the state to facilitate enforcement and 
coercion without consequence; protecting the individuals that worked to maintain the 
regime. In the intervening period, indemnity and amnesty were deployed for another 
                                                
44 The TRC Report findings regarding the riots at Soweto point to the police’s shoot-to-kill policy and 
“excessive force” of the riot control in its findings. See Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South 
Africa Report: Volume Three, Chapter 8, page 570. 
45 Sitze, The Impossible Machine, 84. 
46 Philip Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity: Sharpeville and Its Massacre (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2001), 199. 
47 See Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity, 199. 
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purpose, facilitating progress in negotiations. Despite changes in its justification and goals, 
indemnity persisted through the negotiation period and to the TRC.  
 
9.2.1 Negotiating Political Prisoners  
 
The second discernable goal of indemnity/amnesty in South Africa is evident in its 
association with the initiation of the negotiation process. A contentious issue underscoring 
the transition was the issue of political prisoners. The Apartheid regime criminalized 
political opposition and civil protest.48 Thus, people who operated in opposition to 
Apartheid were criminalized for their association with these organizations, meaning many 
ended up imprisoned or in exile.49 The ANC’s position was that for negotiations to be at 
least somewhat even-footed, members of political groups that were imprisoned ought to be 
released.50  
The context for indemnity’s redeployment is important. Following on the pattern 
of both the commission of inquiry itself and witness protection, indemnity was used 
initially by the Apartheid state to maintain the status quo. But, during the opening of the 
transition, it was used as a tool for change. Given the ANC’s demands to move forwards 
with negotiations, the Government could not ignore the calls for prisoner release, and this 
necessitated the implementation of indemnity measures. Furthermore, the negotiations 
about indemnity, and later amnesty, relied on the incorporation of the ANC’s preferences, 
                                                
48 The TRC Report has an extensive list of Apartheid legislation see Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
of South Africa Report: Volume One, 458. See also: Saul Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, First ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 45. 
49 The number of such prisoners remains imprecise. See: Kate Savage, Negotiating the Release of Political 
Prisoners in South Africa, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (2000), 2. 
50 Parker, "Politics of Indemnities," 2. As per footnote 36, Savage identifies that the number of political 
prisoners was not recorded.  
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given their influence on negotiation decision-making. The implementation of 
indemnity/amnesty at various stages throughout the negotiation and transition period 
demonstrates sufficient ambiguity in application that helps to explain the changing 
purposes of its deployment and re-deployment. This ambiguity is most prominent in the 
provisions and interpretations for who met the requirements for the successive indemnity 
agreements and associated legislation. 
 The government’s decision to lift the ban on opposition organizations in 1990 
required a way to approach those imprisoned for political crimes. In his 1990 speech, de 
Klerk identified that those who were imprisoned simply for being part of the organizations 
would be “identified and released.”51 While there was existing legislation that could be 
used to commute sentences, it was necessary to establish a framework for people who had 
not yet been charged with offences or who were waiting for trial proceedings.52 In addition, 
agreements had to be forged to determine the criteria to denote crimes as political offences. 
It is important to reiterate that the number of political prisoners imprisoned in South Africa 
was imprecise—in part because of the government’s treatment of political offences as 
criminal. People were imprisoned for a wide variety of offences “ranging from treason to 
terrorism, membership of a banned organisation to murder,” complicating the release of 
                                                
51 "F.W. de Klerk’s Speech at the Opening of Parliament 2 February 1990," O’Malley Archives: The Heart 
of Hope, accessed April 13, 2020, 
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Mandela Centre of Memory on the O’Malley Archive compiled by Padraig O’Malley, accessed February 4, 
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political prisoners.53 Given the prospects for negotiations, however, the Government’s 
ability to unilaterally extend indemnities and make determinations of eligibility was 
diminished. 
 Two agreements signed in the early 1990s were incremental steps toward the 
constitutional negotiations that cemented South Africa’s transition. These were also key 
points in which the indemnity and amnesty discussions are rooted. These first steps, the 
Groote Schuur Minute (4 May 1990) and Pretoria Minute (6 August 1990), outlined the 
process for identifying political prisoners and determining how prisoners would be 
released.54 This process was legislated in the Indemnity Act, 1990.55 The deliberations and 
decisions surrounding the release of political prisoners not only laid the foundation for 
amnesty but discerned institutional elements for identifying and indemnifying political 
prisoners. 
These early agreements in the negotiating process opened the space for 
amnesty/indemnity to inform the transitional conversation. As political decisions, their 
composition and the means through which the agreements would be implemented, illustrate 
incremental elements of change. Although the purpose of indemnity at this time was related 
to accountability measures, the indemnities associated with the negotiations demonstrate 
changes in the application of the institution of indemnity. Their purpose at this stage was 
not about amnesty or indemnity-in-exchange-for-information. However, this stage still 
illustrates gradual institutional change.  
                                                
53 Savage, Negotiating the Release of Political Prisoners in South Africa, 40. 
54 "The Groote Schuur Minute, 4 May 1990."; "The Pretoria Minute, 6 August 1990."  
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The indemnity rules incorporated a new group of interests while maintaining the 
interests of the old. As Thelen notes, institutions respond to changing societal and political 
conditions, and “the political renegotiations that accompany such realignments are crucial 
to understanding changes over time.”56 This is significant because in both the Apartheid 
period and in the negotiation period, indemnity was applied differently. At the height of 
Apartheid, indemnity enabled the state to enforce Apartheid rules and order without fear 
of repercussion. During the negotiations, its institutional application was extended to bring 
the opposition forces like the ANC and the PAC into the fold. As Parker states:  
the question of indemnities for those who had not been charged was bound up with 
amnesties for political prisoners; both were seen less as a means of protecting agents 
of the state from subsequent prosecution for human rights abuses, and rather more as 
a necessary pre-condition for talks about talks.57  
 
The necessary extension of indemnity provisions to facilitate negotiations illustrates one 
part of the process of gradual institutional change. The transitional environment, the 
recognition on behalf of the state and opposition that negotiations were inevitable, 
recalibrated the indemnity process to include those who had previously been excluded and 
indeed victimized by indemnity provisions.  
 In order to extend the indemnity institution, these early negotiations and agreements 
directly address a critical element of the indemnity/amnesty conversation that shaped the 
later amnesty process: how a political crime would be defined.58 This is significant for two 
reasons, which will be discussed in turn. First, it placed restrictions on the indemnities that 
                                                
56 Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the 
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followed, which was an adjustment to the sweeping indemnities the State provided itself 
in 1961 and 1977. Second, the ‘political’ caveat on crimes provided a foundation on which 
later indemnities and amnesties would be evaluated. The institution of amnesty was 
reshaped by these agreements and this piece would itself become entrenched during the 
1990s, later being used to determine eligibility for amnesty at the TRC and serving as an 
undergirding reference for the institution of amnesty.  
 The negotiating parties agreed upon to determine which crimes fell under the 
category of political crimes using the Norgaard principles as a framework.59 Danish judge 
Carl Norgaard established these principles during negotiations between the Government of 
South Africa and SWAPO in Namibia.60 With some adjustments, these principles informed 
the Indemnity Act (1990) and the Further Indemnity Act (1992) that emerged from the 
negotiations, agreements, and working groups of the incremental agreements between the 
Government of South Africa and the ANC in the 1990s.61 This language are also found in 
the Constitution in terms of “offences associated with political objectives,”62 and again in 
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the TRC with respect to which types of crimes would be addressed by the amnesty 
provisions.63 
The 1992 legislation, the Further Indemnity Act, strayed the furthest from the earlier 
definitional arrangements. This legislation was criticized for it was perceived as a self-
amnesty for state actors and provided leeway for interpretation.64 Under this legislation the 
President could grant indemnity for “an act with a political object,” the definition of which, 
argues Parker, “covered anything that a person believed or was told was political. Whether 
such a belief was reasonable was an irrelevant consideration.”65 Savage identifies that the 
Further Indemnity Act was a means to deal with the difficult cases of prisoner release with 
regards to “acts with a ‘political object’ in which criminal convictions resulted. It also 
allowed the government to grant indemnity in the most controversial cases.”66 These 
criticisms are underscored by the manner in which the Government passed this legislation. 
When the bill did not pass in parliament, de Klerk sought approval from the President’s 
Council, controlled by the ruling party, to pass the bill.67  
 Implementing the arrangements once agreements had been reached brought other 
challenges. This negotiation stage clearly highlights that the institution of indemnity was 
focused more on securing indemnity for individuals and not on access to information for 
the justifications of indemnity or amnesty. In accounts of the indemnity processes in the 
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1990s, the general consensus in the literature is that the roll-out of the process was uneven 
and not sufficiently transparent. Though the 1992 Further Indemnity Act raised the most 
concerns, given that power rested so tightly with the President, the earlier processes were 
also subject to criticisms. As Keightley identifies, much of the complexity arose from those 
who remained imprisoned whose crimes were seemingly politically motivated but which 
were also often violent.68 The indemnity process for people imprisoned for contravening 
Apartheid laws that stifled the opposition were less contentious, though there were still 
implementation challenges.69  
 The number of applications received, more than 9,000 by April 1992, caused 
bureaucratic challenges.70 The volume of applications also created challenges with respect 
to cases that had to be reviewed based on higher degrees of violence and could not be 
addressed by blanket indemnities.71 In March 1991, the government reported that there 
were 42 “hard cases” to be assessed in this category, however, the number was higher 
according to Lawyers for Human Rights.72 
The lineage and continued use of the Norgaard principles is significant, as are the 
adjustments made in the indemnity-turned amnesty process. Despite challenges in their 
                                                
68 Keightley, "Political Offences and Indemnity in South Africa," 336. 
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application, the Norgaard principles illustrate continuity in the process. The definition of 
political crime was relatively consistent between the negotiations of the Pretoria Minute, 
the Indemnity Act, promulgated 15 May 1990, and the government’s August 1990 
Guidelines for Defining Political Crimes.73  
The Norgaard framework also influenced the TRC. The Report of the TRC identifies 
that “the wording of the Act leaned very heavily on what had become known as the 
‘Norgaard Principles’.”74 This continuity demonstrates a recognition of the continued 
relevance of these criteria, relying on them to guide the transitional process. Using similar 
criteria throughout the negotiating process provided some mutually agreed consistency in 
their application. The negotiated arrangements shifted the indemnity decisions solely from 
the power of the state to reflect the demands and preferences of the former opposition 
movement. This illustrates a new framing for the institution of indemnity that served the 
purpose of negotiation.  
 
9.2.2 Challenges with secrecy  
 
The indemnity processes also proved divisive based on the secrecy that characterized the 
process. The level of secrecy highlights the degree to which information gathering was not 
achieved in the earlier negotiation stages of the institution’s deployment. For example, 
there was agreement during negotiations that called for the establishment of a body to 
advise the government on indemnity and to demonstrate objectivity for involved parties. 
However, the manner in which this was actualized provided for “advisory” bodies that were 
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“subject to high levels of secrecy.”75 Furthermore, equal political representation on the 
deciding committee was not achieved because the “three ANC nominees refused to 
participate because of a ruling that  deliberations had to be held in secret.”76 The secrecy 
of the operation was problematic, and was, according to Keightley:  
not very successful in lending clarity to the indemnity process or in fostering the 
notion of objectivity. This is not to suggest that the committees, comprising three 
judges of the superior courts, were partisan to government interests. It is in particular 
in relation to the proceedings of these committees, and in particular the secrecy 
surrounding them, that criticism may be levelled.77  
 
However, media reports at the time identify that some of the judges assigned to the 
committee on “hard-cases”, including judges who had enforced Apartheid laws, may have 
been perceived as less credible.78  The secrecy further exacerbated a perception that the 
earlier principles agreed to in order to identify political prisoners were not necessarily 
equally applied.79 This perception arose from the indemnification of people whose crimes 
did not fit the established criteria, including violence towards civilians.80 According to 
Keightley, the committee structure used to make the early decisions on who met the criteria 
to receive indemnity followed the development of the indemnity process, meaning that a 
small group of select people was responsible for decisions pertaining to indemnity.81 This 
was problematic because of the secret nature of the adjudication, which led some to 
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question the process given what seemed to be unequal application of the criteria and the 
lack of transparency in the indemnity process as a whole, given the secrecy with which the 
committees operated.82 
 The later iterations of the indemnity process exacerbated the problem of secrecy. 
The Indemnity Amendment Act 1992 (Act no. 124) and the Further Indemnity Act 1992 
(Act no. 151) were problematic given their ability to obscure information, never-mind 
gathering and publicizing it. In the former, indemnity was granted under these provisions, 
which also provided for the “disposal of articles seized in connection with the 
investigation.”83 The Further Indemnity Act “extended indemnity to state offenders and 
provided for total secrecy regarding the actions for which individuals sought indemnity.”84 
The impact of these agreements was controversial. The Further Indemnity Act was seen as 
an effort by the state to ensure security forces were protected. Parker notes that the “Further 
Indemnity Act was thus widely seen as a form of self-indemnity conducted in secret.”85 
The Further Indemnity Act stipulated significant secrecy around the application and 
adjudication process. This act restricted access to information, those approved for 
indemnity under the Further Indemnity Act would be named, but their crimes and victims 
would not be made public.86 André du Toit also recognizes there were unintended 
consequences such that mainly opposition forces sought and were granted indemnity under 
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the Further Indemnity Act while few state security forces sought indemnity under the Act.87 
Making an important observation in the implementation of the Further Indemnity Act, du 
Toit identifies that it “did require amnesty applicants to make personal disclosures—except 
that all procedures, hearings and decisions under the Act were cloaked in official 
secrecy.”88 This illustrates that information gathering and truth-seeking were not the 
priority with these indemnity processes. 
 Prior to the TRC, another interim Committee was established to deal with lingering 
indemnity considerations.89 To deal with these applications, before the TRC and after the 
1994 democratic election, the ANC Government established a committee headed by Brian 
Currin, the national director of Lawyers for Human Rights to process indemnity 
applications that had not be dealt with prior to the election.90 As McEvoy outlines, “the 
committee considered 1,200 individual applicants who claimed their offenses were 
political and recommended indemnity in 260 cases.”91 This link between the 
administrations, but prior to the TRC, illustrates the challenge of completing what ended 
up being a continuing process.  
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 While the amnesty deliberations continued, and an agreement to amnesty was 
included in the 1993 Interim Constitution, the framing of the provision of amnesty shifted 
once again. Through the TRC, amnesty was justified as a means to uncover information 
about the past regime, with a recognition that “Nuremburg-style trials” were not possible, 
nor necessarily desirable.92 Although amnesty was essentially a condition for the transition, 
its deployment through the TRC illustrates that it underwent a process of conversion to be 
used as an information-gathering mechanism. This process is illuminated by the Goldstone 
Commission’s deliberations on amnesty, prior to the TRC.  
9.3 The Goldstone Commission and Information 
Gathering  
This section explores the roots of amnesty’s re-deployment towards information-gathering 
at the TRC. A part of the justification for the conditionality of amnesty through the TRC 
was the potential to use amnesty to gather information. In the intervening period, while the 
negotiations were ongoing, the potential for amnesty to be used more instrumentally for 
information gathering was proposed by the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of 
Public Violence and Intimidation. This discussion with regards to information gathering is 
important because the potential of offering something in exchange for information during 
the transition played out in an important way in the period leading up to the democratic 
elections and the establishment of the TRC.  
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 Conversations around amnesty occurred during the tenure of the Goldstone 
Commission but amnesty was not formally used to gather information until the TRC. This 
illustrates an interaction between three elements that inform Mahoney and Thelen’s 
framework of gradual institutional change. The political context, the institution itself, and 
the type of change-agent at work suggest that the possibility of deploying amnesty for a 
different purpose gained potential but the environment and the institution were not 
conducive to change.93 After the democratic election, the political environment and altered 
composition of the power-holders offers some insight into the re-deployment of amnesty 
at the TRC. However, consideration of amnesty by the Commission of Inquiry for the 
Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation illustrates the potential variation of 
possible functions for amnesty. As this section and the next demonstrate, amnesty’s 
deployment as an information-gathering measure at the TRC highlights the final shift in 
the purpose of amnesty in the period under consideration.  
 In order to ascertain facts, in the quest for information from perpetrators and 
witnesses, discussions of amnesty emerged related to the Goldstone Commission 
operations.94 The Goldstone Commission articulated the political value of granting 
amnesty in investigating the allegations of violence by state apparatus. Daniel Terris 
identifies that “in August 1992, Richard Goldstone took advantage of the public spotlight 
to offer a bold proposal. He called for an amnesty for those who agreed to testify before 
the Commission about matters relating to the promotion of violence.”95 Analysts suggest 
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that the purported purpose of amnesty in these considerations was as a means of access to 
information.96 In Graeme Simpson’s submission on the proposed legislation for 
amnesty/indemnity and the TRC, he identifies that the Goldstone Commission:  
stimulated debate over the merits of a general amnesty, resulting from the 
Commission’s call for such an arrangement in order to better facilitate its task of 
gathering information on the activities of the SADF, the SAP, and the Kwazulu 
police, as well as the military wings of the ANC and the PAC. Albeit on different 
grounds, the issue of indemnity or amnesty was once again linked to the concern 
for the disclosure of information relating to (political) criminal acts.97 
 
As early as 1992, a periodical reflects that Goldstone “calls for an amnesty to enable him 
to investigate fully the activities of the SADF, the SAP, the KwaZulu Police and the 
military wings of the ANC and the PAC, in response to the UN recommendations on 
violence.”98 Notably, this report reads: “Judge Goldstone makes his commission available 
to assist political parties in working out the details of any amnesty that would lead to full 
disclosure, combat violence and start the process of reconciliation.”99  This already hints 
at the idea of amnesty for information. Mallinder suggests that “this appears to be the first 
occasion where an individualised process in which amnesty was offered in exchange for 
truth was suggested in South Africa, although at this moment it was suggested to deal with 
ongoing violence rather than crimes of the past.”100 However, media coverage of the Harms 
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Commission also identified the inability to offer amnesty as a hindrance to witness 
participation for fear of self-incrimination.101 Undoubtedly, the credibility of the Goldstone 
Commission’s operation as discussed in Chapter 7 increased the legitimacy of the 
discussion with the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and 
Intimidation. 
 The fourth interim report of the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public 
Violence and Intimidation, at the end of 1993, marks another turning point in the amnesty 
debate. This report revealed evidence that the Commission had uncovered on a hit squad 
operating in the KwaZulu Police (KZP) Force. The evidence pointed to the connection 
between the SAP, the KZP, and the hit-squad allegations.102  
 Under the transitional administration structures, the Transitional Executive Council 
(TEC) established a Task Force to investigate the hit squad allegations. Within this task 
force, a further request for an amnesty in exchange for information is identified. The 
Preliminary Report of the TEC Investigation Task Group, released in December 1993, 
states that a request was made to the TEC “that a provision be made for the indemnification 
of witnesses or informants where the information supplied would lead to a reduction in hit 
squad activities but would expose the informant to a criminal prosecution.”103 However, 
periodical reports in February 1994 illustrate that the decision had yet to be made:  
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The TEC says it will consider granting indemnity to people who are prepared to give 
evidence on alleged hit squads in the KwaZulu Police. The matter will be discussed 
with the Goldstone Commission and the task group appointed by the TEC is 
preparing a report on the alleged hit squads.104  
 
There was no agreement on amnesty, despite the recommendation, and having few, if any, 
other means to facilitate participation by those who would have been able to advance the 
investigations.105 This is also particularly interesting, because the Interim Constitution had 
been published in the Government Gazette at the end of January in 1994.106 This suggests 
that the agreement was secured and the prospects of the amnesty after the transition, while 
not outlined in detail, were protected. As du Toit points out, “when the amnesty issue 
resurfaced, as in Justice Goldstone’s revelation to President De Klerk of high level SA 
Security Police involvement in ‘Third Force’ operations in February 1994, no reference 
was made to the possible relevance of the amnesty agreement.”107 The purpose here is not 
to explain why the agreement did not emerge. Rather, the focus is on the change that the 
institution of amnesty itself underwent. These considerations at the Goldstone Commission 
are important in tracing the conversion within the institution. As Terris articulates, “for the 
moment, then, Goldstone’s August 1992 suggestion went nowhere. Three years later, 
however, amnesty would return as a major feature of South Africa’s Truth and 
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Reconciliation Commission.”108 An analysis into the political environment helps to 
theoretically situate the emergence of the changing potential goals for amnesty.  
 The requests for amnesty/indemnity by the institutions investigating the state’s 
involvement in hit squads emerged during the constitutional negotiations, after the earlier 
indemnity processes had been established. The discontent with the Further Indemnity Act, 
1992 and a seeming hesitancy towards further amnesties suggests that the context of the 
request helps to explain the lack of institutional deployment. In particular, the deployment 
of information-gathering amnesties needs to be understood in the context of contentious 
negotiations and transitional administrative structures (through the Transitional Executive 
Council). Although information-gathering had been a substantial justification for amnesty 
in the TRC’s truth-seeking process, and despite the credibility that the Goldstone 
Commission had developed, the eventual deployment of amnesty to facilitate information 
gathering rested on the legitimacy of the post-transitional environment. 
 Whereas the  Government, with the support of negotiating parties, established the 
Goldstone Commission to investigate and report on the causes of violence in the hopes of 
curbing it, the democratically elected government established the TRC with the goals of 
promoting “national unity and reconciliation.”109 However, it was the Goldstone 
Commission’s focus on ongoing violence that is used to justify the value of the 
indemnity/amnesty. As the 1993 preliminary Task Force posited:  
It has become evident that persons who have been implicated in such activity are 
willing to provide evidence to the Task Group and/or to the Goldstone Commission 
and that such information would lead to the prosecution and exposure of persons who 
co-ordinate these activities in Natal… It should be stressed that this measure, which 
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is envisaged will be a highly selective indemnification process, would strengthen all 
those mechanisms currently charged with the task of preventing violence and 
intimidation such as the Goldstone Commission.110 
 
With this framing, the decision not to adopt these measures is important because it suggests 
that the application of a contentious tool of information gathering, at a time fairly close to 
the election, could not necessarily be agreed upon by the multi-party TEC. The Interim 
Constitution had not yet taken effect, meaning that the Postamble in the Interim 
Constitution that contained the amnesty provisions was not yet in force.111 
 In this context, the potential for parties to block change can be characterized as ‘high’ 
since the TEC operated based on relative consensus.112 Furthermore, as discussed further 
below, amnesty has been identified as a ‘deal-breaker’ in the transitional negotiations. The 
persistence of disagreement about the issue and its inclusion very late in the process 
demonstrates the difficulty in reaching agreement about it. In this way, the change in 
environment and institutional parameters after the transition facilitated the eventual change 
in the deployment of amnesty and its associated goals. But, the Goldstone Commission 
arguably also influenced another dimension of these parameters in terms of the recognition 
of the potential benefit of using amnesty in this way.  
 The discussions by the Goldstone Commission and the reports of the Goldstone 
Commission influenced the environment in another way. The information uncovered by 
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the Goldstone Commission demonstrated the need for further investigation. Goldstone 
writes, for example, “it is generally accepted that the revelations of the Goldstone 
Commission, particularly those implicating the South African Police and the military, made 
it more difficult for de Klerk to resist the ANC demand for some form of accounting.” 113 
These investigations reiterated that there was information to glean from the state’s security 
forces.114 The credibility of the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public 
Violence and Intimidation connects here too, for impartial investigations could be used to 
justify further information-gathering or truth-seeking measures.  
 The agreement to amnesty, established in the Interim Constitution of 1993, 
necessitated some structure for its facilitation after the transition. The TRC, which had been 
under discussion in civil society for several years, became that tool. During the tenure of 
the Goldstone Commission, however, the political conditions were not conducive to further 
institutional change as they had been after the transition. The Commission of Inquiry  for 
the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation recognized the need and potential value 
of amnesty-in-exchange-for information given the information that it uncovered. The 
conditions were more conducive to change after the election with the Government of 
National Unity after agreement to the amnesty clause in the Interim Constitution. The 
institution of indemnity/amnesty persisted throughout the 1990s, albeit with different 
goals. After the election, the conditions were favourable to change once more, and the final 
outcome of the conversion process is evident.  
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 As du Toit reminds readers, the ANC’s position since 1992 had been that an amnesty 
could not be considered except by a democratically elected government.115 Veto points 
were thus lower after the election, as transitional interests were more stable given the 
entrenchment of some measure of amnesty in the Interim Constitution. The inclusion of 
amnesty in the Interim Constitution meant that the deliberations about the institution 
moved away from if it would be secured to considerations of how it would be enacted. 
These dynamics opened the space for what Thelen calls “political renegotiations” about 
the institution itself given the political changes.116 Considering the eventual re-deployment 
of amnesty through the TRC, the deliberations and investigations of the Goldstone 
Commission are important precursory elements in tracing the shift in the institutions’ 
purpose. 
 It is important to consider that the relationship between ‘truth’ and ‘amnesty’ had 
been ongoing during the negotiations. du Toit outlines the general trajectory of the 
discussion arguing that the value of truth and information was used as a counterpoint to the 
provision of general or blanket amnesties but also recognized as potentially coterminous 
features of the transition.117 He also suggests that there was a disconnect between the 
ongoing public debate about truth and amnesty and the private discussions of the 
constitutional negotiations.118 
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9.4 The Amnesty Process and the South African TRC  
The inclusion of amnesty in the Interim Constitution stemmed from state-security forces’ 
threats of destabilization in light of potential prosecution.119 The amnesty component of 
the negotiations threatened to prevent an agreement to the Interim Constitution until the 
very end; the amnesty agreement was added to the Interim Constitution as a postamble.120 
The inclusion of the amnesty clause in the interim constitution, on which the TRC mandate 
based the approach to amnesty, was intended in part to “ensure that security forces would 
protect the result of the first democratic election and the black majority rule government 
against possible right-wing or security force attempts to overthrow it.”121 Thus, while the 
rationale for the amnesty arrangement continued the negotiated bargain, the mechanism 
through which this 1993 agreement was later to be facilitated demonstrated a shift in the 
justification for amnesty. Paul van Zyl characterizes the TRC as “an attempt to restore 
moral equilibrium to the amnesty process.”122 Tying amnesty to questions of justice and 
truth-seeking once again shifted the institution’s purpose.  
 The TRC became the vehicle for amnesty after the 1994 election in South Africa. 
The decision to adopt a truth commission reflected the earlier negotiations.123 The 
provision to grant amnesty in the mandate of the TRC is one of the unique features of the 
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South African process. Particularly, the notion of a conditional amnesty, and not a blanket 
amnesty, required the development of processes and protocols to facilitate applications, 
disclosures, and decisions in order to determine who would be granted amnesty.124 The 
“conditionality” of the amnesty, that is the provision of amnesty when the criteria of 
sufficient disclosure for crimes of a political nature was met, was a means through which 
amnesty could be individualized.125 This individualizing attempted to structure a non-
blanket approach to amnesty.  
 In light of the compromise on amnesty, amnesty itself is framed as a measure to 
achieve the objectives of the bill establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
specifically “to promote national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which 
transcends the conflicts and divisions of the past.”126 With respect to amnesty, a specific 
function of the commission was to: 
facilitate and promote the granting of amnesty in respect of acts associated with 
political objectives, by receiving from persons desiring to make a full disclosure of 
all the relevant facts relating to such acts, applications for the granting of amnesty in 
respect of such acts, and transmitting such applications to the Committee on Amnesty 
for its decision, and by publishing decisions granting amnesty, in the Gazette;127 
 
The Amnesty committee was established to facilitate these provisions. The Amnesty 
committee, one of three operational committees of the TRC, worked between 1996 and 
2001.128 The Amnesty committee was initially composed of a chairperson, vice 
                                                
124 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume Six, Section 1, Chapter 5, page 
83. 
125 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume One, Chapter 1, page 7. 
126 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act. 
127 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, Section 4C. 
128Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume One, Chapter 10, 267. Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume Six, Section 1, chapter 4, page 54. 
 
 
267 
chairperson and three representative South African citizens.129 However, two amendments 
to the Act increased the number of personnel resulting, in 1997, in a 19-member committee 
that included judges, advocates, and attorneys.130 
 Individuals could apply for amnesty for crimes of a political nature that were 
committed between March 1, 1960 and May 10, 1994.131 The TRC required individuals to 
apply for amnesty, self-initiating the testimony, rather than just receiving amnesty in 
exchange for testimony.132 Chapter 4 of the National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 
“Amnesty Mechanisms and Procedures” specified the criteria for determining whether an 
act was of a political nature.133 The amnesty process required applicants to submit an 
application, after which the committee would determine whether it met the basic 
requirements for consideration (in accordance with the specified criteria). Applications 
were separated based on the type of crimes under consideration, and applications dealing 
with “gross violations of human rights” had to be heard in public.134 The Amnesty 
Committee reviewed individual applications to ensure that the criteria for amnesty were 
met. 1,167 people were granted amnesty, and 145 were granted partial amnesty. In total 
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7,116 amnesty applications were submitted.135 Only about 2,500 of the 7,000 applications 
submitted met the criteria for crimes of a political nature.136 
 Significant scholarly attention has been focused on the uniqueness of a truth 
commission being given the power to grant amnesty. It was the first time that this type of 
arrangement had been formalized within a truth commission process.137 Assessments and 
critiques of the amnesty process in South Africa are numerous, and this type of evaluation 
will not be reiterated here because of the thematic breadth of these inquiries.138 The 
purpose of the analysis here however is how amnesty itself underwent a conversion process 
through its inclusion in the TRC. The change in amnesty’s purpose is evident by comparing 
the earlier indemnity processes with the expectations of amnesty’s deployment at the TRC. 
 The discussions that preceded (and accompanied) the establishment of the TRC 
legislation focused on the value of the ‘truth’ in the transitional period. This discussion ties 
into amnesty’s re-framing. In his opening speech to the “Healing the Past Conference,” 
Minister of Justice Dullah Omar stated that human rights violations “should be 
investigated, recorded and made known.”139 In outlining the proposed provisions for the 
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TRC, he states that “a pre-condition for indemnity or amnesty is full disclosure.”140 The 
TRC Report highlights the professed value of the exchange of truth for amnesty, suggesting 
that the “individual amnesty has demonstrated its value… freedom was granted in 
exchange for truth. We have, through these means, been able to uncover much of what 
happened in the past.”141 The value of amnesty in exchange for information emerged as 
part of the justification for the amnesty inclusion in the Postamble.142  
 The TRC Report highlights the instrumentality of amnesty in pursuit of truth. The 
Report states that “the amnesty process was also key to the achievement of another 
objective, namely eliciting as much truth as possible about past atrocities.”143 The revised 
justification for amnesty was complex. The narrative that emerged from the TRC’s 
operation focused on the value of amnesty for information gathering purposes, although 
this was a political enactment of the previous agreement in the interim constitution. The 
narrative of the value of truth and information thus supplanted the context of the bargain.144 
As du Toit argues the necessity of ‘truth’ in the context of the transition appeared prior to 
the eventual establishment of the truth commission.145 In 1992, for instance the ANC’s 
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response to its own internal inquiry highlighted the potential value in a truth commission 
that included the state.146 
 That the institution of amnesty became entwined with the idea and value of truth 
helps to highlight the shift in the institutional deployment of amnesty. This redeployment 
illustrates the final goal that amnesty was used for in the time period under investigation in 
this project. With weak veto possibilities under the Government of National Unity, and 
with the amnesty secured, tying amnesty to information offered a middle path in the 
aftermath of the transition. Simpson recognizes that the presence of the parties previously 
in conflict within the government of national unity is important in understanding the 
emergence of the TRC.147 The Interim Constitution and the Government of National Unity 
that followed were guided by continued consensus-based decision-making.148 
Furthermore, despite the recognition of the amnesty agreement, there was relative 
ambiguity in the Interim Constitution about how the process would be carried out. To 
revisit the language, the Postamble stipulated that Parliament would address the means 
through which amnesty would be deployed: “providing for the mechanisms, criteria and 
procedures, including tribunals, if any, through which such amnesty shall be dealt with at 
any time after the law has been passed.”149 This meant that the democratically elected 
government would be responsible for determining what the process, if any, would look 
like. This can be considered, as outlined by Mahoney and Thelen, “a high level of discretion 
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in interpretation/enforcement.”150 Conversion in the long-standing institution of amnesty 
can be explained by the environment in which the truth commission was established and 
the relative ambiguity in the process to facilitate and justify amnesty.  
9.5 Effects on Truth-seeking at The TRC  
The effect of the earlier indemnity processes and the secrecy clauses had longer term 
impacts on the available information about those political crimes that had been committed 
in the past. This section discusses the tensions that resulted from indemnity/amnesty’s 
gradual change over time, particularly because the earlier institutional deployments were 
used to prevent information and investigation. When the institution was redeployed as a 
mechanism of information-gathering, the information gleaned was constrained by the 
earlier institutional goals. While changes to the procedural elements of amnesty in the TRC 
addressed some of the procedural shortcomings of earlier indemnity schemes, they were 
not able to redress the legacy of secrecy. Access to information about the past was limited, 
at least in part, by the earlier indemnity decisions and the access to information of state 
records.151  
 This tension in procedural adjustment and the legacy of past decisions also highlights 
the significant degree of transformation in the institution’s deployment. Here, components 
of change are seen in the effort to transform processes from the earlier indemnity 
committees and the later TRC provisions on issues of transparency, public information 
about the process, and information about the associated political crimes. The committee 
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responsible for amnesty in the TRC was more transparent in its decisions, aided by the 
public nature of proceedings (except when the Committee deemed it necessary for hearings 
to be held in private) and the necessary publication of amnesty decisions.152 As the 
Amnesty Committee report stipulates: 
Where amnesty was granted, the Committee informed the applicant and the victim 
of the decision and also, by proclamation in the Government Gazette, published the 
full details of the person concerned as well as the specific act, offence or omission in 
respect of which amnesty was granted.153  
 
Rather than the secrecy and limited details of the previous investigations, the TRC made 
efforts to ensure that the public had information about the crimes for which it granted 
amnesty. This is significant in light of the value placed on information in exchange for 
amnesty.  
 One example of institutional efforts to increase information gathering was the 
creation of the investigation unit, operating with the Human Rights Committee and the 
Amnesty Committee. It has been characterized as a central component of the commission’s 
work,154 though the capacity to conduct thorough investigations has been criticized.155 The 
intention behind such investigations was to gather more information about particular events 
under consideration by the TRC, including corroborating information in statements and 
public hearings, and investigating details for amnesty applications.156 There was, however, 
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a counterpoint to the emergent information from the structure of this process. As du Bois-
Pedain identifies, investigations were only conducted into those amnesty applications that 
met the criteria upon initial review. As such, those applications for which amnesty was 
denied categorically, were not used as a source to identify further information “for truth-
related purposes alone.”157 However, efforts to corroborate amnesty decisions went beyond 
the previous indemnity legislation, despite limitations in process.158 
 The earlier process also meant engagement challenges. A significant component 
that demonstrates the change between the earlier indemnity processes and the amnesty at 
the TRC is the recognition that those who benefitted from the earlier indemnity provisions 
had little incentive to participate in the TRC. An influential element identified by du Bois-
Pedain and Sarkin is that earlier decisions about indemnities limited the pursuit of truth 
through the conditional amnesties as envisioned by the TRC process.  
 Sarkin identifies that the earlier processes of indemnity altered the “amount of truth” 
that emerged through the amnesty process.159 Framing the analysis this way, Sarkin points 
out that the expectation of information in exchange for truth was limited by the fact that 
many people who could have contributed information to the historical record did not have 
reason to participate in the amnesty process because their records (and sentences) had 
already been addressed.160 du Bois-Pedain suggests, somewhat differently, that those who 
had not been tried or convicted for “gross human rights violations as defined in the TRC 
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Act” still ‘had to approach the Commission to receive indemnity from criminal civil 
liability.”161 Sarkin also identifies that ten people who had been granted indemnity earlier 
sought amnesty through the TRC because those who had been indemnified either did not 
know the parameters of the indemnity or because they sought to have the conviction for 
which earlier indemnity had been granted expunged.162 This number is significant in 
relation to the total number of people who might not have applied for amnesty at the TRC 
because of earlier indemnities. 
 The number of people who benefitted from the earlier indemnity process and early 
release is difficult to identify, but a 1995 report suggests approximately 14 000 people 
applied for indemnity under the 1990 and 1992 Acts, and just over 10 000 applications 
were successful.163 Sarkin contends that “the effect of indemnities on the amnesty process 
must have been dramatic. Unfortunately, the extent of this will never be known.”164  
 While the TRC was envisioned as a means through which information could be 
gathered in exchange for amnesty, the actual reach of the process was somewhat limited, 
despite adjustments in the design of the process in light of earlier experiences. The change 
to the practice is evident in both the mechanics of the institution’s deployment and the 
purpose. The process through which the TRC Amnesty Committee deliberated upon, and 
granted amnesty, was far more transparent than the earlier indemnity processes. The reason 
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for this change was the transformation of indemnity and amnesty from a state protection 
mechanism, to a negotiating arrangement, and finally to an information-gathering 
mechanism.  
 While the amnesty dimension of the TRC is often presented as one of the exceptional 
features of the transition, as du Bois-Pedain and Sarkin illustrate, it also provides an 
example of how earlier institutions and decisions impacted the truth-seeking and amnesty 
processes.165 Building upon this recognition, this chapter has argued that the institution of 
amnesty itself underwent a process of gradual institutional change during early 1990s. 
Tracing these influences provides an example of institutional conversion through the 
transition. This analysis does not address the debate on the capacity or performance of the 
South African TRC’s handling of amnesty. Rather, the focus is on the conversion process 
within the institution of amnesty.  
Conclusion  
This chapter has argued that the process of conversion, as a mode of gradual institutional 
change, helps to explain the persistence of the institution of amnesty and the change it 
underwent in order to be used as a tool of information-gathering at the TRC. The chapter 
recognized the roots of indemnity legislation in the Apartheid regime as a tool of social 
order. It then traced the use of indemnities through the political negotiations to maintain 
the transitional negotiations through to the TRC. Finally, the chapter argues that the goal 
of amnesty changed again with respect to information gathering. As such, amnesty was 
used for at least three different goals within the time period under consideration: public 
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order, bargaining, and information gathering. The persistence of the institution of amnesty 
through the transitional environment is explained by its gradual change. The uncertain 
political environment and incorporation of different political preferences after the initiation 
of the transition in 1990 created conditions through which the use of amnesty was 
renegotiated and deployed. 
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Chapter 10  
10 Conclusion 
 
The dissertation answers two related questions. First, what role, if any, did earlier 
investigative institutions play in shaping South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC)? This dissertation argued that the TRC was influenced by the 
development and operation of the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public 
Violence and Intimidation. This commission of inquiry, also known as the Goldstone 
Commission, transformed institutional elements of information gathering that had been 
used by the repressive Apartheid regime. Second, the dissertation answered the question, 
what were the Goldstone Commission’s contributing institutional developments, and how 
do we characterize these contributions? I have argued that the Commission of Inquiry for 
the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation contributed to the institutionalization 
of truth-seeking in South Africa. The operation of the Goldstone Commission illustrates 
gradual institutional change in institutional modalities used for information gathering 
purposes. These institutional changes help to explain the institutional foundations of the 
TRC. Focusing on three institutional modalities of information gathering, I trace the role 
that the Goldstone Commission played in the gradual institutional change toward stronger 
truth-seeking measures. 
To answer these questions. I have presented an argument in several steps. First, I 
outlined the conceptual and institutional challenge of the shared institutional structure of 
commissions of inquiries and truth commissions. I have pointed to the tension that when 
redressing legacies of abuse and past harm, states may have to rely on institutional 
structures that were used to perpetuate harm, even in times of transition. In the South 
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African case, several of the institutional features of the TRC had also been used during 
Apartheid to maintain the Apartheid system. I have explored this tension in relation to the 
persistence of institutional frameworks including the commission of inquiry, witness 
protection, and amnesty that had been used by the Apartheid system.   
Second, I argue that the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public 
Violence and Intimidation did not fall into the same pattern of earlier commissions of 
inquiry that served Government interests and power relations. The founding parameters of 
this institution made possible gradual changes in relatively entrenched institutional 
systems. The Goldstone Commission’s establishment, during the negotiating period, 
acknowledged and attempted to rectify the constraints of the previous institutions and this 
had a lasting impact. I have argued that the adjustments made by the operation of the 
Goldstone Commission laid a valuable foundation for the South African TRC.  
Third, I have demonstrated the ways that the Goldstone Commission redressed 
some of the legacies of the Apartheid investigations in a way that facilitated its own 
credible investigations and also created favourable conditions to establish later truth-
seeking efforts in the form of the TRC.  To develop this part of the argument, I analyzed 
two other information-gathering institutions implicated in gradual institutional change: 
witness protection and amnesty. I argued that each of these institutional modalities 
underwent changes that can be explained as processes of conversion. These changes were 
enabled, in part, by the Goldstone Commission’s operations. The Goldstone Commission 
garnered credibility due to the consensus in its establishment and its impartial 
investigations. As a result of the built-in provisions for adjustment in its founding 
legislation, there was space for the Commission to respond to emergent needs.  
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The Commission recognized the inadequacy of existing witness protection 
measures during its operations. The development of witness protection measures within 
the Goldstone Commission itself demonstrates incremental adjustment in the institution of 
the commission of inquiry based on the limitations of the state-provided structure. Using 
the provisions of the Goldstone Commission, the Commission incorporated witness 
protection within its structures. This strengthened the information-gathering capacities. 
Similar witness protection measures were later used by the TRC. Inclusion in the TRC 
mandate suggests a recognition of the value of this institutional adjustment even after the 
transition.  
Tracing the case of amnesty, I argued that although the institution persisted in its 
use during Apartheid and the negotiations, it was not used for the same purpose throughout. 
I have argued that despite not being used by the Goldstone Commission, 
indemnity/amnesty is still a valuable illustration of how earlier institutional features 
underwent gradual change to be used for information gathering. Whereas amnesty had been 
used to protect state actors under Apartheid, it transformed during the period under 
consideration to a negotiating tool and then to an information-gathering mechanism. 
Although amnesty underwent a significant process of conversion toward information 
gathering and this was used in a novel way by the TRC, the earlier deployment of the 
institution had lasting impacts on its application. 
The process of conversion is evident in each of these institutional modalities. The 
institutions persisted but the transitional environment provided the opportunity for changes 
in their application as the transition unfolded. Significantly, undergoing a process of 
incremental institutional change impacted the truth-seeking mechanisms that followed. 
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This analysis points to the importance of considering institutional histories in 
understanding truth commissions established in transitional periods.  
10.1 Contribution  
The thesis has argued that understanding the design and operation of the South African 
TRC cannot be easily extricated from earlier state-led investigations. The TRC can be 
better understood in light of its predecessor investigations, even if the earlier was not 
intended as a precursor. Read in this vein, this thesis has argued that part of the reason the 
TRC was able to be deployed as it was derived from the important work that was 
undertaken by a precursor institution, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of 
Public Violence and Intimidation. This thesis has offered a novel investigation of the 
lineage of the TRC using historical institutionalism. When analyzed using a framework of 
path dependence and theories of gradual change as has I have done in this project, it is 
possible to trace how institutional modalities changed over the course of the 1990-1995 
period, despite persistent institutional frameworks. The evidence presented here suggests 
an important informative influence in addressing credibility challenges, modifying 
institutional design limitations, and changing goals of institutional practice.  
This dissertation is not arguing that ‘miniaturized’ or ‘quasi’ truth-seeking measures 
necessarily have to precede transitional justice measures. Rather, its innovation is that it 
argues that the experience afforded by a previous regime may warrant further attention in 
the design and implementation of truth-seeking measures. The conditions alter these 
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potentials.1 The case has been made through this dissertation that in the South African case 
particularly, the governance of truth-seeking after transition and upheaval likely benefited 
from the incremental adjustment of institutionalized truth-seeking that was made possible, 
in part, by the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and 
Intimidation’s mandate and emergence as a negotiated component for constitutional talks. 
The conditions under which such adjustments are possible, or the particulars of the 
adjustments themselves, warrant consideration in further research. 
This dissertation did not argue that the implementation of the TRC depended on the 
Goldstone Commission, rather it has argued that the credible operation of the Goldstone 
Commission had important effects on the institutional development of the TRC. This 
dissertation has interrogated how existing institutions, re-tooled, may facilitate information 
gathering. In the South African case, the Goldstone Commission can be made sense of 
through a framework of gradual institutional change because of the history of the 
commission of inquiry in South Africa, the influence of the negotiation period on the 
Commission’s design, and the operation of the Commission itself.  An important 
contribution of this dissertation is the recognition that the persistence of institutional 
structures plays an important role in how transitional justice institutions are implemented. 
Further, the possibility that it may be these very institutions that are redeployed for truth-
seeking, as transitional justice measures, gives insight into what measures can be taken in 
the building and design of transitional justice institutions to mitigate reversion or continuity 
of the status-quo.   
                                                
1 On the significance of conditions and the potential impacts see, Samar El-Masri, Tammy Lambert, and 
Joanna R. Quinn, eds., Transitional Justice in Comparative Perspective: Preconditions for Success 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2020). 
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There is significance in the recognition that truth-seeking measures may be influenced 
by a process of gradual institutional change. It highlights that the existing institutional 
structures are difficult to remove. The path dependent nature of certain institutional features 
may both constrain and enable transitional justice. In addition, in South Africa even in 
contentious and uncertain periods, there was the potential for meaningful change within 
the confines of the old regime. Once this gradual change was initiated, it affected longer-
term truth-seeking. This potential for change is relevant for settler-colonial societies or 
other post-colonial societies that grapple with questions of justice and redress in 
institutionally entrenched political systems. 
This project also makes a contribution in its empirical and theoretical evaluation of the 
Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation. This 
investigative body played an important role in the transitions and negotiations and has been 
under-assessed. As Fanie du Toit points out, the relative smoothness of the elections and 
aftermath in the TRC has supplanted attention from developments in the peace negotiations 
and the National Peace Accord.2 This Commission offers important insights into the value 
of violence investigations that may not be included within the transitional justice lexicon. 
10.2 Findings and the literature  
 
The findings speak to the existing literature on truth commissions in several ways. This 
project engages with the literature on the design and implementation of truth commission 
                                                
2 Fanie du Toit, "A Broken Promise? Evaluating South Africa’s Reconciliation Process Twenty Years On," 
International Political Science Review 38, no. 2 (2017): 173. 
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processes and attempts to discern best practice.3 Scholars have focused important attention 
on the applicability of transitional justice mechanisms to local needs.4 It participates in the 
conversation with respect to how specific institutional modalities may apply in certain 
contexts and suggests that their successful inclusion may depend on how they have been 
used historically. It also contributes another empirical entry point into the “evolutionary” 
dimensions that Beattie recognizes in the development of truth commissions.5 Where 
Beattie focuses on the development of successive iterations of the truth-seeking process 
after the transition in Germany, this project suggests there is also value in exploring the 
relationship between successive investigations even before transition. This research also 
contributes to the conversation on the conceptualization of truth commissions. There is still 
important discussion on the definition and the idea of the truth commission itself. By taking 
as the outcome of interest the South African TRC and suggesting that an earlier 
commission of inquiry played an important role in structuring the truth commission, this 
dissertation speaks to the conceptual challenge of truth commissions and their treatment 
                                                
3 Mark Freeman, Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006); Joanna R. Quinn and Mark Freeman, "Lessons Learned: Practical Lessons Gleaned from Inside the 
Truth Commissions of Guatemala and South Africa," Human Rights Quarterly 25, no. 4 (Nov. 2003): 
1117-1149; Taylor and Dukalskis, "Old Truths and New Politics," 671-684; "Truth Seeking: Elements of 
Creating an Effective Truth Commission." 
4 Laurel E. Fletcher, Harvey M. Weinstein, and Jamie Rowen, "Context, Timing and the Dynamics of 
Transitional Justice: A Historical Perspective," Human Rights Quarterly 31 (2009): 163-220; Wendy 
Lambourne, "Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding after Mass Violence," The International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 3 (2009): 28-48; Lundy and McGovern, "Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional 
Justice from the Bottom Up," 265-292; Millar, "Western Theory and Local Practice," 177-199; Rosemary 
Nagy, "Transitional Justice as Global Project: critical reflections," Third World Quarterly 29, no. 2 (2008): 
275-289. 
5 Andrew H. Beattie, "An Evolutionary Process: Contributions of the Bundestag Inquiries into East 
Germany to an Understanding of the Role of Truth Commissions," The International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 3 (2009): 229-249.  
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within and outside the field of transitional justice.6 This is important because, if, on the one 
hand, truth commissions are treated as isolated measures of transitional justice, separate 
from their institutional predecessors, there is the potential to miss the underlying 
constraints associated with being a certain type of commission of inquiry. On the other 
hand, without taking into account earlier investigations, other attempts at truth-seeking may 
be overlooked, despite their potential value.  
The early work that informs much of the field’s understanding of truth commissions 
is based on institutional structures that were called commissions of inquiry; a clearer 
nominal distinction emerged around the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission.7 This distinction between the commission of inquiry and the truth 
commission matters for how we understand each of these mechanisms. Where Stanton sees 
the potential for a ‘social’ process to emerge from both of these measures, the consensus 
that there is or ought to be a symbolic divergence for particular commissions to fit under 
the banner of transitional justice warrants further clarification.8 Conceptually, the 
dissertation’s tracing of the definitional components between the two institutions, the 
commission of inquiry and the truth commission, highlights the difficulty in making clear 
distinctions between the two, but such a distinction is necessary. This tension is not fully 
resolved in the dissertation but the interrogation of the concepts suggests that there may be 
a temporal element to the discussion; when the truth commission emerged and solidified 
                                                
6 Eric Brahm, "What is a Truth Commission and Why Does it Matter?," Peace & Conflict Review 3, no. 2 
(2009): 1-14; Dancy, Kim, and Wiebelhaus-Brahm, "The Turn to Truth: Trends in Truth Commission 
Experimentation," 45-64; Freeman, Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness, 40-69. 
7 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions 
(New York: Routledge, 2002), 256-262. 
8 Kim Pamela Stanton, "Truth Commissions and Public Inquiries: Addressing Historical Injustices in 
Established Democracies" (Doctor of Juridical Science University of Toronto, 2010). 
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itself (or was solidified) as a symbolic project of redress, its institutional lineage became 
overshadowed by the demands placed upon it. Here, the dissertation helps to articulate the 
value in continuing to interrogate the lineage of state-led investigations.  
 Sitze’s concluding reflections that the field of transitional justice perpetuates 
“necessary silence” on issues that are difficult to reconcile with the theorized values of 
transitional justice also bear further consideration by the field.9 There is not space in a 
project of this kind to take on this issue in its entirety. However, the continuation of the 
colonial-state apparatus, or at the very least, the redeployment of similar such processes 
opens up several lines of questioning, which this dissertation addresses in a small part.  
The field, in its emergence, needed to specify the nature of individual transitional justice 
mechanisms and theorize the justification for particular transitional justice mechanisms.10 
This research participates in the shift away from the normative implications of the field 
towards the use of existing frameworks in other subfields to better understand the 
mechanics of the design, implementation and operation of truth-seeking measures.  
The analysis of the limitations imposed on the transition and the TRC through the 
operation of earlier investigatory bodies and the potential mediating effects thereof 
necessitates an acknowledgment of the continuity of institutions. In addition, delving 
further into questions of lineage and design raises additional points for investigation to 
                                                
9 Adam Sitze, The Impossible Machine: A Genealogy of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (Ann Arbour: The University of Michigan Press, 2013), 251. 
10 Arthur discusses the early discussions about the value of each mechanism, see Paige Arthur, "How 
“Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice," Human Rights 
Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009): 321-367. Kritz outlines the specific mechanisms in Kritz, Transitional Justice: 
How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes. See also, Hayner’s early exploration of truth 
commissions, for example, Priscilla B. Hayner, "Fifteen Truth Commissions —1974 to 1994: A 
Comparative Study," Human Rights Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1994): 597-655. 
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determine how the decisions made during the transitional period evolved over time. This 
type of analysis is also important for the debates on how transitional justice mechanisms 
map onto varied contexts. This research speaks to the idea of context specificity by 
demonstrating the value of domestic gradual institutional change on the institutionalization 
of practices associated with transitional justice. 
Accounting for earlier investigative processes may be a way to assess how elements 
like political will are demonstrated prior to the establishment of a truth commission. Efforts 
to define and measure political will and transitional justice are emerging in the transitional 
justice literature.11 The research presented in this dissertation illustrates that the adoption 
of an earlier investigation, furnished with a broad mandate and resources enabled an 
acknowledgement of violence prior to the transition and the truth commission that 
followed. Engaging with the concept of political will as it pertains to truth-seeking and 
truth commissions prior to, or without, a transition, may be helpful in assessing truth 
commission processes in situations where a transition has not been attempted or has not 
been achieved.12 This is particularly relevant for settler-colonial states grappling with 
redress where institutional structures often remain unchanged.13  
The dissertation also makes an empirical contribution to the literature on 
institutional continuity and change. The analysis offers some insight into the continuity of 
                                                
11 Phuong N. Pham, Niamh Gibbons, and Vinck Patrick, "A Framework for Assessing Political Will in 
Transitional Justice Contexts," The International Journal of Human Rights  (2019): 1-17. 
12 Brian Grodsky, "Justice Without Transition: Truth Commissions in the Context of Repressive Rule," 
Human Rights Review, no. 9 (2008): 285; Hayner, "Fifteen Truth Commissions," 281-297. 
13 On settler colonial harms see: Patrick Wolfe, "Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native," 
Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 4 (2006): 387-409. See also, Jennifer Balint, Julie Evans, and Nesam 
McMillan, "Rethinking Transitional Justice, Redressing Indigenous Harm: A New Conceptual Approach," 
The International Journal of Transitional Justice 8 (2014): 194-216. 
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structures, despite, or because of, their repressive capabilities. While the continuity of the 
structures of the commission of inquiry and truth commissions has been acknowledged and 
investigated, the focus has tended to be on elements of continuity in these structures. Sitze, 
for instance traces the persistence of both the commission of inquiry and the institution of 
indemnity and highlights their continued use without sufficient change to address the needs 
of justice.14 In a similar vein, du Toit queries whether there has been sufficient change in 
state-led investigations in South Africa because of the amnesty agreement.15 However, 
exploring the process as one of gradual institutional change highlights the innovations 
within the institutions during the period under consideration and illuminates different 
degrees of transformation. 
10.3 Implications  
A central implication of this work is a further caution that truth-seeking implements ought 
not be transplanted from one society to the next. While the process of truth-seeking and the 
use of truth commissions in particular has garnered normative favour, insufficient attention 
has been paid to how the truth commission itself can be established. The bureaucratic and 
institutional components that the TRC in South Africa needed in order to operate were 
significant. The actual investigatory modalities that emerged were themselves influenced 
by both the structures that preceded them and the operation of the Commission of Inquiry 
for the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation. This calls into question the 
centrality of the South African case as the ‘model’ on which truth commissions are based. 
                                                
14 Sitze, The Impossible Machine. 
15 André du Toit, "A Need for ‘Truth’: Amnesty and the Origins and Consequences of the TRC Process," 
International Journal of Public Theology 8 (2014): 393-419. 
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The South African TRC may not be replicable without recognition of the institutional 
developments that preceded it.  
This project has identified a specific set of conditions that facilitated the credible 
operation of the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and 
Intimidation, which in turn had an important influence on the TRC. The adjustments that 
occurred between the institutions were based on environmental features, particularly the 
transition negotiation setting, and leadership. However, the governance legacies that 
necessitated institutional change in information-gathering practices must be taken into 
account. More broadly, the implication is that the institutional design of truth commission 
processes is contending with internal and external pressures and constraints. This is not to 
suggest that witness protection programmes, for example, should not be part of other truth 
commissions. If witnesses cannot be protected, either by existing laws or through a formal 
truth commission, critical questions ought to be raised about the viability of a truth 
commission project under such conditions.  
In this way, the study undertaken here demonstrates one way that context informs 
transitional justice efforts. It does so through its explanatory contribution on the 
institutionalization of truth-seeking practice; separating the normative value of truth-
seeking or restorative justice from the potential implications of the context itself on 
structuring and mediating the truth-seeking process. A further implication is the 
recognition that important information gathering can take place before formal transitional 
justice mechanisms are implemented. This has been recognized with respect to the 
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literature on “unofficial truth projects”, but also has impacts on state-led investigations.16 
Context is important in understanding the conditions under which such information-
gathering practice perpetuates the status-quo or whether and how such practices might be 
valuable for later truth-seeking efforts. 
In terms of truth commission evaluation, this dissertation offers a different framing 
that may help to better understand factors that contribute to the strength or weakness of 
truth commissions.17 From a theoretical perspective, it suggests that institutional features 
that affect how truth commissions are designed and operate may be rooted further back in 
time and institutions. Although criteria for more successful truth commissions and factors 
affecting legitimacy are developing in the field, these elements may also be implicated by 
previous experience with similar institutions.18 From an evaluation standpoint, this 
necessitates an assessment of limitations in the design and operation of truth commissions 
to explain success or failure.19 From a practical perspective, if more attention is given to 
the possibility that factors that affect truth-seeking processes are rooted in past institutions 
                                                
16 Louis Bickford, “Unofficial Truth Projects,” Human Rights Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2007): 994-1035; 
Padraig McAuliffe, "Surrogacy and Resistance: Evolving Patterns in Unofficial Truth Commissions and 
Truth Projects," in The Global Impact and Legacy of Truth Commissions, ed. Jeremy Sarkin (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2019), 269-292. 
17 On evaluations see for example: Anita Ferrera, Assessing the Long-term Impact of Truth Commissions: 
The Chilean truth and reconciliation commission in historical perspective (New York: Routledge, 2015), 
17; Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 25; Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies: 
The Impact on Human Rights and Democracy, 8-10. 
18 Angela D. Nichols, Impact, Legitimacy, and Limitations of Truth Commissions (Cham: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2019); Jeremy Sarkin, "Redesigning the Definition a Truth Commission, but Also Designing a 
Forward-Looking Non-Prescriptive Definition to Make Them Potentially More Successful," Human Rights 
Review  (2018): 349-368. 
19 Here, Goodin’s argument that institutional design ought to reflect both the goals of the institution and 
their fit with the broader context of their implementation is particularly insightful. See Robert E. Goodin, 
"Institutions and Their Design," in The Theory of Institutional Design, ed. Robert E. Goodin (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 33-34. 
 
 
290 
and experiences, then there is an increased prospect for making necessary adjustments to 
truth commissions based on these experiences. In practice, the operation of earlier 
investigations themselves may provide insight into how truth-seeking processes may be 
carried out, enabling those responsible for implementation to adjust elements like design 
or timing. 
10.4 Future research  
There are a number of elements that would benefit from further research as a result of this 
dissertation. The institutional focus on the Goldstone Commission in this project narrowed 
the scope. Expanding assessments of the Goldstone Commission and the democratic 
transition from other theoretical perspectives will further understandings of both this 
specific commission of inquiry and the patterns of establishing commissions of inquiry 
during contentious periods.  
One important next step is to evaluate how this process of institutionalization plays 
out in other cases and different conditions. This includes other countries engaged in 
transitional truth-seeking processes but also other mechanics of institutionalization, such 
as the influence of external actors. The process of institutionalization discussed in this 
dissertation is domestic. It also occurred prior to the entrenchment of the transnational 
network of transitional justice scholars and practitioners.20 How the institutionalization of 
truth-seeking is affected by efforts facilitated or accompanied by international pressures is 
an important line of inquiry. It is important because of the adoption of parallel transitional 
                                                
20 Kimberly Theidon, "Editorial Note," The International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 3 (2009): 
295-300. 
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justice mechanisms, and the influence of the advocacy for transitional justice efforts in 
states with varied levels of institutional capacity.  
 A related line of reasoning that warrants further consideration is how truth-seeking 
is institutionalized over longer periods of time and the impact of transitional justice 
mechanisms on this institutionalization. Access to information is a rather understudied 
element or potential output of truth-seeking processes. Whether and how freedom of 
information or access to information laws and implementation are impacted by truth 
commission processes may be a useful indicator that can be used to evaluate the longer-
term institutionalization of truth-seeking measures.   
 Finally, a dimension that has not been covered in the dissertation is an exploration 
of how earlier truth-seeking measures influence the adoption of future transitional justice 
mechanisms. This line of research would be particularly insightful to mitigate ‘all or 
nothing’ responses to transitional justice implementation. With critiques leveled at ever 
broadening mandates, understanding how transitional justice mechanisms may evolve to 
include overlooked dimensions in earlier processes, or emergent shortcomings, may be 
illustrative.21 For example, further understanding of the conditions under which narrow 
iterations of truth-seeking may be implemented successively may reduce pressures placed 
on truth commissions to meet all truth-seeking needs at one time. Such analyses of 
successive Chilean mechanisms of transitional justice are emerging.22 This line of 
                                                
21 On mandates see, Pablo de Greiff, "“Truth without Facts”: On the Erosion of the Fact-Finding Function 
of Truth Commissions," in The Transformation of Human Rights Fact-Finding, ed. Philip Alston and Sarah 
Knuckey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 284-292. 
22 Cath Collins, "Truth-Justice-Reparations Interaction Effects in Transitional Justice Practice: The Case of 
the ‘Valech Commission’ in Chile," Journal of Latin American Studies 49 (2016): 55-82. 
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interrogation is valuable based on the theorized value of truth and assessing the best vehicle 
to access information about human rights violations. 
*** 
The Goldstone Commission played a significant role investigating violence during South 
Africa’s transition from Apartheid to democracy. Its investigations and reports offered an 
impartial assessment of the causes of violence at a time when violence was rampant. On 
certain issues, it was the first time information and evidence was made public by an official 
source. Its credibility was a testament to its leadership and the environment through which 
it navigated its operation. The symbolism and reach of the TRC captured worldwide 
attention. The Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public Violence and 
Intimidation has remained somewhat modest. Its operation and contributions to 
transformation in South Africa ought not be overlooked because it operated prior to the 
democratic elections. Indeed, the Commission of Inquiry for the Prevention of Public 
Violence and Intimidation played an important role in South Africa’s democratic renewal.  
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